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INTRODUCTION
Voices of moderation rarely shift the terms of any discussion, but this is
our goal regarding the debate over school choice. This debate is filled with
numerous claims by advocates and foes alike concerning the impact of
choice on the future of public schools, the academic prospects of students,
and racial and socioeconomic integration. Many of these claims are well
known and equally well exaggerated. Proponents of private school choice,
for example, suggest that choice is a "panacea" for the ills facing public
schools,1 while opponents suggest that it could ruin public education.2 Just
as the claims are becoming quite familiar, so too are (most of) the
participants: On one side stand the teachers' unions and civil liberties
groups who oppose at least private school choice, while on the other side
stand free-market libertarians, religious conservatives, and an already
significant and growing number of African-American parents.3
We believe that many claims regarding school choice miss the mark,
and that they do so because those making them have failed to focus on the
most important stakeholders in this debate: suburbanites, especially
suburban parents. Suburbanites, by and large, are not wild about school
choice, either public or private. Suburban parents are generally satisfied
with the public schools their children attend, and they want to protect both
the physical and the financial sanctity of these schools.' School choice
threatens both. It creates the generally unwelcome possibility that
outsiders-particularly urban students-will be able to attend suburban
schools at the expense of local taxpayers. Choice programs also raise the
possibility that some locally raised revenues will exit local schools as
students leave to attend either private schools or public schools outside of
their residential districts. To the extent that choice may threaten the
exclusivity and superiority of suburban schools, it may also threaten
suburban housing values, which are linked to the quality of neighborhood
1. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 217
(1990) (suggesting that "reformers would do well to entertain the notion that choice is a
panacea").
2. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE LJ. 259, 277-93 (1991)
(arguing that private school choice poses a serious threat to public education).
3. See PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE 17-37, 64-66 (1994) (describing
proponents and opponents of school choice).
4. TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 34-35 (2001)
(describing suburban parents as "fairly satisfied" with their local public schools); Paul E.
Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 47, 56-57 (1998); David A.
Bositis, School Vouchers Along the Color Line, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at A23; see also
Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 32nd Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's
Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 2000, at 41, 57 (noting that a
higher percentage of suburbanites give their local schools a grade of "A" or "B" than do urban
residents).
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schools!5 Like suburban parents, suburban homeowners without children
thus have a strong, self-interested reason to be wary of school choice.
When suburbanites perceive a threat to their schools, they fight back,
and they usually win.6 Consider school desegregation and school finance
litigation. Efforts to integrate public schools came to a fairly abrupt halt in
Milliken, precisely at the point when school desegregation threatened
suburban schools.7 Urban school districts, especially outside the South,
were left to experience the benefits and costs of school desegregation, while
suburban schools remained largely outside of the fight.8 School finance
litigation, meanwhile, never got off the ground in the United States
Supreme Court, in part because it interfered with the same interest
identified in Milliken-local control of schools. 9 What local control meant
in desegregation was essentially the ability of suburban schools to reserve
their seats for neighborhood kids; what it meant in school finance litigation
was the ability of suburban schools to spend unequal amounts of money on
their own schools. School finance litigation has been somewhat successful
on the state level, but, even after court-ordered reform, the general rule is
that states must provide more money for poorer districts, while wealthier
districts remain largely free to devote locally raised funds to local schools."0
We believe that the same dynamic will shape school choice. In fact, it
already has. Most public school choice plans are intradistrict, meaning that
students can choose schools within a particular district but cannot cross
district lines. Even intradistrict "plans" typically do not allow unfettered
choice and instead protect the ability of neighborhood kids to attend
neighborhood schools." Similarly, those states that have interdistrict plans
almost always make participation voluntary or require schools to accept
out-of-district students only when space is available. Most plans also fail to
5. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 1-18 (2001) (arguing that
school quality affects housing values, and that local taxpayers will tolerate property taxes
provided that they are devoted to local schools); William T. Bogart & Brian A. Cromwell, How
Much Is a Neighborhood School Worth?, 47 J. URB. ECON. 280 (2000) (analyzing home price
fluctuations generated by redrawing public school boundary lines in Shaker Heights, Ohio).
6. Their success is obviously related to their political power, which has grown substantially
as a result of post-World War II population shifts away from the cities and into the suburbs. See,
e.g., Marilyn J. Gittell, The Political Agenda of Education in the States, in STRATEGIES FOR
SCHOOL EQUITY 87 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998). For further discussion of this point, see infra
Section I.A.
7. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
8. For two excellent discussions of the impact of Milliken, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 312-17 (1994); and J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO
BAKKE 216-49 (1979).
9. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (holding that
unequal funding of schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause in part because reliance
on property taxes for school finance promotes local control).
10. For a discussion of school finance litigation in state courts, see infra Subsection I.A.2.
11. The same phenomenon that we discuss regarding suburbanites, therefore, also seems to
exist within some large, urban districts, where parents whose children are in good urban schools
fight to protect the schools.
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provide funding for transportation, making traveling across district lines
much more difficult in reality than it appears in theory. It is perhaps not
surprising, then, that very few students attend public schools outside of
their home school districts. 2
Similar geographic constraints are also evident in the two most recent
forms of school choice: charter schools and voucher programs. Charter
school legislation often limits enrollment to children residing in the school
district where the charter schools are located. Those states that allow
students to cross district lines to attend a charter school almost uniformly
give first priority to students living within the district in which the charter
school is located. 3 Similarly, the three publicly funded voucher programs
that exist-in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida-place significant
limitations on where the vouchers may be used. In Milwaukee and
Cleveland, vouchers may be used at private schools, provided the schools
are located within city limits. The Cleveland program, in theory, also allows
vouchers to be used at consenting suburban public schools, but no suburban
schools have volunteered to accept voucher students. In Florida, finally,
vouchers are given to students in persistently failing schools and may be
used at any public or private school, provided that space is available.
Transportation, however, is provided only if students choose a public
school within their home districts. Moreover, the program is minuscule, as
only two schools have "qualified" as persistently failing and thus only
fifty-two students are currently receiving vouchers. 4
Although we hope to resist the temptation to exaggerate, we feel
confident in suggesting that understanding the political economy of school
choice-and particularly the incentives and political power of
suburbanites-is the key to understanding the current and future prospects
of school choice, both public and private. Our central claim is that unless
the politics surrounding school choice are altered, school choice plans will
continue to be structured in ways that protect the physical and financial
independence of suburban public schools. As a result, school choice plans
will be geographically constrained and will generally tend to be
intradistrict. Voucher programs, in particular, are likely to be limited to
urban areas, where parents feel little attachment to neighborhood public
schools and are desperate for relief.
If our central claim is correct and school choice plans continue to be
limited in scope, it is possible to provide a more realistic assessment of the
costs and benefits of school choice. Limited school choice plans will be
neither a panacea for public school students nor much of a threat to the
12. For a discussion of intra- and interdistrict public school choice programs, see infra
Subsections I.B. 1-2.
13. For a discussion of charter school programs, see infra Subsection I.B.3.
14. For a discussion of vouchers, sec infra Subsection l.B.4.
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status quo. Instead, as we hope to show, such plans will lead to, at best,
limited academic improvement, little to no gain in racial and socioeconomic
integration, and little productive competition among schools. This is not to
deny that limited school choice plans have real costs or benefits, but rather
to make the (hopefully) uncontroversial point that those costs and benefits
will be as limited as the plans themselves. The larger and perhaps more
controversial point is that significant gains in academic achievement, racial
and socioeconomic integration, and productive competition are unlikely to
materialize unless choice plans are structured to allow a meaningful
opportunity for poorer students to attend schools outside of their
neighborhoods and outside of their districts.
Although we harbor doubts that such plans can succeed politically, we
do think that some steps can be taken to increase the options available to
students within a choice program. In particular, we suggest that those
interested in long-term change should focus on ways to alter the almost
reflexive attachment to neighborhood public schools. We believe that one
promising way to make progress on this goal is to support the increasingly
popular drive for universal access to preschool. Preschools are not typically
organized on a neighborhood basis and are just as often operated privately.
Our supposition is that if more parents experience a range of government-
funded choices among preschools, this experience could make them more
supportive of programs that offer a similar range of choices among
elementary and secondary schools.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by documenting a
historical pattern in education reform, the central feature of which is that
structural reforms tend to stop at the boundaries separating urban and
suburban school districts, affecting the former and leaving the latter mostly
untouched. We then show that school choice plans conform to this pattern
and explain how the political economy of school choice, if unaltered, will
produce limited school choice plans. Part II assesses the probable impact of
limited school choice plans on racial and socioeconomic integration,
academic achievement, and competition among public schools. We argue
that limited choice plans will have a correspondingly limited impact on all
three factors and suggest that the theoretical benefits of school choice will
never be realized unless choice programs offer a meaningful opportunity for
poorer students to escape impoverished schools. Part III offers suggestions
as to how choice plans might be expanded in politically acceptable ways
and how the politics of choice might be altered.
Before we proceed, two final introductory notes are in order. First, we
recognize that we are painting with a broad brush; that variables such as
race and socioeconomic status, politics, and economics interact in
complicated ways; and that the political dynamics we describe may not
hold true in every locale. In particular, we acknowledge that not all suburbs
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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and suburbanites are alike. Racial and socioeconomic profiles differ among
suburbs and thus among suburban schools. Inner-ring and outer-ring
suburbs are often quite different from one another, with the former typically
more racially diverse and generally poorer than the latter.15 As a result, in
some suburbs, especially those where suburban parents are dissatisfied with
local public schools, there may be less opposition to expansive choice
programs than in others. Notwithstanding these variations among suburbs,
it remains useful and important to distinguish generally between cities and
suburbs, as well as between urban and suburban school systems. Significant
differences in wealth, political power, and school quality typically separate
inner cities and their surrounding suburbs. In addition, local school quality
tends to be a more crucial component of housing values in suburbs than in
cities, giving suburban residents a greater economic incentive to "protect"
their local schools.16 Lastly, many suburbanites select the suburbs precisely
because they wish to separate themselves from urban residents and urban
problems, which presumably predisposes them to oppose efforts to link
urban and suburban schools.'" As we explain, all of these factors, which
generally differentiate suburbs and cities, will determine the contours and
thus the efficacy of educational choice policies.
Second, some readers may wonder why we devote no attention to the
constitutional question of whether vouchers may be used at private,
religious schools. Legal commentators have devoted substantial attention to
this issue, and the Supreme Court is, as of this writing, considering a case
posing this very question. 8 Some voucher proponents argue that legal
uncertainty has seriously hampered the growth of voucher programs and
15. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN
TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICA 169-75 (1986); Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047,
1050 (1996).
16. See generally William T. Bogart, "Trading Places": The Role of Zoning in Promoting
and Discouraging Intrametropolitan Trade, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (2001) (discussing
zoning as a tool for protecting homeowners' investment in public goods such as education).
17. To be sure, the factors that prompt individuals to select suburbs as places to live are
numerous and complex. See, e.g., William H. Frey, Central City White Flight: Racial and Non-
Racial Causes, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 425, 438-39 (1979) (discussing an array of factors that
influence residential mobility); Harry L. Margulis, Household Mobility, Housing Traits, Public
Goods, and School Quality in Cleveland's Metropolitan Statistical Area, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 646,
660, 670-73 (2001) (discussing factors contributing to home-buyer mobility). It is clear, however,
that one factor motivating migration to the suburbs is a desire to separate oneself and one's family
from urban problems, including problems in urban schools. See, e.g., Margulis, supra, at 660;
Kirsten Hoffman, Note, Waterfront Development as an Urban Revitalization Tool: Boston's
Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 471, 471 (1997) (describing a desire
for safer living and better schools as factors fueling flight to suburbs). For a classic account of the
suburbanization of the United States, see generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
18. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23
(2001). For a historical account of the constitutional issues involved, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001).
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that a favorable Court decision will free the hand of cautious legislators,
leading to an outburst of new voucher programs. 9 It cannot be denied, of
course, that a favorable decision might lead to additional voucher programs.
The analysis in this Article, however, suggests that a Supreme Court
decision approving the use of vouchers at religious schools is not likely to
remove the serious political constraints on voucher programs, which will
continue to keep those programs limited in size and scope. That is, we may
see additional programs like the ones that exist in Cleveland and
Milwaukee, but we are not at all likely to see anything close to a universal
voucher program, no matter how enthusiastically the Court endorses the use
of vouchers at religious schools. This does not mean that the Court's
decision will be irrelevant. But it does suggest that a favorable Court
decision will do less to remove the real constraints on voucher programs
than it will to reveal them.
I. SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE SUBURBS
A. The Historical Context
To understand the current political dynamics of school choice, it is
helpful to place school choice in historical context by considering the
character and progression of earlier educational reforms. In the last fifty
years, there have been two substantial efforts to alter the structure of public
education in order to equalize educational opportunities: school
desegregation and school finance reform. Both reforms initially sought to
equalize opportunities by erasing the boundaries, whether physical or
financial, that separated schools and school districts. School desegregation
sought to erase physical boundaries between traditionally white and
traditionally black schools, while school finance reform tried to eliminate
financial boundaries between rich and poor schools by equalizing the
resources available to all schools within a state.20 To a very real extent, both
school desegregation and school finance reform pitted equality of
opportunity against local control regarding student attendance and finances.
Put differently, desegregation and school finance reform often threatened
the concept of the traditional neighborhood school, attended only by local
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
19. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Friedman Disappointed That Voucher Plans Aren't Bolder, EDUC.
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TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at Al.
20. For further discussion of the initial goals of school desegregation and school finance
litigation, see James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 258-72 (1999).
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students and paid for primarily by local residents who could devote as much
money to their "own" schools as they wished.'
From one perspective, school choice-both public and private-is of a
piece with school desegregation and school finance. To be sure, school
choice is nascent by comparison and is capable of promoting goals, such as
increased liberty and efficiency, that have little to do with equity.22 It is
nonetheless fair to say that school choice represents the latest major attempt
to restructure public education in order to equalize opportunities among
students. The core principle of school choice is an equitable one, as school
choice grants poorer students an opportunity-the chance to choose their
own schools-that is now reserved for wealthier students.23 Moreover,
school choice is theoretically linked to school desegregation and school
finance reform, insofar as school choice will succeed in equalizing
educational opportunities only to the extent that it succeeds in limiting local
governmental control over student attendance and finances. The
relationship is quite simple: To the extent that students have the right to
choose their schools, local schools and districts will lose the right to choose
their students and limit their revenues to local schools and residents.
The important question for school choice is whether it will share not
only a theoretical link to school desegregation and school finance reform,
but a practical one as well. In practice, school desegregation and school
finance reform have fallen far short of the ideal of equalizing educational
opportunity. Both school desegregation and school finance reform have
foundered on the shoals of local control-or suburban local control, to be
more precise. Indeed, if one were to conceive of these reforms as a contest
between equality of opportunity and the suburban neighborhood school, one
would have to declare the latter the overall winner. Consider first the
21. School desegregation did not always threaten the neighborhood school; in districts that
were residentially integrated, school desegregation, if anything, was more consistent with the
neighborhood school concept than was school segregation. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down the district's "freedom-of-choice" plan for student
assignments). Where neighborhoods were segregated, however, desegregation would obviously
interfere with neighborhood schools.
22. John Chubb and Terry Moe, in their influential book Politics, Markets, and America's
Schools, essentially make an efficiency-based argument in favor of school choice. See CHUBB &
MOE, supra note 1; see also JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE
MARKET METAPHOR 57-58 (1994) (describing the theory that school choice will force schools
"to increase the quality of education and the efficiency with which they deliver it, or else risk
going out of business" ).
23. Some school choice advocates base their arguments on precisely this point. Two excellent
examples are JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CHILDREN (1992),
and JOSEPH P. VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY (1999). Notably, it is political conservatives-
not typically known for supporting efforts to ensure equality between the poor and the wealthy-
who often advocate school choice as a means of assuring that poor and middle-class parents have
similar choices. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 148 (2001). William Bennett, for example, argues
that "poor parents ought to be able to make the same kinds of choices that middle-class parents
can make for their children." Id.
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example of school desegregation, and in particular the reaction to court-
ordered busing.
1. School Desegregation
After allowing the South to resist desegregation for more than a decade,
the Supreme. Court in 1968 finally ordered Southern school districts to
make substantial efforts to integrate their schools.24 In 1971, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court went further and
approved busing students within a district in order to integrate schools.25 By
the end of 1974, however, the Court had imposed a devastating limitation
on urban school desegregation. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court prohibited
busing between urban and suburban school districts absent unusual and
difficult-to-prove circumstances.16 All-out desegregation would continue
within urban districts, which essentially meant that poor black kids and a
dwindling number of white kids would be bused from one urban school to
another. Most suburban schools, meanwhile, would remain inviolable, out
of the reach of desegregation decrees and out of the tumultuous integration
controversies that wracked cities like Boston.27
Milliken is often identified as the reason why school desegregation
failed to reach suburban schools in Northern and Western metropolitan
areas. Although an accurate assessment as far as it goes, it is important to
recognize that Milliken was not decided in a political vacuum. On the
contrary, Milliken came during a period of intense antibusing political
activity, which began shortly after the Court's decision in Swann. Over the
five years following Swann, the public consistently expressed strong
opposition to mandatory busing in polls, and state and national politicians
worked hard to limit it.z"
24. The Court finally brought down the hammer in Green when it ordered school districts to
take affirmative steps to integrate students, and to do so immediately. As the Court said, "The
burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work,
and promises realistically to work now." Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
25. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
26. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken held that interdistrict relief could only be ordered upon
proof of an interdistrict violation, which the Court suggested might involve drawing district lines
upon the basis of race. Id. at 745. Such proof was hard to come by primarily because residential
segregation between cities and suburbs made altering school district lines that tracked municipal
boundaries largely unnecessary. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DEEPENING SEGREGATION IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 20 (1997).
27. See J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985) (describing the desegregation battle
in Boston); see also WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 213-15, 222 (describing how busing primarily
affected poor whites and blacks and noting that Milliken '"saved' the suburbs").
28. For an excellent overview of the busing controversy, see generally THE SCHOOL BUSING
CONTROVERSY: 1970-75 (Judith F. Buncher ed., 1975), which collects newspaper editorials and
articles on busing decisions and antibusing legislation.
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On the national level, President Nixon blasted busing and defended
neighborhood schools. Nixon campaigned on the issue in 1968 and repeated
his criticism of busing once in office. 29 In March of 1972, Nixon delivered a
televised address devoted exclusively to the topic, in which he again
denounced busing to achieve racial balance. 30 Nixon made his appearance a
few months after federal district court judges in Detroit and Richmond had
ordered suburban districts to participate in metropolitan-wide desegregation
plans.31 The Supreme Court would eventually overturn these orders,32 but in
1972, it appeared to many that suburbanites might be forced to participate
in wide-ranging busing plans.33
In his televised address, Nixon offered a compromise that would
surface time and again in federal and state debates regarding education
reform. He proposed legislation that would prohibit busing to achieve racial
balance, suggesting that such legislation was consistent with the views of
"[t]he great majority of Americans-white and black-[who] feel strongly
that the busing of school children away from their own neighborhoods for
the purpose of achieving racial balance is wrong."34 At the same time, the
proposed legislation would direct additional federal funds to poor, inner-
city schools. Nixon exhorted his television audience:
It is time for us to make a national commitment to see that the
schools in the central cities are upgraded so that the children who
go there will have just as good a chance to get quality education as
do the children who go to school in the suburbs."
The compromise Nixon proposed to the nation was thus quite clear: Kids in
inner-city schools would not be permitted to attend suburban schools, but
they would be entitled to additional support and resources.36
Members of Congress, meanwhile, tripped over each other in a rush to
introduce an array of measures designed to limit busing, ranging from
constitutional amendments outlawing busing to legislation that would
29. GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 242-44 (1978).
30. Transcript of Nixon's Statement on School Busing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1972, at 22.
31. See Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 338 F.
Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
32. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Richmond Sch. Bd. v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S.
92 (1973) (affirming, by a divided 4-4 vote, a Fourth Circuit decision that had overturned the
district court's merger order).
33. ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 247.
34. Transcript of Nixon's Statement on School Busing, supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. It is worth noting that Nixon's compromise proposal ignored the conclusions of his own
Commission for School Finance that such compensatory programs were largely ineffectual.
GEORGE R. METCALF, FROM LITTLE ROCK TO BOSTON: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 144 (1983).
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restrict the ability of federal courts to hear desegregation cases.37 Congress
even considered a proposal to deny gasoline for school buses that would
take students farther than their neighborhood school." Congress eventually
managed to enact legislation declaring that "the neighborhood is the
appropriate basis for determining public school assignments" and
purporting to prohibit courts or federal agencies from ordering the busing of
any student beyond her neighborhood school.39 Although important
symbolically, the legislation had little effect, as courts interpreted it to
allow busing as a remedy for de jure segregation. 0 Congress also passed
legislation that was more effective, though less publicized, which
prohibited federally funded legal services organizations from working on
desegregation litigation.4'
Opposition to busing within Congress was not limited to the traditional
group of Southern conservatives and Northern sympathizers who
reflexively opposed strong efforts to desegregate schools. Instead,
antibusing legislation in the early 1970s was just as likely to be introduced
and supported by Northern moderates and liberals whose constituents were
facing the prospect of busing for school desegregation.42 The measure to cut
off gasoline for school buses, for example, was proposed by John Dingell, a
Democrat from the Detroit suburbs.43 Similarly, Joseph Biden and Birch
Bayh, Democrats from Delaware and Indiana, respectively, each introduced
legislation in the mid-1970s to limit or prohibit cross-district busing for the
purpose of school desegregation. They did so in response to political
pressure from their suburban constituents.'
Dingell, Biden, and Bayh were not alone in seeking to immunize
suburban schools from busing orders." Indeed, although members of
37. For descriptions of the various proposals introduced and considered in Congress, see
ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 247-72; and GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 464-
66 (4th ed. 2001 ).
38. ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 255-57.
39. Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, tit. II, §§ 202(a)(2), 215,
88 Stat. 514, 514, 517 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1714 (1994)).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 394 n.18 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist, v. United States, 429 U.S. 990
(1976).
41. The Legal Services Corporation Act, enacted on July 25, 1974, prohibited funds available
under the Act from being used "to provide legal assistance with respect to any proceeding or
litigation relating to the desegregation of any elementary or secondary school or school system."
Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, sec. 2, § 1007(b)(7), 88 Stat. 378,
385 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(9) (1994)).
42. George Metcalf describes a virtual stampede of liberals rushing to vote in favor of
antibusing measures following an outpouring of antibusing sentiment from their constituents.
METCALF, supra note 36, at 117, 162-63.
43. Id. at 163, 193; ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 255.
44. On Bayh's proposal and political motivation, see ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 263. On the
Biden episode, see METCALF, supra note 36, at 235-37; and ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 272-73.
45. LILLIAN B. RUBIN, BUSING & BACKLASH 6 (1972) (describing how "[m]any northern
liberal Democrats, who until [the early 1970s] had been articulate spokesmen for school
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Congress disagreed on the various proposals introduced to restrict busing,
on the question of restricting busing across city-suburban lines, there was a
large consensus.4" A similar consensus existed outside of Congress. Polls in
the early 1970s consistently revealed strong opposition to busing, with one
Gallup Poll in 1973 indicating that ninety-five percent of those surveyed
opposed busing to achieve integration.4 7 Middle-class communities that
faced the prospect of busing "protested on an unprecedented scale," and
the mass movement taking to the streets in the early 1970s "marched not
under the banner of 'INTEGRATION NOW' but with signs reading
'PRESERVE OUR NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS."' 48 Not only did white
communities oppose busing, but there was little organized support among
blacks for busing.49 Many blacks, like many whites, preferred sending their
children to neighborhood schools to placing them on buses to attend distant
schools.5" It is not surprising, then, that members of Congress could agree
in principle that a better strategy than integrating suburban and urban
students would be to enhance education within urban schools by devoting
greater resources to those schools. This, of course, was precisely the
compromise proposed by Nixon in his 1972 televised address.
Perhaps not coincidentally, this was also the compromise ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court. Three years after the Court prohibited
busing between Detroit city schools and the surrounding suburbs, the Court
approved remedial funding for Detroit city schools. In Milliken II, the Court
held that states could be required to fund remedial and compensatory
education programs in formerly segregated schools.51 What was true for
Detroit became true for a host of other metropolitan areas in the North and
West: Students in urban school districts would be confined to those districts
but would receive additional resources under the guise of "desegregation"
remedies .52
integration, cast their votes for thesc antibusing" measures); Alexander M. Bickel, Undertaking
the Busing Snarl, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23-30, 1972, reprinted in THE GREAT SCHOOL Bus
CONTROVERSY 27, 28-29 (Micolaus Mills ed., 1973) (describing how Northern liberals took the
lead in passing measures that virtually mandated neighborhood schools).
46. See ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 233-78.
47. See THE SCHOOL BUSING CONTROVERSY: 1970-75, supra note 28, at 207, 210, 228, 231.
48. ORFIELO, supra note 29, at 6, 248. For an interesting account of the fight over busing in
the Richmond Unified District-a large, urban district in Northern California-see RUBIN, supra
note 45.
49. ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 248; WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 232-34; Christine H.
Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During
the Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 639-45 (1995).
50. See WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 233; see also METCALF, supra note 36, at 192 (noting
that Detroit's black mayor, Coleman Young, declared after the Milliken decision that he would
shed "no big tears for cross-district busing" and instead demanded equal funding for Detroit
schools).
51. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S, 267 (1977).
52. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 263-64.
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It would be easy, and it may well be accurate, to suggest that the
Supreme Court was influenced by the dominant and widespread political
opposition to busing, especially busing between urban and suburban
schools.5 3 Whether political pressure motivated the majority in Milliken I
and Milliken II, however, is less important for the purposes of this Article
than the fact that political pressure existed. Rather than contradict popular
opinion or political actions, both decisions reinforced and ultimately
superseded widespread political activities designed to accomplish the same
goal. The Court, like state and federal politicians, acted to protect "local
control" of the schools, which in the context of Milliken and interdistrict
integration meant the physical independence of the suburban neighborhood
school.54 The Court's efforts largely succeeded. After Milliken I, lower
courts ordered interdistrict busing in only four metropolitan areas:
Indianapolis, Little Rock, Wilmington, and Louisville.55 In addition to these
court orders, lower federal courts approved a settlement in a St. Louis
desegregation case that involved voluntary interdistrict busing, 6 and a
small number of metropolitan areas in the South were integrated because
the formerly segregated school districts happened to encompass both city
and suburb.57 On the whole, however, suburban school districts received a
pass and were exempted from busing plans.58
It is tempting to imagine that opposition to cross-district busing is a
thing of the past and that suburbanites would now welcome the opportunity
to open their schools to students from poor, urban neighborhoods.
53. Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated as much: "Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection
of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's
guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles of law." Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 814 (t974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a similar but more strident argument, see
Nathaniel R. Jones, An Anti-Black Strategy and the Supreme Court, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 203 (1975).
Jones, general counsel of the NAACP at the time (and later a federal court of appeals judge),
argued that Milliken represented "the sad but inevitable culmination of a national anti-black
strategy" and that it should be "viewed in light of the political climate created by the [Nixon]
administration." Id. at 203; see also WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 222 (suggesting that precedent
supported a metropolitan-wide remedy in Milliken).
54. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 (suggesting that school district lines should be protected
when possible because "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools").
55. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980); Evans v.
Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d
1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
56. See Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984). For further discussion of this
plan, which is currently being dismantled, see infra Subsection I.B.2.
57. Charlotte-Mecklenburg is the most well-known. Others included several large districts in
Florida, as well as the Las Vegas metropolitan area and the Nashville-Davidson County district in
Tennessee. See ORFIELD, supra note 29, at 412 tbl.12-1 (listing metropolitan-wide desegregation
plans); Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80
MINN. L. REV. 825, 832-33 tbl.I (1996).
58. Cf. WILKINSON, supra note 8, at 215 ("With busing [the Court] declared an all-out war,
but then decided that much of the citizenry was not obliged to participate.").
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Tempting, but largely untrue. Although there are signs of progress
regarding attitudes toward racial and socioeconomic integration of schools,
as well as some regional variations, there is little sign that opposition to
mandatory interdistrict integration has abated. In fact, the busing
controversy that enveloped the country in the early 1970s is currently being
replayed in Connecticut, and the sequel is turning out to be a miniaturized
version of the original.
In 1996, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in Sheff v. O'Neill that
de facto segregation violated the state constitution, a holding that
essentially outlawed current school district lines and required the state to
take affirmative steps to ensure that all schools were racially balanced. 9
The Court allowed the legislature to devise a remedial plan. Cross-district
busing would obviously remedy the identified violation, but state political
leaders took this option off the table almost immediately.' Hearkening
back to Nixon's compromise in 1972, the Governor and state legislators
instead proposed to spend more money on racially isolated urban schools
and slowly offer more opportunities for interdistrict school choice.6" Given
the attitude of the Governor and the legislature, it is not surprising that very
few students in Connecticut have crossed district lines to attend school
since the 1996 decision.62 Meanwhile, racial isolation in the Hartford
District-which spurred the suit in the first place-has actually worsened,
while spending in the district has increased fairly dramatically.63
What the national experience with busing demonstrates, and what the
Connecticut experience confirms, is quite straightforward: A great deal of
59. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). For a discussion of the decision and some
of the commentary about Sheff, see James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance
Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529 (1999).
60. The Governor, for example, said a few days after the decision that "[a]s long as I'm
governor, [busing] will not be one of the options." Robert A. Frahm, Court Orders
Desegregation; Rowland Rules Out Busing, Vows To Keep Local School Control; Legislature,
Governor Left To Manage Remedy, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 1996, at Al. For descriptions
of similar reactions by state and local officials, see Ryan, supra note 59, at 566-67 & n.1 17.
61. See Ryan, supra note 59, at 567 & n.119; Jeff Archer, Opposing Sides Agree Conn.
Integration Efforts Need More Money, EDUC. WK., Jan. 10, 2001, at 23.
62. In the 2000-2001 school year, for example, fewer than 2000 students (out of 540,000 in
Connecticut) participated in the state's "open choice" plan, which allows for interdistrict
transfers. Rick Green, Desegregation Effort Called "Dismal": Analysts Say Racial Isolation in
Schools Is Getting Worse, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 7, 2000, at A3 [hereinafter Green,
Desegregation Effort]; Rick Green, Out-of-Town Schools Draw Support; Many Parents Like
Racial Balance Idea, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 20, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Green, Out-of-
Town Schools]. The open choice plan does not currently meet demand for interdistrict transfers,
see Green, Desegregation Effort, supra, and the low enrollment figures are due in part to the fact
that "[flew suburban districts allocate more than a few dozen seats for the program, and many
allocate none," Green, Out-of-Town Schools, supra. An additional 6400 students attend regional
magnet schools, but here, too, demand outstrips supply. See Archer, supra note 61; Rick Green,
Magnet Schools Drawing a Crowd; Demand Is High, but Funding Falls Short, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 22, 2001, at Al.
63. See Robert A. Frahm, Sheff Plaintiffs Back To Prod Desegregation, HARTFORD
COURANT, Dec. 29, 2000, at Al.
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opposition to forced interdistrict integration endures. At the same time,
outside of a few civil rights groups, there is not much organized support for
it. Black parents, who might be the most natural supporters of interdistrict
busing, have always been divided on the issue, with a large number
opposing a policy that forced their children to take long rides to distant
schools. With strong opposition and weak support, it is little wonder that
mandatory interdistrict busing has occurred in very few jurisdictions and
that even voluntary interdistrict busing plans are relatively rare and
uniformly modest.' Put simply, the Supreme Court in 1972 helped halt
desegregation when it reached the suburban border, and very few courts or
legislatures have managed to open that border since. Suburban school
districts have thus been able to remain physically independent of urban
school districts. As the next Subsection describes, they have also been able
to remain financially independent.
2. School Finance Reform
Almost all school finance systems rely on a mixture of state and local
revenue, with localities funding the bulk of their contributions through
property tax revenues.65 Inequalities arise because localities have differing
amounts of property wealth and thus can raise disparate amounts of funding
for schools with similar property tax rates-that is, the greater the property
wealth, the easier it is to raise funds for schools. States make varying efforts
to equalize funding, but the persistence of inequalities, not to mention the
persistence of funding suits, demonstrates that such efforts typically fall
short.
66
School finance litigation began at a time when many civil rights
advocates were growing frustrated with the slow and uneven pace of school
desegregation. Advocates hoped that by attacking funding inequalities, they
would be able to improve the education available to poor and minority
students. Like desegregation proponents, early school finance reformers
essentially proposed a tying strategy. Whereas school desegregation would
tie the fate of white and black students together by placing them in the same
64. For a discussion of voluntary interdistrict integration plans, see infra notes 108-109 and
accompanying text.
65. For an overview of school finance systems, see Allen R. Odden, School Finance and
Education Reform, in RETHINKING SCHOOL FINANCE I (Allen R. Odden ed., 1992).
66. For a discussion of the cause of inequalities and states' responses to them, see U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS To EQUALIZE FUNDING BETWEEN
WEALTHY AND POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1998). See also Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality
Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101, 104-05 (1995)
(describing variations in property wealth among school districts, along with reliance on property
taxes for school funding, as sources of expenditure variations among districts).
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schools, school finance equalization would tie the fate of poor and wealthy
schools together by ensuring equal access to resources.67
The Supreme Court put an early end to school finance litigation in the
federal courts by ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez that unequal school funding schemes do not violate the U.S.
Constitution.' Despite the early blow it inflicted, Rodriguez did not end
school finance litigation but redirected it. Advocates turned their attention
to state constitutions and state courts, where they have experienced mixed
results. Since 1974, litigants have challenged the finance schemes in over
forty states, and nearly twenty state supreme courts have declared their
respective school funding programs unconstitutional.' 9 Prior to 1989, those
challenging school finance systems primarily sought equalization of
resources.7" Since 1989, however, adequacy-based challenges have largely
supplanted equality-based claims. Most litigants now contend not that all
students are entitled to the same resources, but rather that all students
should receive the funds necessary to finance an adequate education. 7
Much has been and could be said about these cases. 2 For our purposes,
two features of this litigation bear emphasis. The first has to do with the
remedies that have been provided, and the second has to do with the
changing nature of the claims that have been brought. As for the remedies,
the most remarkable feature of school finance litigation is that even
successful challenges have not led to equal funding, nor have any of the
suits done much to alter the basic structure of school finance schemes.73
Indeed, only two states-Nevada and Hawaii-have finance systems that
could be described as providing equal funding to all districts, and Hawaii
hardly counts given that there is only one school district for the entire
state.74 Inequalities caused by differing property values thus continue to
67. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 259-60. See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educational
Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical
Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REv. 543, 553-57 (1998) (discussing how
school desegregation and finance litigation share critical structural aspects); Ryan, supra note 59,
at 563-64 (same).
68. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. For descriptions of, and citations to, the cases, see Ryan, supra note 20, at 266-69 &
nn.70-86.
70. See Enrich, supra note 66, at 121-40; Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave ": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1152-53
(1995).
71. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 268-69 (describing the shift in theories and pointing out that
not all cases since 1989 have shifted from equity to adequacy claims).
72. For an excellent overview of the cases and discussion of the commentary, see Enrich,
supra note 66.
73. There is a good deal of disagreement in the literature regarding the precise impact of
court decisions on school funding. See Heise, supra note 67, at 585-628. There is no
disagreement, however, regarding the central point made in the text: No school finance suit has
led to equalized funding among school districts in any state.
74. For a discussion of Hawaii's finance scheme, see John A. Thompson, Notes on the
Centralization of the Funding and Governance of Education in Hawaii, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 286
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20592002]
The Yale Law Journal
exist in nearly every state, even in those states whose courts have ordered
equalization.75
The reason is not hard to fathom. In order to equalize funding,
legislatures would have to do one of two things: Raise all districts to the
level of the highest-spending ones, or bring districts down to a specified
level and essentially cap any spending beyond that level. The first option is
financially impractical in most states.76 The second option is financially
possible, but it is so controversial that it is politically infeasible."
The controversy stems from the fact that equalizing funding by
controlling local spending requires a cap on local spending or the
recapturing of some locally raised revenues. Neither measure is politically
popular, to say the least. Local citizens, and especially parents, do not like
to be told that they cannot raise and spend local revenues on their own
schools.7" They especially dislike the idea that locally raised revenues might
be recaptured and redistributed to the rest of the state.7 9 Indeed, in places
like Texas, Kansas, and Vermont, recapture plans-dubbed "Robin Hood"
schemes-have provoked continued and intense political squabbling, public
protests, and litigation." Donor districts in Kansas and Texas, for example,
(1992). For a discussion of Nevada, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 26.
Nevada does not guarantee that all districts will have the same funds; rather, in Nevada (and only
in Nevada) all districts can raise the average per-pupil funding amount at the same tax rate. See id.
75. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 2-8; see also Kirk Vandersall,
Post-Brown School Finance Reform, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note 6, at 11,
17-18 (discussing studies indicating little improvement in funding equity during the 1980s,
despite successful school finance litigation).
76. See Enrich, supra note 66, at 156 (noting that "bringing all districts up to the spending or
service level of the top districts would be prohibitively expensive in most states"); Thomas
Vitullo-Martin, Charter Schools and Tax Reform in Michigan, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL
EQUITY, supra note 6, at 115, 121-22 (calculating that it would cost Michigan an additional $7
billion in state aid (which would double state spending) to bring all districts up to the level of the
wealthiest districts).
77. For a discussion of the political difficulties raised by limiting spending or redistributing
locally raised revenues, see Enrich, supra note 66, at 157-59; Margaret E. Goertz, Steady Work:
The Courts and Reform in New Jersey, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note 6, at 101,
111-13; and Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promise and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 88, 108-15 (Jay P. Heubert
ed., 1999).
78. Consider, for example, the recent controversy generated when school board officials
initially refused to let parents in Greenwich Village raise funds to keep a popular teacher on the
staff at a local school; the parents eventually won this battle. See NYC Parents, Willing To Pay
Teacher's Salary, Get To Keep Her, CNN, Sept. 26, 1997, at http://www.cnn.comfUS/9709/26/
teacher.uproar. Consider, as well, the fact that parents in wealthy suburbs have established private
foundations to supplement government funding for schools and to avoid court-imposed spending
limitations. See FISCt-EL, supra note 5, at 156; Richard Rothstein, Assessing Money's Role in
Making Schools Better, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2001, at D12.
79. For a discussion of this point, see William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions
Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by
Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 731, 739 (1992); and
Enrich, supra note 66, at 156-59.
80. For discussions of legislative reactions in Texas, see Albert Cortez, Power and
Perseverance: Organizing Change in Texas, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note 6,
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sued their respective states, contending that the states had taken the
districts' property without compensation."1 Some donor districts in Kansas
even considered seceding from the state.82 In Vermont, protestors purchased
the station wagon owned by the chief sponsor of the finance plan, parked it
near the state capitol, and allowed passersby to demonstrate their opposition
to the plan by sledge-hammering the car
8 3
Given the strong opposition to spending caps and recapture plans, it is
not surprising that almost no school finance systems---even those reformed
in response to a court order-limit the amount that local districts can
raise.' Similarly, very few rely on explicit recapture provisions." States
typically respond to court orders by increasing state aid to poorer districts.86
States usually hold aid to wealthier districts constant or increase it at a
slower rate than aid to poorer districts,87 but wealthier districts are typically
allowed to use their own revenues to spend more than the poorer districts
can afford.8" Providing more state aid to poorer districts while holding such
aid to wealthier districts constant is, of course, redistributive, and it is often
controversial.89 But the controversy generated by this response is nowhere
near as intense as that created by recapture provisions. This is a point that
legislatures will have to bear in mind when and if they determine how to
finance interdistrict school choice plans, as such plans have the potential to
be retail versions of general recapture plans, where local money is diverted
to neighboring districts, private schools, or nonresident transfer students.
at 181; Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 499 (1991); and Sam Howe Verhovek, Texans Reject Sharing School Wealth, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1993, at A12. For Kansas, see FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 120-21. For Vermont, see Joetta
L. Sack, In Vermont's Funding Shakeup, a Bitter Pill for the "Gold Towns," EDUC. WK., Oct. 28,
1998, http://www.edweek.org.
81. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1194-96 (Kan. 1994) (concluding
that recapture did not constitute an impermissible taking of property); Bess Keller, Districts File
Lawsuit Against Texas' School Finance System, EDUC. WK., Apr. 18, 2001, at 26 (describing a
suit filed by "[flour Texas school districts that were forced by state law to share their tax revenue
with poorer districts").
82. See John Augenblick, The Role of State Legislatures in School Finance Reform: Looking
Backward and Looking Ahead, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note 6, at 89, 98.
83. See Sack, supra note 80.
84. See Augenblick, supra note 82, at 93 (noting that "Colorado and Washington are among
the very few states that place limits on how much revenue school districts can choose to raise on
their own").
85. See id.; Enrich, supra note 66, at 158; McUsic, supra note 77, at 111; see also Gittell,
supra note 6, app. 1, at 70-83 (listing legislative school finance reforms current to 1997).
86. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 20-29 (discussing state efforts at
equalization); William N. Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano,
16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 12 (1997) (concluding from a study of litigation and
legislative responses that "[c]ourt-ordered reform reduced inequality by raising spending at the
bottom of the distribution while leaving spending at the top unchanged").
87. Evans et al., supra note 86, at 12.
88. Enrich, supra note 66, at 158.
89. The long-running controversy in New Jersey is probably the most well-known example.
For an insightful discussion of the school finance saga in that state, see Goertz, supra note 77,
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The second, related feature of school finance litigation worth
emphasizing is the transition in litigation strategies from equalization
claims to adequacy claims. Legislators are not the only ones to have
recognized the political difficulty in equalizing resources. Advocates have
as well, and they have generally altered the goal of school finance litigation.
Instead of seeking equal funding or equal access to resources, most school
finance suits now seek sufficient resources to fund an adequate education?
A number of considerations prompted the switch in strategies and
goals, including the fact that strict equality of resources could actually harm
some urban districts, whose property values are higher than the state
average9 It seems clear, however, that one important consideration was
political. Seeking adequate instead of equal resources is politically less
controversial, as it does not raise the specter of leveling down through
spending caps or recapture provisions. Adequacy arguments are thus "less
threatening" than equality arguments because they do not interfere with
local control over resources or the ability of wealthy districts to retain a
92superior position. Perhaps because they are less threatening, adequacy
suits have proven more successful in court than have equality suits.93
Even successful adequacy suits, however, presuppose that existing
funding inequalities will remain. More precisely, adequacy suits abandon
the idea of tying districts together financially by requiring access to equal
resources. Those districts that can fund a more-than-adequate education are
free to do so. While not all of these districts are in the suburbs, the vast
majority are. The progression of school finance suits has thus paralleled the
progression of desegregation suits, in that both reforms have preserved the
boundaries between urban and suburban districts. Indeed, the parallel
between adequacy suits and Milliken II relief is quite striking: Both channel
resources to poor, often urban, districts while protecting the independence
and sanctity of wealthy, usually suburban, districts.
The desegregation and school finance experiences, we suggest, offer
some important insights into the prospects for school choice plans, both
public and private. It seems clear from the experience with desegregation,
stretching from the busing crises to the Sheff decision, that suburban
districts and their legislators can be expected to resist any attempt to join
them forcibly with urban districts. One would therefore expect that most
suburban districts would oppose any choice plan-be it public or private-
that requires suburban schools to accept interdistrict transfers. Such a plan
90. See Heise, supra note 70, at 1162-66; Ryan, supra note 20, at 268-69.
91. See Heise, supra note 67, at 579-84.
92. Enrich, supra note 66, at 168-69; see also McUsic, supra note 77, at 119 (arguing that
adequacy claims have "political" advantages over equality claims, including the fact that
"[u]nder adequacy claims, [wealthy] districts remain free to exploit their local property wealth in
pursuit of educational excellence").
93. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 268-69.
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would be little different from a one-way mandatory interdistrict busing
plan. At the same time, efforts to reform school finance suggest that it will
be politically difficult to force localities to use local revenues to fund
interdistrict choice plans, as such plans would be functionally similar to
recapture provisions that require the redistribution of locally raised school
revenues.94 The dynamics of school finance reform and the politics of
desegregation thus suggest that local districts will rarely be forced to accept
outsiders or to divert local revenues to private schools or schools outside of
their districts. This will obviously limit the options available to students.
Taken together, then, experience with school desegregation and school
finance reform suggests that school choice plans are likely to be fairly
limited in scope and ambition. Politically, school choice seems most likely
to succeed when it is confined to districts where there is not a great deal of
attachment to neighborhood schools, which is most likely to be true in
urban districts where neighborhood schools are not very good. Even within
urban districts, however, there may be opposition to school choice if some
neighborhood schools are much better than others. The dynamic between
suburban and urban districts that we describe thus may also exist within
some urban districts, making widespread intradistrict choice plans
politically difficult to adopt and implement there. Any effort to extend
choice beyond a particular district or to include private schools will be even
more difficult politically, in large part because such plans threaten (or will
be perceived to threaten) suburban schools. What we should expect to see,
in short, are scattered, geographically constrained choice plans in urban
areas with a large number of inadequate schools. What we should not
expect to see, unless some significant political changes occur, are statewide
or even robust regional choice plans. Although school choice is in what one
could call the toddler years, the emerging pattern conforms to these
expectations.
B. The Shape of School Choice
Formal school choice plans come in four main varieties: intra- and
interdistrict public school choice, charter schools, and voucher plans.
Although vouchers for private schools generate the most controversy and
have attracted the most attention, they represent a tiny portion of the
existing school choice universe. Most school choice currently occurs among
public schools. Moreover, within the realm of formal public school choice
plans, most students choose among schools within one district. The largest
94. Cf. Vitullo-Martin, supra note 76, at 122 (arguing that, "in political reality," the state
could not force local districts to pay the costs of out-of-district students attending local charter
schools).
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school choice "program," of course, is not formalized at all, but rather
occurs when parents select where to live based on the quality of public
schools in a residential area.9" The existence of this type of school choice,
which by conservative estimates encompasses at least twenty-five percent
of public school students, is widely recognized but rarely discussed.' The
fact that such a large number of parents-including the overwhelming
majority of well-to-do parents-have already exercised a form of school
choice, however, is a crucial starting point in understanding the shape of
current school choice plans as well as the political dynamics surrounding
proposals to expand school choice.
1. Intradistrict Public School Choice
The next most popular form of school choice, after what could be called
residential school choice, allows students to attend a nonneighborhood
school within a single school district. Approximately four to five million
students are involved in intradistrict choice plans. 97 Although this number
dwarfs the number of students involved in other types of school choice, it
still only encompasses approximately eight percent of all public school
students.98 Even this relatively modest figure may give a misleading
impression regarding the degree of choice made available in intradistrict
plans, most of which are designed to protect the neighborhood school.
There are three types of intradistrict plans. By far the most popular
offers students the opportunity to attend one or more specialized schools
within a district. These schools tend to offer alternative or accelerated
programs and often use selective admission criteria. Famous examples
include the Boston Latin School, Bronx Science, and Lowell High School
in San Francisco.99 In addition, a number of districts have created magnet
schools to foster voluntary racial integration."° Like traditional alternative
schools, magnet schools typically offer specialized programs or curricular
95. Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare
as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 506 n.34 (1999).
96. For an exceptional discussion of residential school choice, including discussion of the
estimated number of families exercising such choice, see Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D.
Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY 13, 14-17 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
97. Id. at 17; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ISSUE
BRIEF No. IB-9-96, PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS, 1993-94: AVAILABILITY AND STUDENT
PARTICIPATION 2 (1996) (providing other relevant statistics).
98. Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 32 n.8.
99. See id. at 18.
100. One study reports that 1.2 million students attended magnet schools in 1991, most of
them within their home districts, most of which were urban districts. Rolf K. Blank et al., After 15
Years: Magnet Schools in Urban Education, in WHO CHOOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE,
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 154, 157-58 (Bruce Fuller &
Richard Elmore eds., 1996).
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themes. Because they are designed to encourage racial integration, they
often employ racial balance criteria in selecting students.' Although
specialized or magnet schools obviously increase the public school options
available to students and parents, these programs do nothing to alter the
traditional organization and structure of public schooling: The default in
these districts is that students are assigned to neighborhood schools. This
default further suggests that there may be resistance to widespread choice
plans even within urban districts, especially if those districts are
residentially segregated by race and income and feature schools that range
in quality.
A more far-reaching but much less prevalent type of intradistrict choice
plan requires all parents within a district to select a school for their children.
Students are not assigned to neighborhood schools, and there is no
guarantee that parents who choose a neighborhood school for their children
will receive their first choice. Parents typically list several choices among
district schools, and school officials then make the final assignments,
usually with an eye toward creating racially or socioeconomically
integrated schools."0 2 While confined to single districts, these controlled
choice plans are nonetheless fairly radical in their departure from the
traditional neighborhood assignment plan. They are also, probably for that
reason, quite rare. Developed first in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1981,
such plans currently exist in little more than a handful of districts
nationwide." 3
Rounding out the intradistrict picture are districts that allow for
individual student transfers out of neighborhood schools. These programs
can either be formalized, such as the one in New York City, or remain fairly
informal, with principals of neighborhood schools retaining a good deal of
discretion as to whether to accept nonneighborhood students.'04 In either
case, first priority is given to neighborhood children. In New York, for
example, students are allowed to choose any public school, but cross-
community transfers are allowed only when space is available. Given that
most public schools in New York are already overflowing with
neighborhood kids, there is usually no space for outsiders, rendering school
choice in this context more theoretical than real for the overwhelming
majority of New York public school students.'05
101. Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 18. For an analysis of the constitutional
dimensions of racial ceilings in the education context, see Michael Heise, An Empirical and
Constitutional Analysis of Racial Ceilings and Public Schools, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 921
(1993).
102. For a discussion of these "controlled choice" plans, see HENIG, supra note 22, at 111-
12; KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 116-30; and VITERITTi, supra note 23, at 58-60.
103. See HENIG, supra note 22, at 111-12; Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 19.
104. See Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 20.
105. See id.
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2. Interdistrict Public School Choice
A large gap between theory and reality also plagues interdistrict choice
programs. These programs come in two varieties: statewide open
enrollment plans and more targeted urban-suburban choice plans created to
foster racial integration. Neither type of plan has led to much movement
across district boundaries. Indeed, despite what might seem like a large
number of programs, the number of students participating in interdistrict
choice is minuscule. As of 1993, only about 200,000 students nationwide
were involved in such plans; that figure represented less than one-half of
one percent of all public school children. Although growing rates of
participation have since been reported in various states, the figures remain
tiny and suggest that participation is still limited to less than one percent of
all public school students." 6 A closer look at the open enrollment and
urban-suburban choice plans reveals several structural limitations that help
protect the autonomy of suburban districts and simultaneously depress
participation rates.
On paper, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have open
enrollment plans, which ostensibly allow students to attend any school
within the state."°7 Minnesota began this trend in the late 1980s and has
since been followed by seventeen other states, most of which created their
plans in the early 1990s."0 8 Despite the promise of open enrollment
statewide, a number of formal restrictions and practical obstacles limit the
options available to students. The most important restriction, at least for
purposes of this Article, is that participation in most state plans is at least
partially optional.
Local districts in all but four states can decide whether or not they wish
to participate as receiving districts; fewer states (but still a majority) allow
districts to control exit from as well as entry into the district. " All plans,
moreover, give first priority to students living within a desired district to
attend the district's schools. That is, no plans require districts to accept
students unless space is available. " '
From a historical perspective, it is not surprising that the plans are
structured this way. That almost all open enrollment plans are voluntary and
106. The figures in this paragraph are taken from id. at 22, 29.
107. See NINA SHOKRAii REES, SCHOOL CHOICE 2000, at xxii (2000) (listing states).
108. See HENIG, supra note 22, at 112-13. For an excellent description of various states' open
enrollment plans as of 1993, see LOUANN BIERLEIN ET AL., A NATIONAL REVIEW OF OPEN
ENROLLMENT/CHOICE (1993).
109. See BIERLEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at B 1-49; see also Henig & Sugarman, supra note
96, at 21 (noting that in Ohio, where districts have the option of participating or not, "the major
urban school districts have opted not to participate for fear of losing far more students than they
could expect to attract").
110. BIERLEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at B 1-49.
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allow districts to reject incoming transfers is understandable when
considered within the context of interdistrict desegregation. In light of the
intense opposition to mandatory interdistrict integration, it would be odd for
state legislatures to require districts to accept out-of-district transfer
students. It is thus probably no coincidence that the states that require
districts to accept transfer students-Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and
Washington-had limited experience with school desegregation."' In
addition, that all plans, even the few mandatory ones, allow for transfers
only if space is not already taken by resident students is consistent with the
traditional preference for neighborhood schools. Indeed, this feature is
similar to the one that exists in those districts that allow intradistrict
transfers only if space is not already taken by neighborhood residents." 2
These structural limitations obviously reduce the options available to
students. In some states, the majority of districts simply have opted out of
the program." 3 In other states, more districts formally participate in open
enrollment programs, but the fact that districts will nonetheless accept
transfer students only when space is available restricts the actual number of
possible transfers. We have been unable to find data regarding the actual or
reported capacities of districts, so it is difficult to assess with any precision
how many transfer options are available in the various states. It is therefore
hard to gauge whether the remarkably low participation rates are due more
to lack of space or to lack of interest. Undoubtedly space constraints and
personal preferences both play a role in limiting participation, but it is
impossible to tell without more data which factor is more important.
There is good reason to suppose, however, that at least relatively high-
spending districts have an incentive to limit or block the transfer of students
into their districts. As discussed above, school financing is organized by
district, and disparities exist among different districts. Interdistrict transfers
thus pose more complicated financial (and political) questions than do
intradistrict transfers." 4 Although funding schemes for interdistrict plans
111. See id. at B20-21 (Iowa); id. at B31-32 (Nebraska); id. at B41 (Utah); id. at B44-45
(Washington). For more information about the demographics of public schools in these four
states, including in their urban school districts, see Bess Keller, No Strings Attached, EDUC. WK.,
Jan. 8, 1998, at 153, discussing Iowa; Bess Keller, Walking Softly, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at
195, discussing Nebraska; Mark Walsh, Small City, Big Issues, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 254,
discussing Utah; and Jeanne Ponessa, A United Way, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 262, discussing
Washington.
112. See supra Subsection IB,.
113. See BIERLEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at BII (reporting that, in Arkansas, as of 1993,
only 163 out of 319 districts were participating); David J. Armor & Brett M. Peiser, Interdistrict
Choice in Massachusetts, in LEARNING FROM SCHOOL CHOICE 157, 160 (Paul E. Peterson &
Bryan C. Hassel eds., 1998) (reporting that as of 1995-1996, only eighty-nine of Massachusetts's
331 districts accepted transfer students).
114. For an insightful discussion of some of the financing difficulties-as well as some of the
potential benefits-surrounding interdistrict choice plans, see Stephen D. Sugarman, School
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vary in their details, states typically allow state aid to follow the student,
but states usually do not cover the local district's share of school funding.
Because incoming students represent additional costs, receiving districts,
especially high-spending districts, have an incentive to reject transfer
students. Such districts can act on that incentive either by formally opting
out of a state's interdistrict plan or by claiming not to have space available
for transfer students."' The latter option seems readily available, given that
states do not seem to monitor district capacity and instead allow districts
simply to self-report regarding available space." 6 This structure conforms
to what one would expect from the experience with school finance reform:
Local districts are rarely required to spend local revenues on students
exiting local districts or transferring in from neighboring districts.
Even where space is available, additional limitations in most state plans
make exercising choice practically difficult. Most states do not provide
funds for transportation." 7 Parents who wish to exercise choice are
responsible for transporting their children either to the out-of-district school
or to the district boundary lines. Although some states provide
transportation subsidies for low-income students, these subsidies often
come in the form of reimbursements, requiring parents first to pay the costs
of transportation." 8 In addition, not all states require parents to receive
information about the existence of interdistrict choice programs, let alone
the availability of transportation subsidies.1"9
In most states, therefore, exercising interdistrict choice is not for the
faint of heart. Because some districts may have opted out and others may
report no available space, options for parents interested in sending their
children to another district may be limited in the first instance. Where
options remain available, parents who wish to participate in open
enrollment plans must be motivated to learn about those options and have
the time and resources to help transport their children to school. Obviously,
not all parents would send their children to other districts even if doing so
were easier, but clearly the existing interdistrict choice plans are not
Choice and Public Funding, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 96, at
111, 119-21.
115. Cf. Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 21 (noting that "in practice.., receiving
districts can probably block in-transfers they oppose by refusing to acknowledge that they have
space available").
116. See BIERLEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at BI.
117. See id. at B2-3; HENIG, supra note 22, at 225.
118. See BIERLEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at B3 (noting that five states, as of 1993,
reimbursed low-income parents for some transportation costs); Armor & Peiser, supra note 113, at
160 (reporting that transportation subsidies for Massachusetts's open enrollment plan were
available to low-income students through the receiving district).
119. Bierlein and her coauthors report that, as of 1993, seven states required the distribution
of data regarding open enrollment programs; they do not indicate whether those states specifically
required that information about transportation subsidies be included. See BIERLEIN ET AL., supra
note 108, at B2.
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designed to maximize interdistrict transfers. On the contrary, many plans
seem more like gestures toward choice, designed as much to protect local
district autonomy as they are to enhance parental or student autonomy.
Telling proof of this point is found in Minnesota, long hailed as a
progressive pioneer in the territory of school choice. Although Minnesota
has had an open enrollment plan for more than a decade, the NAACP
recently sued the state on grounds similar to those presented in the
Connecticut Sheff case."2' The plaintiffs argued that the de facto racial and
socioeconomic segregation between the city of Minneapolis and the
surrounding suburbs violated the city students' fundamental right to an
adequate education, as guaranteed in the state constitution. 2' The parties
ultimately settled. The settlement requires eight suburban districts
collectively to make 500 seats available for low-income city students each
year for the next four years, and it also requires the state to pay for
transportation costs.'22 One of the striking aspects of this case is that it
highlights the deficiencies in the existing open enrollment plan. Open
enrollment in Minnesota existed on paper, but it obviously was not doing
much to alleviate the racial and socioeconomic segregation between city
and suburban districts. The plan failed in this regard, at least in part,
because the state let it fail: It did not provide any funds for transportation,
and state officials did not require suburban schools to accept inner-city
students.
12 3
Just as the case itself is striking, so too is the settlement. The plaintiffs
initially argued that students in the Minneapolis metropolitan area should
have the option to attend any public school in the region,124 but they
ultimately settled for a modest increase in the existing open enrollment
plan. 2 5 Even this limited increase generated a good deal of controversy,
with community members likening it to "forced busing" and protesting the
120. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 175-77 (discussing the litigation).
121. Id. at 175; see also Statement of Minneapolis NAACP and Parents (Feb. 19, 1999), at
http://cfl.state.rnn.us/naacpO2l9.htm (calling for open enrollment to end segregated, inadequate,
and unequal education).
122. See Minneapolis Pub. Schs., NAACP Settlement Information, at http://www.mpls.kl2.
mn.us/news/newsrelease/naacp5.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
123. See HENIG, supra note 22, at 167 (noting that state officials in Minnesota "have been
very wary about requiring suburban school districts to accept inner-city residents"). According to
opponents of school choice in Minnesota, wealthy suburban districts tended to "exclude low-
income and minority students from nearby cities." COOKSON, supra note 3, at 45.
124. See Statement of Minneapolis NAACP and Parents, supra note 121 (proposing that
parents in Minneapolis and the surrounding suburbs have the right to choose "to send their
children to any suburban school or to any Minneapolis school").
125. In fairness to the plaintiffs, it must be noted that under the existing open enrollment
plan, most students transferring to suburban districts from the city were white, and most of the
students transferring to city schools were minorities. By targeting low-income city students for
transfers to suburban schools, the settlement may help curtail or reverse the segregating effects of
the open enrollment plan. See Anne O'Connor, School Settlement Aims To Reverse Trend Set
Under Open Enrollment, STAR TRIB., Mar. 22, 2000, at lB.
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fact that local school revenues would be spent on outsiders. 26 At the same
time, however, that a settlement was reached at all suggests that there is
some tolerance among suburban districts for at least limited enrollment by
urban students. In these respects, the Minnesota settlement typifies the
limited urban-suburban choice programs targeted to achieve racial
diversity, which constitute the second type of interdistrict choice plan.
Some of these "plans" are not full-fledged plans as such, and do not
claim to be, but rather involve the creation of one or more urban magnet
schools that accept suburban students. There are currently over one million
students in nearly 2500 magnet schools.1 27 Although most of these schools
accept only resident students, some accept out-of-district students as well.
12
1
Interdistrict magnet schools, like their intradistrict counterparts, are
designed to foster racial integration and typically use racial balance criteria
in selecting students, a move that has created both political and legal
controversies. 19
In addition to interdistrict magnet schools, a very small number of
suburban districts participate in programs that allow a limited number of
urban students to attend suburban schools. These include suburban districts
surrounding Boston and Springfield, Massachusetts, Hartford, Rochester,
Milwaukee, and St. Louis. 30 All of the programs, except for the one in St.
126. See Minneapolis Pub. Schs., NAACP Settlement Questions and Answers, at
http://www.mpls.kl2.mn.us/news/news-release/naacp7.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
127. See Blanket al., supra note 100, at 157.
128. We have been unable to find precise figures on enrollment in interdistrict magnet
schools. Given that there are no more than 250,000 to 300,000 students in all interdistrict
programs combined, see supra note 106 and accompanying text, the figure must be below
300,000.
129. Politically, magnet schools are controversial because they cost more to operate and
restrict admissions, taking away resources from other public schools while simultaneously
limiting the opportunities of resident students to attend the schools in order to assure racial
balance. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 128-29; VITERITTI, supra note 23, at 57-58. Legally,
magnet schools are controversial because the use of racial balancing criteria might be
unconstitutional outside of a remedial context. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195
F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding unconstitutional the use of race in assigning students to magnet
schools); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding unconstitutional the use of
race in selecting students for academically elite public schools). The constitutional question
remains unsettled, though given its importance to both grade schools and universities, the
Supreme Court will surely have to address it soon. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of
Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 940 (1999).
130. For a discussion of the Boston and Springfield METCO programs, see SUSAN E.
EATON, THE OTHER BOSTON BUSING STORY (2001); KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 152; and
Armor & Peiser, supra note 113, at 161-70. For a discussion of the Hartford and Rochester
programs, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 151-52. Joseph Viteritti discusses the Milwaukee
program, VITERrIT, supra note 23, at 98-99, and the St. Louis program is the subject of a recent
book, AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS (1997). In addition to these interdistrict
programs, there are a number of metropolitan-wide districts, mostly in the South, that allow city
residents the opportunity to attend suburban schools. See infra Subsection I.A.2 (discussing
metropolitan districts).
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Louis, are very limited in scope. Boston's METCO program, which began
in the 1960s as a purely voluntary effort to promote racial integration,
started with 220 students and involved only 3100 students by the year
2000.' Hartford's program also began in the 1960s with 265 students, and
by the 1980s involved a little more than a thousand students; it has
expanded recently, but this has been in response to the Connecticut
Supreme Court's unique decision in Sheff outlawing de facto school
segregation. 3 2 The programs in Rochester and Milwaukee are similarly
small, involving roughly 600 and 5000 students, respectively.'33
These programs are limited in scope not because of lack of demand.
The programs have long waiting lists; indeed, the waiting lists in Boston
and Rochester are four to five times larger than the number of students
participating in the program." Instead, the scope of the programs is
intentionally limited to ensure space for district residents or simply to
preclude a large number of urban transfer students. Like open enrollment
plans, none of these programs requires suburban districts to make space
available by expanding facilities or increasing staff.'35
The only (temporary) exception to this pattern, and the only relatively
large-scale interdistrict choice program, existed in St. Louis. This program
resulted from the settlement of a desegregation lawsuit, which many
suburbanites reasonably believed would lead to the consolidation of
suburban school districts with the St. Louis district.136 To avoid this result,
sixteen suburban districts agreed to a "voluntary" interdistrict choice plan,
which required them to accept transfer students, with a goal of increasing
black enrollment to at least fifteen but no greater than twenty-five percent
of the districts' total. The settlement also called for the creation of urban
magnet schools. In the mid-1990s, this program was easily the largest of its
kind in the country, involving 12,700 black students who transferred to
suburban schools and 1500 white suburban students who attended urban
magnet schools. The program was also quite expensive, as the settlement
required the state to provide an "incentive payment" to suburban school
131. EATON, supra note 130, at 4-5.
132. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 151-52; see also supra Subsection I.A.1 (discussing
interdistrict choice in Connecticut).
133. KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 152; VITERITTI, supra note 23, at 99.
134. The Rochester program serves 600 students, while 3000 are on the waiting list.
KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 152. The Boston program serves 3100, while 13,000 are on the
waiting list. EATON, supra note 130, at 5-6; see also Anand Vaishnav, For Metco Students, the
Ride Was Worth It, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2001, at D13 (reviewing EATON, supra note 130).
135. As Susan Eaton observed in her study of Boston's METCO program, "METCO
operates on terms that suburbanites can accept. It does not greatly alter the status quo of either
suburbia's schools or their larger communities." EATON, supra note 130, at 221.
136. See WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 130, at 97-102 (describing the litigation and
settlement, and explaining that the aggressive tactics of the district court judge led suburban
residents to fear that a trial would ultimately result in their districts being consolidated with the St.
Louis district).
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districts which equaled the per-pupil cost of transfer students. The
settlement also required the state to pay for transportation, which in 1995
averaged a remarkable $2000 per student.137
Although the St. Louis program was large relative to other interdistrict
choice programs, it still involved fewer than one-fourth of the students in
St. Louis and a much smaller fraction of suburban students.138 Many black
parents in St. Louis simply chose to keep their children in St. Louis schools,
and obviously the great majority of white suburban parents opted against
sending their children to urban magnet schools.'39 Suburbanites, meanwhile,
at best tolerated the influx of transfer students. Even those sympathetic to
the program repeatedly suggested, in words President Nixon would have
appreciated, "that the millions of dollars the state pays to bring nearly
13,000 African-American students to suburban schools would be better
spent 'fixing up' the city schools." "' It appears that suburbanites may soon
get their wish, as the plan, which was never meant to be permanent, is being
dismantled. State funding for the program will continue for another ten
years, and the St. Louis school district will have to continue its magnet
school programs indefinitely. Beginning in 2002, however, suburban school
districts will no longer have to accept transfer students."' Thus, in the end,
even the most ambitious interdistrict choice program in the country bowed
to suburban autonomy.
This is not to suggest that interdistrict choice in general or urban-
suburban transfers in particular can never work. In some ways, the paucity
of urban-suburban integration is an accident of local government law and
tradition, as most school districts track municipal boundaries. In many
places in the South, however, school districts encompass both cities and the
surrounding suburbs. These metropolitan districts tend to be much more
racially stable, have higher achievement levels, and have much higher
approval ratings among parents than do urban-only districts, and they serve
as examples of relatively successful urban-suburban integration. 142 In
addition, evidence suggests that parents who participate in interdistrict
choice plans are quite satisfied with the plans, and the waiting lists in places
like Boston and Rochester indicate that more parents would participate if
137. For this paragraph, see id. at 99-105.
138. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 153.
139. WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 130, at 151-79.
140. Id. at 336.
141. For a discussion of the dismantling of the St. Louis plan, see Caroline Hendrie,
Settlement Ends St. Louis Desegregation Case, EDUC. WK., Mar. 24, 1999,
http://www.edweek.org.
142. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 57, at 832-33 (extolling the benefits of metropolitan
desegregation plans); Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain
Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759 (1993) (same).
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they had the opportunity.143 There is also evidence that some suburban
receiving districts in metropolitan choice or desegregation plans eventually
came to accept and support at least limited urban-suburban integration."
And there is evidence, finally, that the students from urban areas who
transfer to suburban schools improve their academic achievement, as well
as their academic aspirations, as compared to students who remain
behind.'45
Despite the intriguing success of some metropolitan districts and some
interdistrict choice plans, students currently have quite limited opportunities
to transfer from one district to another. The promise of interdistrict choice
thus remains largely unfulfilled. 46 Indeed, in recent years, interdistrict
choice programs have been eclipsed by a remarkably popular new form of
choice: charter schools. Perhaps not surprisingly, charter schools offer
choices mostly within particular districts.
3. Charter Schools
A charter school is a cross between a public and a private school. 47
Authorized by state statutes, the schools are publicly funded, tuition-free,
nonsectarian schools that operate pursuant to a contract between the school
and the chartering agency, which is either the local school board, a state
agency, or a state-designated agency."4 The schools themselves can be
newly created schools, converted public schools, or converted private
schools. They can be opened and operated by any number of groups,
143. On parental satisfaction, see WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 130, at 180-218; and Armor &
Peiser, supra note 113, at 183.
144. See, e.g., DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION
OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 215-54 (1995) (describing the success and community support of
district-wide desegregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Metropolitan School District);
KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 153-55 (describing support for interdistrict desegregation plans
in St. Louis, Wilmington, and Indianapolis); WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 130, at 309-34
(describing reaction to the St. Louis plan); Orfield, supra note 57, at 845-46 (describing support
for such programs in North Carolina).
145. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 151; Orfield, supra note 57, at 847. Although
studies regarding academic achievement cannot perfectly control for self-selection bias and
therefore must be interpreted with caution, a study of the St. Louis plan suggests that the schools
themselves play an important role in influencing academic achievement. The study found that
students who attended city magnet schools began with higher test scores than those who
transferred to suburban schools, but that the latter eventually outperformed the former. WELLS &
CRAIN, supra note 130, at 183-84.
146. EATON, supra note 130, at 251 ("In the current discussions about school reform, while
there is often polite mention of the benefits of diversity, the interdistrict efforts that would actually
create that diversity are rarely explored.").
147. See generally Brunno V. Manno et al., Beyond the Schoolhouse Door: How Charter
Schools Are Transforming U.S. Public Education, 81 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 736 (2000) (explaining
the theory and structure of charter schools).
148. Id. at 737; see WestEd & U.S. Dep't of Educ., Overview of Charter Schools, at
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs-docs/gi/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
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including teachers, parents, and private corporations, although some states
require that the charter school creators be a nonprofit group.'49 The schools
are freed from complying with various regulations-relating to such issues
as teacher hiring, curriculum, calendar, and length of school day-in
exchange for accountability for performance. 50 The core idea behind
charters is to grant greater flexibility to schools in exchange for greater
accountability, which includes the threat of closure if a school fails to
perform adequately. 5 ' Although the charter periods can vary between three
and fifteen years, charters typically last for five years, after which the
school must be reviewed before the charter is renewed.'52
Unlike interdistrict choice plans, which have either grown slowly or
withered, charter schools are the kudzu of school choice. Minnesota opened
the first charter school in 1992. Four years later, in 1996, 178 charters were
operating in seventeen states.' Another four years after that, there were
roughly 2000 charter schools operating in thirty-four states and the District
of Columbia."5 The number of students attending charter schools grew
exponentially during the same period. Starting from a few hundred in 1992,
enrollment in charter schools last year exceeded 500,000 students.' This is
twice the enrollment in charter schools just three years prior and is nearly
twice the estimated number of students involved in interdistrict choice
programs.156
Statutes authorizing charter schools, which now exist in thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia, vary a great deal in terms of funding,
who can authorize charters, whether there are caps on the annual or total
number of charters, and the degree to which charter schools are exempt
from traditional school laws and regulations.'57 Although these variations
149. Manno et al., supra note 147, at 737; see also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE STATE OF
CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, at 12 (2000), http:/www.ed.gov/pubs/charter4thyear,
150. See Manno et al., supra note 147, at 737.
151. WestEd & U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 148 (" The basic concept of charter schools is
that they exercise increased autonomy in return for this accountability.").
152. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 149, at 12.
153. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 149, at 10-11. Also, in 1996, an additional seven
states, for a total of twenty-five, and the District of Columbia enacted legislation authorizing
charter schools. id. at 10; see also Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 23.
154. Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Survey of Charter Schools 2000-2001, at http://www.edreform.
com/charter schools/report/survey0l.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
155. Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Charter School Highlights and Statistics, at
http://www.edreform.com/pubs/chglance.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
156. For 1998 enrollment figures, see U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 149, at 18. For
interdistrict choice figures, see Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 22.
157. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 149, at 12. The Center for Education Reform
(CER) classifies charter legislation generally as either strong (meaning the laws foster the
development of numerous, independent charter schools) or weak (meaning the laws inhibit the
development of charter schools or significantly limit their autonomy). Ctr. for Educ. Reform,
Charter School Laws: State by State Ranking and Profiles, at http://www.edreform.comi
charterschools/laws/ranking.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002). For the CER's most recent
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make it precarious to generalize, charter statutes and charter schools do
share certain common features that are relevant for our purposes. First,
almost all charter schools enroll students from their home districts."S This
typically results from statutes restricting enrollment or granting a
preference to resident students. Nine of the thirty-eight charter statutes
explicitly limit enrollment to district residents."59 In all but two of the other
states, residency preferences are allowed or required.' 60 Given that most
charter schools report having a waiting list, it is reasonable to presume that
residency preferences operate in practice to exclude at least some
nonresidents. 6 ' Finally, very few states provide funding for transportation
of nondistrict residents to attend charter schools, which also works to limit
attendance to resident students.
1 62
The second common feature of charter statutes involves funding. The
details of funding schemes vary from state to state, and they also vary
within states, depending on whether the charter is granted by a local school
board or by a state agency."' In general, however, charter schools are
financed by a combination of state and local aid. Public schools in districts
in which charter schools are located thus stand to lose a portion of both
rankings, see Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Charter School Laws: Scorecard and Ranking (Oct. 2001), at
http://www.edrcform.com/charter schoolsflaws/ranking-chart.pdf.
158. See Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 23.
159. These include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 228.056(6)(a) (Harrison 1998 & Supp.
2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2066(a) (2001); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-4(d) (West
1998 & Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-1 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.410 (West
2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4.1 (Michie 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-50 (Law. Co-op.
2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.6 (Michie 2000); Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Charter School
Legislation: Profile of Rhode Island's Charter School Law, at http://www.edreform.con
charter schools/laws/Rhodelsland.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002). Other states have double
standards: Locally granted charters may have to limit enrollment to district residents while state-
granted charters may admit students statewide. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380,504
(West 1997).
160. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002) ("[Ihf the number of
pupils who wish to attend the charter school exceeds the school's capacity, .. . [p]reference shall
be extended to pupils currently attending the charter school and pupils who reside in the
district .... ), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.06 (Anderson 1999) (" [Preference shall be given
to students attending the school the previous year and to students who reside in the district in
which the school is located."). Of the twenty-eight states that nominally allow statewide
enrollment, only Nevada and Minnesota do not allow or require residency preferences.
161. As of 2000-2001, seven out of every ten charter schools had waiting lists. U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., supra note 149, at 1.
162. Only two states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, providc limited state aid for
transporting out-of-district students. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66bb (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001). Most statutes do not mention transportation.
163. In Arizona, for example, recipients of charters granted by local agencies may negotiate
for funding in their contract with the locality. State-chartered schools, however, receive funding
calculated by the same formula used to calculate aid to district schools. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-185 (West Supp. 2001); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995 (West Supp. 2001)
(establishing a similar two-track system of funding).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2002] 2075
The Yale Law Journal
state and local funds.164 This gives local school boards an obvious financial
incentive to block charter schools; as one observer commented, allowing
local boards to authorize charters is akin to allowing "the New York Times
to decide whether the Wall Street Journal can sell papers in New York
[C]ity." '6 Perhaps not surprisingly, local school boards have proven more
reluctant to grant charters than have other granting agencies.' 66 In districts
where there is a good deal of support for existing public schools, obtaining
a charter from a local school board is especially difficult, if not quixotic.
67
This last point leads to the third and final common feature of charter
schools, namely, their location. Most charter schools are located in urban
school districts. A New York Times report in December 2000, for example,
estimated that approximately two-thirds of all charter schools were located
in cities. 6 In some states, this concentration is mandated or encouraged by
charter statutes. At least twelve statutes explicitly provide that authorizing
agencies, whether local or state, should give priority to charter schools that
serve poor, minority, or low-achieving students, and more often than not
these students are located in urban districts. 169 In two states, Ohio and
Missouri, charter schools are by law allowed only in urban districts. 7 ' In
one other, Wisconsin, charters can more easily be opened in Milwaukee
than elsewhere in the state, by virtue of the fact that charters can be
authorized by several different agencies in Milwaukee but only by local
school boards everywhere else. 7' In addition to these statutory provisions
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 408 (1999) (entitling charter schools to 100% of
state and local per-pupil funding).
165. Lisa Black, Elective Excellence, School Officials Measure Responses to Non-Traditional
Schools, C41. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2000, Schaumberg & Hoffman Estates, at 5.
166. As of 2000-2001, states requiring local approval had an average of 9.6 charters per state,
while states with multiple chartering entities and strong appeals processes had an average of 80.8
charters per state. Ctr. for Educ. Reform, supra note 154.
167. The difficulty faced by those attempting to locate the Thomas Jefferson Charter School
in the Chicago suburbs is perhaps the most egregious example. At least eleven suburban districts
had rejected the proposal by June 1997. In Elk Grove Township, the district fought off the school
for four years until, in 2000, a court ruled in favor of the State Board of Education's decision to
overturn the district's rejections. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ulah, District 59 May Drop Fight over
Charter, Ci-I. TRIB., Nov. 22, 2000, Metro Northwest, at 1. The judge's decision, not surprisingly,
was perceived by residents as a blow to local control. Becky Beaupre, Judge Permits First
Suburban Charter School, Cf. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at 14.
168. Kate Zemike, Suburbs Face Tests as Charter Schools Continue To Spread, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2000, at Al.
169. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-304 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2001); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605
(West 1993 & Supp. 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-109 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66bb (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 503 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §
38-1702.1 (2001); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-4 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.405 (West 2000); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 2852 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29C (1999).
170. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.013 (Anderson 1999) (limiting the total number of
charter schools and eligible districts); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.400 (West 2000) ("Charter schools
may be operated only in a metropolitan school district or in an urban school district . .
171. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001).
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that encourage or require the concentration of charters in failing, urban
districts, constituent demand and local politics push in the same direction.
Suburbanites seem much less interested in charter schools, which
undoubtedly has to do with the fact that suburban residents are generally
more satisfied with their public schools than are urban residents and thus
see less of a need for alternatives.'72 In fact, news reports suggest that
suburbanites see charter schools not only as unnecessary but as an insult to
their public schools and a threat to suburban property values.' 7 3 As one
resident of Glen Cove, a New York suburb, told a New York Times reporter,
"We want to keep our community desirable. The connotation of a charter
school is, 'The schools are lousy, they're not meeting the needs of our
children.' Our property values will go down, our taxes will increase
because we'll need to pay more money to keep up the standards." ''4
Another community member echoed this point. "There's nothing wrong
with our public schools," she exclaimed, "and I take great offense to
people coming in here and telling me otherwise." "
Charter schools can send the same message in urban school districts, of
course, and many urban leaders and educators also see charter schools as a
threat to existing public schools.'76 The difference, however, is that urban
residents are generally more prepared than suburban residents to admit that
their public schools are failing and that alternatives are needed.'77 Urban
educators, in turn, generally seem more willing to endorse alternatives, both
because of a greater degree of desperation and because the large size of
urban districts makes it easier to absorb a few charter schools. 7 8 In
addition, some educators see charter schools as a way of attracting middle-
class residents back to city schools. The suburbs, by contrast, are generally
already filled with middle-class residents, and charter schools may, because
of the signals they send, drive some of them away.'79
172. See, e.g., Black, supra note 165 (explaining that suburban Chicago communities are
indifferent to charters, which are perceived as alternatives to failing schools); Emily Wax,
Alexandria Votes To Consider Charter Schools; Arlington Rejects Similar Plan, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2000, at BI (noting that public meetings to discuss charter school proposals have been
sparsely attended in Arlington and Alexandria due to lack of interest).
173. See, e.g., Editorial, Give Charters a Better Chance, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1999, at 28
(suggesting that some suburban local school boards view charter schools as a threat to their
authority and control).
174. Zernike, supra note 168.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Kit Wagar, Lawmakers Ponder Possible Removal of Accreditation, KAN. CITY
STAR, Oct. 20, 1999, at B7 (noting that urban lawmakers argued that charter schools in Kansas
City would weaken public schools).
177. See MOE, supra note 4, at 147-54 & tbl.5-7 (explaining that among those most
supportive of school choice are those who are interested in removing their children from the
public schools they are attending).
178. See Zernike, supra note 168.
179. See id. (describing suburban residents' opposition to charter schools).
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Charter schools are thus an interesting political phenomenon. They
draw broad and bipartisan support on the national level and in many state
legislatures." 0 Although the charter concept is generally popular, the
assumption underlying much of the support appears to be that charter
schools are mostly appropriate for students in failing, urban districts. They
are rarely viewed or created as a means of offering significant opportunities
for interdistrict school choice,' and they are often greeted with hostility
when proposed in suburban districts. Many thus see charter schools as an
innovative, not to mention relatively low-cost, way of reforming failing
urban school systems. In this sense, charter schools are quite similar to the
few existing voucher plans.
4. School Vouchers
Publicly funded vouchers have for a while seemed right around the
corner, but they have yet to arrive in force. Three limited programs have
been created in the last decade, in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida." 2
All provide vouchers that can be used at private schools, including religious
schools, and all have been challenged on constitutional grounds, though
each is currently operating. 83 Despite the lavish attention each program has
received, very few students receive vouchers through them.
Milwaukee's program is the oldest and largest of the three. It began in
1990 and currently allows for a maximum of 15,000 vouchers to be
distributed to low-income students, but as of last year, only a few more than
10,000 students took advantage of the plan."M The Cleveland program
180. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 4, at 53.
181. There are some limited exceptions, as some states allow out-of-district students to enroll
in (at least) state-created charter schools. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text. A few
other states allow for regional charter schools. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.265(b) (Michie
2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
17-1718A (West 2001).
182. Much has been written about these plans. For a basic description of all three, see MOE,
supra note 4, at 37-38; and Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 26-28. See also VITERITrI,
supra note 23, at 98-113 (discussing the Milwaukee and Cleveland plans). In addition to these
programs, Maine and Vermont provide money for students in rural districts too small to run their
own schools to attend private schools, and many states pay the costs for at least some disabled
students to attend private schools. See Sugarman, supra note 114, at 128-29, 138 n. 18. Although
the Vermont and Maine plans have caught the attention of voucher supporters, see id. at 128,
vouchers for students in districts too small to run schools, like payments to private schools for
disabled students, are tangential to the general battle over vouchers, and we treat them
accordingly.
183. See Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 26-28. For a discussion of the various legal
challenges that have been filed against the programs, see Alison Frankel, On the Way to a
Supreme Court Test, AM. LAW., May 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, American Lawyer File.
184. See BRUCE FULLER ET AL., SCHOOL CHOICE: ABUNDANT HOPES, SCARCE EVIDENCE
OF RESULTS 62 (1999); MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM FACTS AND FIGURES FOR
2001-2002 (2001), http://www.dpi.state.wi.us/dpi/dfmlsms/pdf/mpcOlfnf.pdf (noting that a total
of 10,882 students were enrolled in the Milwaukee voucher program as of November 2001).
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began more recently and involved, as of 1998-1999, 3500 students.' 85 The
Florida program is the newest and, as described above, offers vouchers to
students in persistently failing schools.'86 Since 1999, the first year of its
operation, only two schools met the "persistently failing" standard, and
only fifty-two students accepted vouchers to attend private schools.187 At
the moment, then, fewer than 15,000 students receive publicly funded
vouchers, which is less than one-tenth of one percent of all elementary and
secondary students and is smaller than the number of students currently
receiving privately funded vouchers.'
More voucher plans have been rejected than passed. Though the
rejections have been a disappointment to the plans' proponents, the rejected
plans are as instructive as the few that have been adopted. Every proposal to
provide vouchers on a large scale has failed." 9 Between 1990 and 1993
alone, for example, fourteen state legislatures considered and ultimately
rejected voucher proposals.' 90 Voucher or tax-credit initiatives also
appeared on a number of state ballots in the 1990s, including ones in
It is not entirely clear why the Milwaukee program is undersubscribed. Some have suggested
that it has to do with the lack of space in private schools, the availability of better-funded charter
schools, and a preference for public schools that have responded to the competitive threat posed
by the voucher program. See Alan J. Borsuk, Charter Schools Gaining on Choice Program,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 22, 2000, at 3B; Scott S. Greenberger, Voucher Lessons Learned,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2001, at Al; Jill Leovy, School Voucher Program Teaches Hard
Lessons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at Al. It may also be due to the fact that the program was only
recently expanded to allow for 15,000 vouchers,
185. Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 27.
186. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 229.0537 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.)
(describing the "Opportunity Scholarship Program").
187. See JAY P. GREENE, MANHATTAN INST., AN EVALUATION OF THE FLORIDA A-PLuS
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM (2001) (describing the voucher program in
Florida).
188. Private scholarship programs exist in over thirty cities nationwide and involve over
50,000 students. See FULLER ET AL., supra note 184, at 63-64. It is certainly relevant to note that
these private scholarships, like publicly funded voucher programs, target low-income students and
offer them some choice of private schools, but no ability to enter good, suburban public schools.
See id. It is also likely, as Professor Moe has argued, that the existence of private vouchers helps
keep the issue of publicly funded vouchers visible. See MOE, supra note 4, at 38. We will not
devote much attention to private vouchers, however, because they are really not at the core of the
debate over publicly funded vouchers and are unlikely to become so. As Henig and Sugarman
describe, most of the private scholarships provide only partial and modest funding for private
school tuition, and, more importantly, it "is currently unimaginable that private charity could
sustain a nationwide private scholarship scheme that would provide choice opportunities for all
the low-income families wishing to pursue them." Henig & Sugarman, supra note 96, at 28.
189. For a discussion of the failed proposals, see MOE, supra note 4, at 37; Robert C. Bulman
& David L. Kirp, The Shifting Politics of School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY, supra note 96, at 46-52; John J. Miller, Why School Choice Lost, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 1993, at A14; and Mark Walsh, Voucher Initiatives Defeated in Calif., Mich., EDUC. WK.,
Nov. 15, 2000, at 14.
190. See AMY STUART WELLS, TIME TO CHOOSE 157-58 (1993).
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California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. 9 ' In each case, voters not
only rejected the proposals, but did so by wide margins.1 2 School choice
proponents typically blame the losses on teachers' unions and the fact that
the unions greatly outspent voucher proponents on initiative campaigns. 93
Although the formidable opposition of teachers' unions played some role in
the defeat of these initiatives, it is hard to accept union opposition as the
sole explanation, in part because voucher initiatives have failed even when
proponents outspent opponents. Just last year, for example, proponents in
Michigan outspent opponents by $7 million; yet a voucher proposal that
would have given $3300 to children in failing schools and allowed other
districts to authorize vouchers failed by a wide margin.'94 Similarly,
proponents of the most recent California voucher initiative spent roughly
the same amount as did their opponents, but the proposal was nonetheless
crushed at the polls by a seventy-one to twenty-nine percent margin.'95
Voucher ballot initiatives lost in California and elsewhere not only, and
perhaps not even primarily, because teachers' unions opposed them, but
also because suburbanites did not support them. 96 As John J. Miller,
associate director of the pro-voucher Manhattan Institute, explained after
the defeat of the 1993 voucher ballot initiative in California: "School
choice failed in California because Republican voters didn't want it." 1
97
The initiative rejected by California voters would have provided a $2600
voucher for use at virtually any private school in the state. Some voucher
proponents explained the defeat by pointing to teachers' unions and the
biased media, but Miller suggested that the real explanation had more to do
with suburban apathy:
Most suburbanites-the folks who make up the GOP's rank and
file-are happy with their kids' school systems. Their children
already earn good grades, score well on tests, and gain admission
into reputable colleges and universities. Moreover, suburban
affluence grants a measure of freedom in choosing where to live
191. See Miller, supra note 189. All told, "[v]oters of various states have been asked 10
times to approve either vouchers or tuition tax credits for private school tuition, and they have said
no each time." Walsh, supra note 189.
192. See MOE, supra note 4, at 365-69; Miller, supra note 189. California and Michigan
voters most recently rejected voucher proposals in November 2000, and again did so by wide
(more than two-to-one) margins. See MOE, supra note 4, at 366-69; Walsh, supra note 189.
193. See, e.g., Robert D. Novak, Halfhearted Fight for Choice, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1993,
at Al 9 (blaming the loss of the voucher initiative in California on the lack of funding to match the
amount spent by teachers' unions opposed to the initiative).
194. MOE, supra note 4, at 367-68; see also Walsh, supra note 189.
195. MOE, supra note 4, at 366-67; see also Walsh, supra note 189.
196. In this respect, it might be helpful to consider that teachers' unions also strongly
opposed Proposition 209 in California, which banned any racial preferences in public education
and employment. See Annie Nakao, Prop. 209 Lead Shrinks in Poll, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 30,
1996, at Al.
197. Miller, supra note 189.
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and thus provides at least some control over school selection. It's
not that suburbanites refuse to admit the country's deep education
crisis; they just don't believe the problem affects them
personally. 198
Voucher opponents exploited these sentiments by suggesting, for example,
that the voucher program would weaken public schools by taking money
away from them and giving it to parents whose children were already
attending private schools.'99 Voucher opponents used similar tactics in
fighting the most recent ballot initiatives, in Michigan and California, with
similar results.2°
What Miller and others allude to is an odd disjuncture between the
leadership of the two main political parties and their rank-and-file members
on the issue of school vouchers. On the one hand, vouchers are typically
associated with the Republican Party, and many Republican leaders do
support vouchers."01 Many suburban members of the party, however, remain
skeptical of-if not strongly opposed to-large-scale voucher programs.
They do so at least in part out of self-interest: They have already paid a
premium in purchasing their homes in order to ensure that their children
attend good public schools, and they-like their neighbors-want to protect
both the schools and their property values." 2 A wide-ranging voucher
program, which allows resident students to exit freely and nonresident
students to enter suburban schools, might take money away from local
students and local schools and introduce lower-income and minority
students. As Bill Burrow, associate director of the first President Bush's
Office on Competitiveness, explained, "School choice is popular in the
national headquarters of the Republican party but is unpopular among the
Republican rank-and-file voters who have moved away from the inner city
in part so that their children will not have to attend schools that are racially
198. Id; see also David Barulich, Four Reasons why Voucher Plans Lose Elections, EDUC.
WK., Sept. 6, 2000, at 58. Barulich campaigned in favor of the same California initiative and said
that his "most difficult encounters were casual conversations in living rooms with white, middle
to upper-class conservative voters... who expressed deep reservations about vouchers."
Barulich, supra.
199. Miller, supra note 189. For an insightful and nuanced account of the fight over the
California voucher initiative, see MOE, supra note 4, at 359-65. Moe suggests that the money
spent by teachers' unions played a role, but so too did the public's ambivalence toward vouchers.
He also suggests that the deck is usually stacked against initiatives-that is, it is much easier to
defeat an initiative than to secure its passage. See id. On the last point, an instructive
counterexample, again, is the passage of Proposition 209 in California, which was obviously able
to overcome this status quo bias.
200. See Walsh, supra note 189.
201. See COOKSON, supra note 3, at 17-37; HENIG, supra note 22, at 81-96.
202. Thomas W. Hazlett, Class Warfare: It's Soccer Moms vs. Poor Kids-in a Rout,
REASON, Feb. 1997, http://www.reason.com/9702/co.hazlett.html (calling this "the ugly financial
story lurking behind the soccer-mom pandering on education").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2082 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 111: 2043
or socioeconomically integrated."21 3 The possibility that school choice
might introduce a substantial number of urban students into suburban
schools thus makes choice threatening to many suburban parents and
homeowners alike.2°4
This chasm within the Republican Party may help explain why, when
push comes to shove, leaders in the Republican Party often back away from
voucher plans. Governor Wilson, for example, came out in opposition to the
1993 California ballot initiative, just as Republican Governor Engler (as
well as Republican Senator Spencer Abraham) opposed the recent voucher
initiative in Michigan. °5 Similarly, Governor Whitman toyed with a modest
voucher proposal for New Jersey students, but ultimately let it die in the
face of legislative opposition from both Democrats and Republicans." 6
Most recently, the second President Bush gave up fairly quickly, and
without much fight, his initial plan to allow poor students to use federal
money to pay for private school tuition.07 Surely these Republican leaders
were not trying to court the teachers' unions by opposing or dropping their
calls for vouchers; more likely, they were responding to the less-than-
enthusiastic message being sent by their constituents.
On the other side of the aisle, there is also a gap between the leadership
of the Democratic Party and some of that party's core constituents, although
the arrows here point in the opposite directions. The leadership of the
Democratic Party remains opposed to vouchers for private schools, and this
undoubtedly reflects the influence of teachers' unions within the
Democratic Party.20 8 African Americans, however, especially those younger
than fifty, consistently express strong support for vouchers.2 09 Although this
support represents a switch from the 1950s and 1960s, when vouchers were
associated with Southern resistance to desegregation, it is not altogether
surprising. African Americans are disproportionately represented in failing,
urban school systems." ° Given that parents are most likely to support
203. COOKSON, supra note 3, at 68.
204. Hazlett, supra note 202.
205. On Wilson's position, see Miller, supra note 189. On Engler's and Abraham's
opposition, see MOF, supra note 4, at 367; and Walsh, supra note 189.
206. Bulman & Kirp, supra note 189, at 50-51.
207. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2001, at A26.
208. See COOKSON, supra note 3, at 39; Peterson, supra note 4, at 53.
209. Bositis, supra note 4 (reporting the results of four annual surveys, conducted between
1996 and 2000, each of which indicated that "[m]ore African-Americans supported school
vouchers than opposed them, and blacks consistently supported them more than whites did"). For
similar reports, see MOE, supra note 4, at 212-17; VrIERrtn, supra note 23, at 5; and Bulman &
Kirp, supra note 189, at 38.
210. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 272-73.
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vouchers when they are dissatisfied with their children's public schools, the
support for vouchers among African Americans is understandable."'
With these political and economic dynamics in mind, it becomes easier
to understand why the three publicly funded voucher programs operating
today look the way they do. The programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland
offer vouchers to a limited number of poor students to attend private
schools." 2 The Milwaukee plan explicitly limits the use of vouchers to
private schools within city boundaries, thus assuring that Milwaukee
voucher students will not enter suburban schools.1 3 The Cleveland plan
allows students to use the vouchers at any private school within Cleveland
and also at any suburban public school that agrees to accept voucher
students; none has.2"4 Florida's plan, which is the most recently adopted and
the only ostensibly statewide program, allows students in failing schools to
use vouchers at private or public schools. The program pushes students to
choose nearby public or private schools, however, as it fails to provide
transportation to private schools and explicitly requires parents to transport
their children to public schools in other districts, which must accept
voucher students only if space is available."1 5
These programs are not designed to provide poor students the
opportunity to attend elite private schools. The voucher amounts are fairly
modest and enable students to enroll primarily in private, religious schools.
Milwaukee's voucher program is the most generous, providing students
roughly $5300 to use for private school tuition." 6 The Cleveland program is
the least generous, providing a maximum of $2500 and requiring parents to
pay a portion of private school tuition.217 The Florida program provides a
maximum of $4000 per pupil.21  The vouchers represent less than the
average amount spent per pupil, either in the Cleveland or Milwaukee
districts or in Florida, primarily because the voucher amount is roughly the
amount of state aid provided to students and does not include local
211. MOE, supra note 4, at 212-17; Bositis, supra note 4. The failure of most Democratic
leaders to respond to African -American support for vouchers may be due not only to the
leadership's ties to teachers' unions, but also to the fact that older African Americans tend to
oppose vouchers and are more likely to vote than those who are younger. Given that African
Americans in general are unlikely to vote for Republicans in any event, Democrats who oppose
vouchers may not risk losing many votes. Bositis, supra note 4.
212. See supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
213. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a) (West 1999) (providing that eligible pupils may use
vouchers at "any private school located in the city" of Milwaukee).
214. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (Anderson 1999); Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 949 (6th Cir. 2000).
215. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 229.0537 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st Reg. Sess.).
216. See MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2001-2002,
supra note 184, at 1.
217. See ERIK ROUSH, CLEVELAND VOUCHER SYSTEM I (Legislative Budget Office, Policy
Brief, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1999), http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/l123ga/publications/peiodicals/
policybriefs/cleveland voucher.pdf.
218. REES, supra note 107, at 36.
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revenues.1 9 While the voucher amounts have been criticized as being too
low, the voucher programs have also been criticized as being too expensive
or unfairly funded. In Ohio, for example, the program is more expensive
than the voucher amount suggests, because the state continues to allow
local districts to count voucher students for purposes of receiving state
aid.2 And in Wisconsin, where the state has reduced aid to other districts
in order to fund the Milwaukee voucher program, districts outside of
Milwaukee charge that the funding scheme is unfair.2"' The funding
controversies generated by these programs undoubtedly help explain why
the vouchers are fairly modest and are provided only to a limited number of
students.222 The controversies are also ongoing and threaten the stability of
even these limited plans.223
Just as these programs are not designed to send voucher students to the
local equivalents of Exeter or Andover, it is also obvious that these
programs are not meant to open up suburban public schools to inner-city
students. This fact is apparent from the structure of the programs, and it is
understandable in light of the political forces that shaped the plans. In
Milwaukee and Cleveland, for example, minority leaders teamed with state
and local Republican leaders to create these programs, which in turn reflect
their respective interests.224 The minority leaders pushing for the programs
219. Funds for the Cleveland plan are allocated from state aid for disadvantaged pupils, and
the voucher amount is substantially less than the average per-pupil amount, which is over $7000.
ROUSH, supra note 217, at 3. Half of the Milwaukee plan is funded by a reduction in state aid to
the Milwaukee school district, and half by a statewide reduction in aid. See MILWAUKEE
PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2001-2002, supra note 184, at 1. The
voucher amount is less than the average per-pupil amount, which in 1997-1998 was just shy of
$6500, Lynn Olson, Fighting Back, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 268. The Florida plan is funded
by transferring state aid from local districts to students who accept the opportunity scholarships,
see FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 229.0537(6)(a)(1), and the amount is less than the statewide average per-
pupil expenditure, which in 1996 was $5497, Craig D. Jerald et al., The State of the States, EDUC.
WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 76.
220. See ROUSH, supra note 217, at 2-3.
221. See Julie Blair, Fight Erupts over Way Wisconsin Pays for Vouchers, EDUC. WK., May
23, 2001, http://www.edweek.org. The financial story in Wisconsin is actually more complicated
than this because the state allows local districts that lose money to raise local taxes and then
contributes additional state aid when local taxes are increased. As a result, some districts outside
of Milwaukee have actually made money as a result of the voucher funding scheme. Id.
222. The Milwaukee program is explicitly limited to no more than fifteen percent of the
Milwaukee Public Schools' enrollment, while the Cleveland program is limited by the amount of
funds allocated by the legislature. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(b) (West 1999); OHIO. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (Anderson 1999). The Florida program has no set limit on the
number of participants; all who attend persistently failing schools are eligible. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. chs. 229.0535-.0537. In reality, however, there may be very few schools that qualify as
persistently failing, a possibility suggested by the fact that in two years, only two schools have
qualified. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
223. Legislators in Wisconsin, for example, are considering requiring Milwaukee to foot the
bill for the entire voucher program, which would require a $30 million tax increase for Milwaukee
citizens. See Blair, supra note 221.
224. For the legislative and political history of the Milwaukee program, see COOKSON, supra
note 3, at 64-68; VITERITTI, supra note 23, at 98-108; and Jim Carl, Unusual Allies: Elite and
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were interested primarily in improving the educational opportunities
available to students in failing schools, and they tended not to be interested
in enhancing opportunities for racial integration.' 25 Republican leaders,
meanwhile, seized the opportunity to support a market-based educational
reform that would operate largely within the confines of urban school
districts. 26 Urban vouchers allow Republican leaders to push a policy that
is ideologically attractive and politically low-risk, as it leaves suburbanites
alone. If anything, urban vouchers will win the support and votes of
suburbanites, because they offer assistance to urban students.227
Suburbanites continue to express support for programs that offer greater
assistance to inner-city students in failing schools.22 At the same time,
however, criticizing the bureaucracy of urban school districts as inefficient
and corrupt is a popular sport among many legislators and governors, some
of whom must believe that doing so plays well in the suburbs. 229 All of
which suggests that a reform that does not provide large sums of money to
city-school bureaucrats, but instead allows parents to escape the clutches of
those bureaucrats, is likely to be pretty popular among suburbanites-
provided that city kids stay in city schools.
C. Pulling Together the Politics of Choice
1. The Radical Potential of School Choice
In most areas of the country, school districts or neighborhood schools
within large districts are quite segregated by race and income. This is
typically a result of the fact that school districts tend to track municipal
boundaries and attendance zones within districts track different
neighborhoods. Because municipalities, often through exclusionary zoning,
are segregated by income (and thus, to a large degree, by race), so too are
Grass-Roots Origins of Parental Choice in Milwaukee, 98 TCHRS. C. REC. 266 (1996). For the
history of the Cleveland program, see VITERITTI, supra note 23, at 108-13. In Florida, the
Opportunity Scholarship Program was endorsed by a number of African-American state
legislators as well as the Urban League of Greater Miami. See Prepared Testimony of the
Honorable Jeb Bush to the House Budget Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 23, 1999, at 3.
225. See VrrERITrn, supra note 23, at 98-109; Carl, supra note 224, at 268-75.
226. See VrTERITrI, supra note 23, at 109; Carl, supra note 224, at 275-76.
227. Cf MOE, supra note 4, at 318-19 (noting that more than one-third of those who
generally oppose vouchers would be willing to support voucher programs for the inner-city poor,
and that these programs are supported 57% to 35% among Democrats and 52% to 42% among
Republicans).
228. See, e.g., Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 30th Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup
Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1998, at 41,
49 (reporting that 86% of those surveyed believe it is "very important" "to improve the nation's
inner-city schools," and that 66% say that they would be willing to pay more taxes to do so).
229. An example of this tendency is found in the increasing number of state takeovers of
failing urban school districts. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98
MICH. L. REv. 432, 446-47 & n.57 (1999).
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the districts that track them. The same is true with regard to neighborhoods
within larger districts.20 Districts that have higher property values and
residents in higher income brackets have a double advantage of being able
to spend more locally raised revenues on students who are easier to educate
because they come to school with few of the problems that attend students
living in poverty. If states and districts adhere to a neighborhood-school
policy and allow local districts to raise and spend what they wish on local
schools, schools will obviously continue to be segregated by income and
race, and they will continue to be funded unequally.23'
Recognizing these basic facts unveils the radical potential of school
choice. Simply put, allowing students to choose freely among schools could
transform the way that education is provided in this country. To accept
school choice in its most aggressive and purest form is to accept the
proposition that all students should be able to choose from a range of
schools. Further, if one believes that schools should really compete for
students-and compete fairly-then all students should have an equal
opportunity to attend all schools. It seems arbitrary to limit choice to a
particular type of school, whether public or private, or to schools in a
particular geographic area. A robust school choice plan would give all
students a ticket good for entry at any school. Under these circumstances,
students would have the widest range of choices practicable, and schools
would have to compete on the basis of services provided with similar
resources. A universal school choice plan thus would undermine the
rationales for local control of public schools; local restrictions on
attendance would be inconsistent with allowing students to choose freely,
and unequal expenditures among localities would be inconsistent with
requiring schools to maximize their efficiency by competing fairly with one
another.
What we suggest is that, while advocates and commentators rarely
discuss the radically equalizing potential of school choice, suburbanites
intuitively recognize this potential and the threat it poses to their interests.
The typical story about school choice, especially private school choice and
to a lesser extent choice among charter schools, suggests that the most
important opponents of choice are the teachers' unions. It is certainly true
that teachers' unions are formidable opponents of certain kinds of school
choice, and that this opposition has shaped and will continue to shape
school choice plans. The unions' steadfast opposition to vouchers and their
230. For a more detailed discussion, see Ryan, supra note 20, at 272-84; and Ryan, supra
note 229, at 435-37.
23 1. See, e.g., EATON, supra note 130, at 252 (" Because our local communities, especially in
the northern metropolitan areas, are still heavily segregated by race and income level, dividing
school districts along municipal lines is, for all practical purposes, segregation by race and
class.").
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eventual, grudging acceptance of charter schools, for example, certainly
helps explain why far more students attend charter schools than receive
publicly funded vouchers.232 Yet the pattern we have just described suggests
that teachers' unions are certainly not the only important characters
involved in the school choice drama. If they were that powerful, it would be
hard to explain why there are any voucher programs at all.233 Moreover,
given their strong connection to the Democratic Party, it is hard to point to
teachers' unions as the reason why many Republican leaders have opposed
or walked away from voucher proposals.
What the pattern instead suggests is that suburbanites are the key
players in all school choice plans, public or private. Think first of the fact
that suburbanites strongly support local control over student attendance, as
demonstrated by their intense resistance to interdistrict desegregation, and
that they also strongly support a certain degree of local control over locally
raised revenues, as demonstrated by the myriad battles over school finance
reform. Then consider that most choice plans, public and private, involve
choices within particular school districts, most typically within urban
districts. Plans that allow interdistrict choice are not only less prevalent, but
they almost always contain restrictions-allowing districts to opt out of
participation or to accept transfers only if space is available-designed to
protect the autonomy of local school districts. Plans that require suburban
schools to accept urban students are extremely rare, almost always the
result of court order or settlement and, for that reason, not necessarily
stable-as the dismantling of the St. Louis plan demonstrates. Recall as
well that charter schools most often, by practice or design, draw students
from within the district in which they are located, and that they, too, are
located most often in urban areas. Consider, finally, that two of the three
voucher plans in existence specifically target poor, urban students and
constrain their choices to schools within city limits, while the third allows
greater choice in theory but places practical obstacles in the way of those
who wish to use their vouchers outside of their home districts.
What do all of these plans have in common? They protect the ability of
suburban parents to send their kids to suburban public schools, to spend
locally raised revenues primarily if not exclusively on local kids, and to
shield their kids from having to attend schools with more than a relative
handful of "outsiders." At the same time, the plans represent some attempt
to reform urban school systems and improve the opportunities available for
232. See William G. Buss, Teachers, Teachers' Unions, and School Choice, in SCHOOL
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 96, at 300, 300-05 (describing the position of
teachers' unions regarding charter schools).
233. Teachers' unions opposed the voucher plans ultimately adopted in Cleveland,
Milwaukee, and Florida. See VITERITTI, supra note 23, at 98-113; Bulman & Kirp, supra note
189, at 47-50.
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students currently stuck in failing city schools. All of this fits perfectly
within a worldview that believes that educational crises exist in the cities
but not in the suburbs and that some efforts should be made to address those
crises, provided that doing so does not simultaneously threaten suburban
school autonomy. This was the worldview essentially expressed by Nixon
in his antibusing speech and that has been echoed and implemented time
and again by suburbanites faced with the prospect of having to share their
schools or their local tax dollars with urban students.2 The pattern, in
short, is unmistakable. Suburbanites like their public schools, want to be
able to devote local money to "their" schools, and want generally to limit
attendance to local residents; existing school choice plans, in turn, tend to
conform to these preferences.
2. Suburban Political Power
If it is clear enough that existing school choice plans reflect suburban
preferences, it remains to explain why this is so. The answer, we think, is
straightforward: political strength. In most state legislatures, where choice
plans are crafted, suburban legislators hold the balance of power.235
Although legislators obviously respond to special interest groups on some
issues, public choice theory posits and empirical studies confirm that they
are more likely to follow the wishes of their constituents on high-visibility
issues."6 As George Stigler put it, an "obvious characteristic of democratic
political life [is that] special minorities... can exploit uninterested
234. See supra Section I.A.
235. See, e.g., Marilyn Gittell, Conclusion: Creating a School Reform Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY, supra note 6, at 230, 238 (" Suburban
interests and power are pervasive in almost all state legislatures and in the state education
bureaucracies."); Margaret Weir, Central Cities' Loss of Power in State Politics, CITYSCAPE,
May 1996, at 23, 23 (examining how large cities have fared in state politics and concluding that
such politics "are increasingly driven by a suburban-based politics of 'defensive localism' that
seeks to limit State action in addressing urban economic and social problems"); see also William
Schneider, The Suburban Century Begins, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1992, at 33, 33 (noting that,
because of population shifts, "[wle are now a suburban nation with an urban fringe and a rural
fringe" and arguing that national politics is now driven by the concerns of suburban voters).
236. On this aspect of public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1991); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53-82 (1994); Arthur T. Denzau &
Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get
Represented, 80 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 89 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being,
and Public Choice, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 63, 88 (1990); and James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 357-72 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). For
empirical studies supporting this theory, see, for example, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261-388 (1986). For a
particularly relevant case study, indicating that legislators in education funding battles tend to
follow their constituents' wishes over the wishes of organized interest groups, see Dorothy A.
Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 179 (1996).
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majorities but will be exploited by interested majorities., 237 Within the
realm of state and local politics, few if any issues are more highly visible
than those concerning schools and education; electoral majorities, in other
words, are keenly interested in education issues. Suburban legislators thus
have the political power, as well as the political incentives, to protect their
constituents' interests.238
At the same time, it is important to recognize that there are not many
organized groups pushing in the opposite direction-that is, pushing to
expand the opportunities for choice beyond particular districts or to abolish
neighborhood schools. Those advocating for school choice-especially
private school choice and charter schools-are typically not very interested
in enhancing opportunities for racial or socioeconomic integration."' Civil
rights groups that remain committed to integration, by contrast, devote
more of their energy to blocking private school choice than to seeking ways
to use choice to enhance integration. The NAACP, for example, has formed
a partnership with People for the American Way for the stated purpose of
preserving public education.24 The partnership's main activity, however,
appears to be fighting against vouchers rather than offering much in the
way of new programs generally or new ideas for increasing integration in
particular.24 Given the strength of suburban voters and legislators, it is hard
to imagine that even a strong push toward expanding school choice into the
suburbs would be hugely successful. As it stands, however, no one is really
even pushing that hard.
Consider the situation in Milwaukee, which captures many of the
themes we have highlighted and serves as a good concluding vignette. The
story of the Milwaukee voucher program has been told often enough that
there is now a conventional narrative, which describes how a liberal,
African-American state legislator, Annette "Polly" Williams, teamed up
with Republican leaders to launch what essentially amounted to a pilot
voucher program.2 42 Initially, the program was limited to 1000 students,
who could use the vouchers in nonsectarian private schools within the city
limits.243 Polly Williams pushed the choice program in part because she was
fed up with school desegregation within Milwaukee, which she believed
237. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 162 (1975).
238. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Rich States, Poor Cities and Mighty Suburbs: In
Connecticut and New Jersey, Urban Poverty Confronts Leafy Affluence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2001, § 1, at 39 (describing suburban political dominance in New Jersey and Connecticut and the
reluctance of suburban legislators to devote resources to urban areas, including urban schools).
239. See supra Subsection I.B.4.
240. See Partners for Public Educ., Every Child Counts, at http://www.everychildcounts.org
(last visited Feb. 19, 2002) (describing the partnership).
241. See id. (listing activities).
242. See infra notes 244-247 and accompanying text.
243. See WELLS, supra note 190, at 160-61.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2002] 209
The Yale Law Journal
was unfair to blacks and educationally ineffective.2" Her voucher allies
were equally uninterested in desegregation, while those civil rights groups
that remained committed to racial integration-the NAACP chief among
them--opposed the voucher plan.245 Given this political lineup, it is not
surprising that the voucher plan that finally emerged offered no means by
which city students could attend suburban schools, whether public or
private, nor is it that surprising that the conventional account suggests that
vouchers were offered as an alternative to a failed attempt to desegregate
the schools.
What does not make it into the conventional account of the voucher
program, and what makes Milwaukee so interesting and instructive, is that
the Milwaukee metropolitan area has operated a voluntary desegregation
program for the last twenty-five years.246 Known as the Chapter 220 plan,
this program allows approximately 5500 Milwaukee students to attend
suburban schools that have volunteered to accept the students, while 1300
suburban students attend city magnet schools.247 Although state leaders
have occasionally proposed ending the program, it has survived and
remains fairly popular, at least among Milwaukee residents.248 Indeed,
while 5000 city students attend suburban schools, another 3800 remain on a
waiting list to do so.249 Moreover, a legislative audit of the program in 1994
found that minority transfer students performed better on statewide
achievement tests than minority students in the Milwaukee city schools,
including those students who tried to transfer to suburban schools but were
unable." 0 Those who would support expanding this demonstrably effective
program, however, clearly lack sufficient political power, which just as
clearly resides with those who support the Milwaukee voucher program.
Thus, while the number of city students attending suburban schools has
remained steady for the last ten years,2"' during that same time period the
244. See Bulman & Kirp, supra note 189, at 48; see also Lynn Olson, Choice Plan's
Architect Relishes Her Role as State Legislature's Lone Independent, EDUC. WK., Sept. 12, 1990,
http://www.edweek.org (describing Williams's 1987 attempt to create an all-black school district
in Milwaukee).
245. See VITERITri, supra note 23, at 102 (noting that the local chapter of the NAACP
opposed the plan).
246. See Michael Stolee, The Milwaukee Desegregation Case, in SEEDS OF CRISIS: PUBLIC
SCHOOLING IN MILWAUKEE SINCE 1920, at 229, 256-60 (John L. Rury & Frank A. Cassell eds.,
1993).
247. For an overview of the program as of 1994, see STATE OF WiS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT
BUREAU, AN EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER 220 PROGRAM (1994). For more recent figures on
participation, see ViTERITrl, supra note 23, at 99; and Alan J. Borsuk, Eyes on Milwaukee for
School Choice, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2000, at Al.
248. Joseph A. Ranney, "Absolute Common Ground": The Four Eras of Assimilation in
Wisconsin Education Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 791, 816 n.96.
249. See Olson, supra note 219, at 269.
250. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 247, at 4.
251. Telephone Interview with James McIntosh, Chapter 220 Financial Officer, Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction (July 11, 2001).
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state legislature expanded the number of vouchers available to Milwaukee
students from 1000 to 15,000.
21
2
The lesson from Milwaukee is not that school integration in general, or
urban-suburban integration in particular, is a failure and has lost all support
among African Americans. What we take from Milwaukee is that there is
continued support for suburban-urban integration programs among African
Americans, and at least limited tolerance of such programs among suburban
districts.253 At the same time, however, there is obviously much stronger
political support for school choice that is limited to inner cities. What is true
in Milwaukee is obviously true elsewhere. Indeed, the voucher program in
Milwaukee is yet another version of the compromise proposed by Nixon in
his antibusing speech in 1972: A reform that offers some assistance to
urban students but makes sure that they remain in city schools. All of this
suggests that the radical potential of school choice, if the trends we have
highlighted continue, will be contained, and school choice plans will be
limited in scope. The next Part tries to gauge what we can expect from such
limited plans.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTRAINED CHOICES
If our assessment of the political economy of school choice is correct,
and if the political and economic dynamics do not change substantially, we
should continue to see school choice plans confined to single districts.
Within single districts, we should expect to see mostly limited choice plans
that allow some students to attend specialized nonneighborhood schools,
either public or private, but that also preserve the traditional neighborhood
school. In this Part we try to assess the likely impact of such limited school
choice plans along three dimensions: racial and socioeconomic integration,
academic achievement, and productive competition among schools. These
three are the most important and most discussed criteria for assessing
school choice plans. Our analysis relies on data regarding the current
demographics of school districts and neighborhoods, studies of the impact
of previous and existing choice plans, and economic literature on school
competition. We cannot pretend, of course, to predict with precision the
impact of limited school choice plans; variations among the thousands of
school districts, residential mobility, and the limits of existing research are
252. See WELLS, supra note 190, at 160-62.
253. Although initially part of a legal settlement, the program has continued past the
deadline, in 1993, for the termination of the settlement. See STATE OF WIS. LEGAL AUDIT
BUREAU, supra note 247, at 12; cf. EATON, supra note 130, at 12-13 (noting that, despite media
reports of growing disenchantment among African Americans with busing in Boston and
elsewhere, "the waiting list for METCO continues to grow, even though it buses students much
farther than typical desegregation plans").
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but three factors that counsel caution in trying to predict the future here.
Nonetheless, we have enough information to provide a general sense of
what we can expect limited choice plans to accomplish.
A. Racial and Socioeconomic Integration
One of the more controversial questions that looms over choice
programs involves their implication for racial and socioeconomic
integration. The implications are historically framed in unflattering light.
As Betsy Levin, among others, reminds us, in the middle of the twentieth
century school choice flourished in the South principally as a mechanism to
thwart desegregation efforts. 4 Prohibiting school choice was thus one step
toward desegregating Southern schools. Although school choice policies
have been used to integrate rather than segregate schools since the 1970s, 25
Levin speculates that school choice would nonetheless unwind decades of
school integration efforts, fuel increased socioeconomic stratification, and
thereby enhance rather than ameliorate social inequities.256
Professor Levin is not alone in her concerns. One recurring argument
against school choice plans in general and vouchers in particular is that they
lead to greater racial and socioeconomic isolation.257 This argument reflects
a belief that white and black parents, if given the choice, will opt for
schools that are more racially homogeneous than current public schools.
The argument also reflects a belief that if more families are empowered to
choose among education options, the most well-informed, motivated, and
economically well-off families are more likely to avail themselves of school
choice. 5 s Indeed, even choice proponents recognize the salience of the
"skimming effect" as well as the need for policymakers to address this
danger when crafting choice programs." 9
Advancing dire predictions about the impact of school choice on racial
and socioeconomic integration is a powerful rhetorical strategy, but it is
crucial to examine the often unstated assumptions that underlie such
predictions. Suggestions that school choice will exacerbate racial and
socioeconomic isolation often rest on an implicit premise that the nation's
public schools are fairly well integrated by race and income. As we explain
254. Betsy Levin, Race and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY,
supra note 96, at 266, 267-68; see also HENiG, supra note 22, at 101-06.
255. Cf. HENIG, supra note 22, at 110-11 (discussing "controlled choice" plans);
KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 116-30 (same); VITERITTI, supra note 23, at 58-60 (same).
256. Levin, supra note 254, at 286.
257. See, e.g., McUsic, supra note 77, at 125-28; Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 283 (1999).
258. See COOKSON, supra note 3, at 91-93.
259. Terry M. Moe, Private Vouchers, in PRIVATE VOUCHERS 1, 23 (Terry M. Moe ed.,
1995); see also MOE, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that "readers should be aware that I am a
supporter of vouchers").
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below, this premise is mostly false. Most children in this country attend
schools largely identifiable by race and socioeconomic status.260 To make
progress on this issue, we believe that assessments of the effects of choice
programs must be approached from a comparative perspective. Thus,
existing integration levels in public schools must be the starting point in
determining the likely net impact of school choice, both public and private.
1. Residential Patterns and School District Demographics
School enrollment patterns and residential patterns are tightly linked in
this country because the overwhelming majority of public school students
attend neighborhood schools. Public schools therefore tend to reflect the
neighborhoods in which they are located. And neighborhoods in most
metropolitan areas remain remarkably segregated by income and by race.
A common measurement of residential segregation is the dissimilarity
index, which captures the degree to which various groups are evenly spaced
throughout a particular geographic area. For racial segregation, the index
measures the percentage of blacks who would have to move to achieve an
even residential pattern-where every neighborhood reflects the
composition of the larger geographical area.261 The higher the index
number, the greater the level of segregation, with a score of zero indicating
perfect balance and a score of 100 indicating complete apartheid. Looking
at segregation by race, in 1990, the average dissimilarity index was 77.8%
for Northern metropolitan areas and 66.5% for Southern metropolitan
areas. 6 Racial segregation is down a bit from levels recorded in the
1970s,2 6 3 but African Americans remain more segregated than any other
racial or ethnic group now or in the history of the United States.t They are
also more segregated today than they were in 1940, despite decades of
efforts to increase residential integration. 65
Indeed, one-third of all African Americans live under
"hypersegregated" conditions, which essentially means that they live in
large, contiguous, racially homogeneous neighborhoods clustered around
city centers. African Americans living in such cities as Atlanta, Baltimore,
Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and New York are not
260. See VITERIT-ri, supra note 23, at 49; see also infra Subsection H.A.1.
261. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 219 (1993).
262. Id. at 222 tbl.8.1 (1993).
263, While most observers agree that residential segregation lessened between 1970 and
1990, little agreement exists on the precise magnitude. For a discussion of the range of estimates,
see David M. Cutler et al., The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455,
471-72 (1999) (discussing estimates ranging from 7.5% to 16.7%).
264. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 261, at 2.
265. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLuM. L. REV.
1965, 1980 (2000).
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likely to encounter any whites in their own neighborhoods, the
neighborhoods adjacent to theirs, or the ones adjacent to those.266 It is a sad
paradox that many blacks living in the nation's largest and most populous
urban centers are actually quite isolated.267
Although segregation in school or housing patterns is often discussed
solely in terms of blacks and whites, attention should also be paid to
Hispanics, who make up the fastest growing segment of the public school
population.268 Hispanics have experienced similar, though less dramatic,
residential segregation. In 1990, the dissimilarity index for Hispanics living
in the largest 100 metropolitan areas in the United States was 45. 1%.69 This
figure dropped slightly, to 44.6%, by 2000.270 This slight decline, however,
masks an increase in segregation among Hispanic immigrants; that is,
housing segregation increased for those areas with rapidly increasing
Hispanic populations. 7 '
Just as residential areas are quite segregated by race and ethnicity, they
are also economically segregated. In 1990, the dissimilarity index for poor
households in the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the country was
36.1 %272 This number was higher than the number in 1970, indicating an
increase in economic segregation." 3 Economic segregation, moreover,
interacts and corresponds with racial segregation. Although half of the poor
people in metropolitan areas are white, three-quarters of poor whites live in
middle-class neighborhoods.274 Neighborhoods of concentrated poverty
"are overwhelmingly black ghettos and Hispanic barrios."275
This leads to our final point about racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
residential segregation. A good deal of residential segregation takes place
between municipalities rather than within a particular town or municipality.
Residential segregation most visibly tracks boundaries separating cities and
their suburbs.27 6 Since the middle of the twentieth century, whites and
middle-class blacks have left cities in droves, leaving behind cities
266. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 261, at 74-78.
267. Id. at 77.
268. GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YuN, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1999), at http://www.harvard.edu/civilrights/
publications/resegregation99/resegregation99.html.
269. Memorandum from David Rusk to Rick Kahlenberg 4 (Aug. 29, 2001) (on file with
authors).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1,4.




276. Indeed, racial segregation between cities and their suburbs has become so pronounced
that social scientists no longer find it helpful to measure segregation within cities alone. See
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 261, at 61.
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increasingly dominated by poor minorities.277 By the end of the 1970s, the
pattern of an urban core dominated by blacks surrounded by a ring of
predominantly white suburbs emerged.278 That pattern has continued, with
large numbers of Hispanics joining poor African Americans in the cities.279
One consequence of this demographic shift has been to concentrate poverty
in urban neighborhoods. And what is true for urban neighborhoods is true
for urban schools.
The numbers tell the story, and the numbers are stark. Most African-
American and Hispanic students attend urban schools that are
predominantly minority. In 1996-1997, for example, nearly 70% of
African-American and nearly 75% of Hispanic students attended schools
that were between 50% and 100% minority.280 Perhaps even more striking,
over one-third of African-American and Hispanic students attended schools
that were almost exclusively (over 90%) minority."' The overwhelming
majority of white students, in turn, attended schools that were
predominantly white; indeed, the average white student attended a school
that was 81.2% white.282
If we shift our gaze from national statistics and focus on some large,
urban districts, the intensity of racial and ethnic segregation becomes clear.
As of 1995, all of the students in East St. Louis, Illinois, and Compton,
California, were minority.283 Close to all-between 93% and 96%--of the
students in Atlanta, Camden, Hartford, Los Angeles, New Orleans,
Oakland, San Antonio, and Washington, D.C., were minority.2 4 In
Richmond, Virginia, and Newark, New Jersey, over 90% of the students
were minority.28 In Chicago, as of 1996-1997, just under 90% of the
students were minority, while in Detroit in the same year, close to 95% of
the students were minority."' In New York, meanwhile, nearly 84% of the
over one million public school students are minorities.2 87
277. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729 (2001)
(considering the costs and benefits of black suburbs).
278. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racial Change and Social Policy, 441 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SC. 114, 122 (1979) ("This doubled proportion of blacks in central cities is the
basic fact underlying the spatial maldistribution of the races; and it is the largest single reason for
the vast residential separation of black and white citizens in America today.").
279. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 261, at 67, 77.
280. ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 268, tbl.9.
281. Id.
282. Id. tbl.l 1.
283. Craig D. Jerald & Bridget K. Curran, By the Numbers: The Urban Picture, EDUC. WK.,
Jan. 8, 1998, at 56.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 268, tbl.4.
287. Jerald & Curran, supra note 283, at 56.
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Where there is racial and ethnic isolation of minorities, there is also
usually concentrated poverty. Generally speaking, the larger the percentage
of minority students, the larger the percentage of poor students. We
consider a school to be predominantly poor if more than 50% of the
students are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, which is a common
measure of student poverty.28 Less than 10% of schools whose enrollment
is between 10% and 20% minority are predominantly poor. Exactly ha/f of
the schools that are 50% to 60% minority are predominantly poor. And
nearly 90% of schools that are 90% to 100% minority are predominantly
poor."9 If we narrow our focus again and look at particular urban districts,
the extent of poverty in urban public school districts becomes clear. Over
two-thirds of the students in Atlanta, Bridgeport, Camden, Jersey City,
Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, New Orleans, Newark, and St. Louis are
poor. So too are nearly two-thirds of the students in Oakland, Washington,
D.C., Baltimore, Detroit, Kansas City (Missouri), Buffalo, and Dallas. 2"
It bears emphasizing that the racial and economic segregation that
exists in America's schools typically occurs between districts rather than
within the same district. A recent study of all schools that reported data on
poverty and race-slightly over 33,000 schools-revealed that most poor
primary school students are clustered in majority-poor districts.29" ' The same
is true for both African-American and Hispanic students; most attend
schools within majority-minority school districts.292 This has very important
implications for school choice because it means that even if schools within
districts were perfectly integrated, schools within those districts would
remain majority poor and majority-minority. In order to reduce significantly
the isolation by race, ethnicity, and poverty, integration must occur between
rather than within districts.2 93
2. Gauging the Impact of School Choice
As the demographic statistics indicate, public schools today are highly
segregated by race and income. Urban schools, in particular, principally
serve poor, minority students, and most minority students attend urban
schools.29 If school choice plans are confined to single districts and are
288. See infra note 300.
289. These figures are reported in ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 268, tbl.13.
290. The district poverty figures are reported in Jerald & Curran, supra note 283, at 64-65.
See also Table 1, infra Subsection II.A.2.
291. See Duncan Chaplin, Estimating the Impact of Economic Integration of Schools on
Racial Integration 2-3, 12-13 tbl.A.I (Oct. 15, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
292. See id. at 6; ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 268, tbls.8-9.
293. Cf Chaplin, supra note 291, at 6 (concluding that "most segregation (both racial and
economic) is across districts and not within districts").
294. See Ryan, supra note 20, at 272 & n.92.
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implemented primarily in urban districts, the effect of such plans on racial
and socioeconomic integration will be marginal. The reason is
straightforward: If those in a school district are predominantly minority and
poor, moving them around through choice plans to other schools within the
district will not have much impact on integration levels.
This is not to deny that there may be some movement, in either
direction, at the margins. Much will depend on the structure of the plan and
the demographics of particular districts. If choice is confined to public and
charter schools, there may be slightly more or slightly less integration in
particular schools as students move from one setting to another. But given
the demographic starting point, it seems implausible that such school choice
plans will significantly modify current levels of integration.
If instead of a choice plan confined to public schools, an urban district
launches a voucher program, those who use the vouchers to attend private
schools may move from a relatively segregated to a relatively integrated
setting. This is because in a number of cities, private schools are more
racially and socioeconomically integrated than are the public schools.2 95
Poor, minority students who choose private schools may well find
themselves in either a more integrated setting, or one that is equally isolated
by race and socioeconomics but consists not of poor minorities, but middle-
class whites. Evidence from the Cleveland and Milwaukee voucher
programs supports this hypothesis, as reports indicate that voucher students
are in more integrated settings than are nonvoucher students who remain in
city public schools.
29 6
Vouchers for private schools, however, can only do so much to enhance
racial and socioeconomic integration. To begin, the politics of vouchers
have thus far resulted in fairly limited programs, where a small percentage
of public school students receive vouchers for use at private schools. If this
trend continues, the impact of a voucher program on integration levels will
necessarily be slight. A select few students may find themselves in more
integrated settings than the ones they departed, but this will do little to alter
295. See, e.g., Nicole Garnett, The NAACP's Parent Trap, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 30,
1996-Jan. 6, 1997, at 16, 17 (reporting that "[mlany of the private and religious schools in inner-
city Milwaukee are more integrated than their public counterparts, some of which are virtually all
black"); Jay Greene, The Racial, Economic, and Religious Context of Parental Choice in
Cleveland, Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Association for Policy Analysis and
Management 5-8 (Oct. 8, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reporting a similar
dynamic in Cleveland). See generally Paul E. Peterson & Jay P. Greene, Race Relations &
Central City Schools: It's Time for an Experiment with Vouchers, BROOKINGs REV., Spring 1998,
at 33, 36 (reporting statistics that show that private school students are typically "less racially
isolated than their public school peers").
296. See Peterson & Greene, supra note 295, at 35-36; Joe Williams, Religious Schools See
Racial Mix; Study Says Integration Rises in Parochial Schools, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June
26, 2000, at lB.
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the demographics of public schools or the overall levels of integration in
urban districts.
Urban districts' integration levels are unlikely to change in any
meaningful way even if the programs are expanded in size, as existing
private schools will be unable to accommodate all of the voucher students.
This is true not only because there is a limited supply of private schools
generally, but also because voucher programs have not been-and likely
will not be-sufficiently generous to allow voucher students to attend
expensive private schools. The private schools available for voucher
students will thus continue to be even more limited than the already limited
supply of private schools generally. Although it seems fair to assume that
new private schools would develop in response to an expanded voucher
program, these schools presumably would be filled primarily with voucher
students, which obviously would do little to change a district's overall
integration levels.
Again, none of this is to deny that integration levels may increase or
decrease slightly in districts with school choice plans. It is instead to
suggest that such marginal changes, which garner a great deal of attention
in the academic literature on charter schools and vouchers,2 97 should not
distract us from the larger picture. Unless the politics change, the larger
picture will remain dominated by racial and socioeconomic segregation,
with a splash of exceptional, integrated areas here and there. To provide a
better glimpse of this picture and a more concrete sense of the likely impact
of choice, we have organized data drawn from a representative sample of
American public school districts across the country. As is clear from the
table below, we endeavored to report demographic data from four different
types of school districts-large urban, small urban, suburban, and rural.
Within each of those classifications, we provide data on three different
school districts from different geographic locations within the United
States.
297. See sources cited supra notes 261-265.
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TABLE 1. RESIDENCE29 8 AND PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLLMENT29 9
BY RACE AND POVERTY RATE
3
00
Res. Res. Res. Res. School Schoi School Schoot School
_________ Wite Blak Hisp. father) White Rfacc Hisp. (other) Poverty
Urban:
New York City 39.5 28.7 24.4 7.4 15.7 35.8 37.5 11.0 69.6
Los Angeles 35.8 14.0 39.9 10.3 10.9 13.8 68.5 6.8 73.3
Chicago 37.3 39.1 19.6 4.0 10.3 53.7 32.6 3.4 *70.1
Small Urban: I
Charl.-Meck. 64.6 31.8 1.4 2.2 50.9 41.7 2.9 4.5 38.1
Indianapolis 75.2 22.6 1.1 1.1 38.4 58.5 2.4 0.8 *53.5
Portland, OR 82.6 7.7 3.2 6.51 66.7 16.0 6.4 10.9 38.2
Suburban:
Plano, TX 85.4 4.0 6.2 4.3 75.5 6.1 76 10.8 *3.5
Bellevue, WA 85.0 2.2 2.5 10.3 70.1 3.7 6.5 19.6 *7.8
Loudoun Cty., VA 87.7 7.1 2.5 2.7 81.9 8.7 4.7 4.7 4.2
Rural:
Gilbert, AZ 84.8 1.5 11.6 2.1 84.4 2.2 10.6 2.8 ' 9.1
Moore, OK 88.5 1.8 3.4 6.4 80.1 4.3 3.9 11.6 *10.3
St. Johns Cty., FL 88.3 8.7 2.3 0.8 86.2 11.0 1.7 1.1 °15.1
298. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 47-49 tbl.48 (1998) (giving 1990 U.S. census data).
299. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS: 2000, at 116 tbl.93 (2001) (presenting fall 1987 enrollment data).
300. Except where otherwise indicated, "school poverty" reflects the percentage of a school
district's students eligible for the free or reduced-price lunch program, and the data are drawn
from NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 100
LARGEST PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
1999-2000, at 28-29 tbl.9 (2001). Data for district figures noted with * are drawn from COUNCIL
OF THE GREAT CITY SCHS., NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS: BASELINE INDICATORS:
1990-91, at 118-211 (1992). We could not locate reliable school free or reduced-price lunch
program eligibility data for all school districts, and those districts are noted with '. For these
districts we report general school poverty rate data for five- to seventeen-year-olds drawn from
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 299, at 117 Ibl.95.
The school poverty rate is typically lower than the percentage of students eligible for free
and reduced-price lunch, as students whose families are above the poverty level by a certain
amount are still eligible for federal lunch programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b)(1)(A) (1994)
(providing, inter alia, that students from families below 185% of the federal poverty level are
eligible for reduced-price lunch). The difference in poverty rates between some of the districts is
thus slightly exaggerated because of the different data used. Nevertheless, it remains very safe to
conclude that there is a stark difference between urban and suburban district student poverty.
Finally, as between the two types of data, we feel that free and reduced-price lunch program
eligibility is a more probative proxy for student socioeconomic status, especially in the school
context. It is also the criteria used to determine federal Title I aid, which is designed to assist
"poor" students. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994).
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The data presented in Table 1 reflect the general trends outlined above
and raise several points that warrant discussion. To begin, white enrollment
in the nation's largest districts (New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago)
is comparatively minimal, principally because these districts experienced
significant losses of white students. Equally important, the percentage of
poor students in each of these districts is quite high, nearing or exceeding
seventy percent. The high degree of racial and socioeconomic isolation
within these districts indicates that intradistrict choice plans there would
have little chance of significantly altering levels of integration. To the
extent that the relatively few white and nonpoor students are clustered in
particular schools, intradistrict choice may improve integration. On the
other hand, to the extent those students are evenly distributed, choice could
increase segregation. Both movements, though, will be at the margins. No
matter how evenly one might disburse students within urban districts, these
schools will remain majority-minority and majority poor.
Another notable demographic feature of large urban districts is that the
proportion of whites remaining in these large cities exceeds, in many
instances by more than 100%, the proportion of white students attending
public schools. Thus, not only do white families avail themselves of school
choice by departing urban areas when their children reach school age (or
never living in cities to begin with), those white families who do live in the
nation's largest cities avail themselves of private schools at a rate that
greatly exceeds their nonwhite counterparts. White families' mobility-
both in terms of departing urban for suburban areas and departing public for
private schools-fuels a disproportionate absence of white schoolchildren
in urban public schools and generates levels of racial isolation in urban
public schools that exceed what residential integration levels predict. This,
again, suggests that choice plans that include vouchers for private schools
may increase integration levels by tapping into the white student population
in private schools. Conversely, it also suggests that plans limited to choice
among public schools in these districts have no real chance-absent
significant demographic changes-of altering the drastic degree of racial
isolation that currently exists.
If we turn our attention to smaller urban districts, we see a good deal of
variation even among just the three sample districts. Some of the variation
flows from different demographics within traditionally drawn urban
districts. Indianapolis is majority-minority, for example, while Portland is
majority white, which will affect the opportunities for increased racial
integration through intradistrict choice. Similarly, there are fewer poor
students in Portland than in Indianapolis, which would make it easier to
achieve socioeconomic integration in Portland because fewer students
would have to change schools to achieve this goal.
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Some of the variation among these districts has less to do with the
demographics of the cities themselves and more to do with how the district
lines are drawn. Many Northern and Western metropolitan areas are divided
into a large number of relatively small, independent school districts that
usually track city lines. This approach contrasts with a number of
metropolitan areas in the South, such as Charlotte-Mecklenburg, that
organize school districts along county lines."' County-wide school district
attendance zones reduce the possibility for nearby predominantly white
public school districts and thereby enhance the prospect for integrated
schools." 2 Because they also include suburban areas, the overall poverty
rates in such districts also tend to be lower than in districts that only include
central cities.
Choice plans within districts that include cities and suburbs almost
always have a greater chance of improving racial and socioeconomic
integration than choice plans confined to districts that only include central
cities. But the choice must be fairly widespread and must essentially require
the abandonment of neighborhood assignments or neighborhood
preferences. This may be especially difficult to accomplish in a number of
these Southern districts, which are just now being released from
desegregation decrees that required busing in order to achieve and maintain
integration. (Charlotte-Mecklenburg, for example, was just declared unitary
in September 2001.)303 Often the drive for unitary status is motivated by a
desire within the district to return to neighborhood schools; those
neighborhood schools, in turn, because of lingering residential patterns,
would be largely segregated by race.3" Under those circumstances, the odds
that a district released from a busing plan will choose to adopt a choice plan
that rejects neighborhood assignments seem fairly slim.
On the other hand, if the drive for unitary status is not a popular one,
and if there is political support for continuing integration efforts,
transitioning from mandatory busing to controlled choice may actually be
easier in these metropolitan districts than elsewhere. In Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, for example, most reports suggest that the desegregation plan
was politically popular and that the drive for unitary status was not widely
supported. 5 Charlotte-Mecklenburg thus may be fertile ground for a
301. Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80
MINN. L. REV. 825, 841 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of the South's county-line school
districts on bolstering school integration levels).
302. Id.
303. See Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001).
304. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, for example, residential areas continue to be very segregated
by race. See id. at 311 (Traxler, J., concurring). See generally ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 268
(arguing that the dismantling of desegregation decrees is causing schools, especially in the South,
to resegregate).
305. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 144, at 215-54; Douglas M. Jarrell & Scott W. Gaylord,
Will 4th Circuit Continue Race-Based Assignments?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 11, 2000, at B9.
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widespread, intradistrict choice plan that offers an alternative means to
maintain racial and socioeconomic integration; indeed, the district has
already begun contemplating such a plan. °6
The sample rural and suburban districts, finally, present a picture that is
nearly the perfect opposite of that presented by large, urban districts. The
rural and suburban districts are predominantly white and middle-class. The
rural schools are between roughly eighty-five and eighty-nine percent
white, as are the suburban schools. Poverty rates are higher in the rural than
in the suburban schools, but poverty in the rural districts is still far below
that of the urban districts. Choice confined to suburban and rural districts,
therefore, would not significantly affect racial or socioeconomic integration
levels in the schools in these districts, because the students are nearly all
white and middle-class. Again, intradistrict choice in these districts could
alleviate or exacerbate racial or socioeconomic isolation, depending on the
current distribution of students, but the overall impact on integration levels
would necessarily be slight.
B. Academic Achievement
For many involved in the choice debate, the ultimate barometer of
success or failure is student academic achievement. We tackle this issue
second not because we quarrel with that ranking of priorities, but rather
because academic achievement and integration often intertwine. To be sure,
exactly what causes some students to perform well and others to perform
poorly is endlessly debated in the literature. Amid a vigorous debate, a
consensus exists that a student's own socioeconomic status, as well as the
socioeconomic status of the student's peers, greatly affect the student's
academic achievement and social behavior." 7 There is also some agreement
that good teachers, strong principals, small schools, small class sizes, and
parental involvement in schools can improve achievement, but the
306. See SCHOOL CHOICE 2001: WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE STATES 169-70 (Robert E.
Moffit et al. eds., 2001). Districts, of course, may be constitutionally prohibited from explicitly
using racial criteria in student assignment, including any school choice plan. The extent to which
race can be used in student assignment outside of the remedial context remains an unsettled
constitutional question. See Note, supra note 129. The use of socioeconomic status for student
assignment is more clearly constitutional, as it would not trigger strict scrutiny. For just this
reason, Wake County, North Carolina, recently adopted a socioeconomic integration plan to take
the place of its racial integration plan. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 251-54.
307. James Coleman was the first to report this phenomenon in his famous 1966 study for the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which has since become known simply as the
Coleman Report. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 301-04 (1966). Scores of subsequent studies have
confirmed Coleman's conclusion. For citations to the literature, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 23,
at 25-28; and Ryan, supra note 20, at 287 n. 167.
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significance of these variables remains subject to debate.3"8 Added to these
specific areas of contest is the more general dispute over the extent to
which expenditures correlate with achievement-i.e., over how much
money "matters." o
We do not wish to add fuel to these debates, although we must note that
it seems clear that something as complex as academic achievement almost
assuredly does not pivot on any single variable, such as funding, teacher
quality, or class size. We instead focus on a fact beyond dispute: Schools
with a majority of poor students rarely, if ever, perform as well as their
middle-class counterparts. This holds true even when substantial resources
are provided to these schools. There are several reasons why this is so, as
we explain below, but the most important point is the clear and undisputed
one that schools of concentrated poverty almost always perform poorly. If
school choice plans, as we predict, do little to alter the demographics of
schools or to break apart and preclude schools of concentrated poverty, it
follows that those plans will likely do little to alter the student achievement
levels within those schools. Again, there will likely be some movement in
both directions at the margins, but the larger picture will be one of stasis.
We begin with evidence regarding the relationship between concentrated
poverty and academic achievement, and then turn to emerging data on
existing choice programs, which thus far support our hypothesis that limited
choice plans will have a limited impact on student achievement.
1. Concentrated Poverty and Academic Achievement
High-poverty schools, especially high-poverty urban schools, almost
always have lower levels of academic achievement than do low-poverty
schools. Studies reaching this conclusion abound. A 1997 longitudinal
study of 40,000 students, for example, concluded that "It]he poverty level
of the school (over and above the economic status of an individual student)
is negatively related to standardized achievement scores."31 This study
confirmed that "the poverty level of certain schools places disadvantaged
308. For a further discussion of research on this point, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at
86-90.
309. For research generally skeptical of a correlation between educational spending and
educational achievement, see ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK (1994);
ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE 277-81 (2d ed. 2000); and Eric A.
Hanushek, The Impact of Differential Expenditures on School Performance, EDUC. RESEARCHER,
May 1989, at 45. For research generally supportive of such a correlation, see Ronald F. Ferguson,
Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 465 (1991); and Larry V. Hedges et aL., Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies
of the Effects of Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr. 1994,
at 5.
310. MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON
STUDENT OUTCOMES 73 (1997).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20021 2103
The Yale Law Journal
children in double jeopardy. School poverty depresses the scores of all
students in a school where at least half the students are eligible for
subsidized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when over 75 percent
of students live in low-income households." 3 ' A similar study conducted in
1993 found that students in low-poverty schools typically score fifty to
seventy-five percent higher on reading and math tests than do students in
high-poverty schools."'
In addition to depressing achievement, attending a high-poverty school
also depresses academic attainment. Students attending high-poverty
schools are more likely to drop out than students attending low-poverty
schools.313 This helps explain why dropout rates remain alarmingly high in
many cities. The average dropout rate in the nation's forty-seven largest
school districts is more than twice the national average of 12 .1%.34 In
individual districts, the dropout rates astonish. In 1998, for example, the
overall dropout rate in Cleveland was seventy-two percent; in Memphis and
Milwaukee, it exceeded fifty-six percent." 5 Problems also persist for those
students who remain in high-poverty, urban schools. Urban teachers report
spending more time on classroom order and discipline than their nonurban
counterparts,3 16 as well as more problems relating to student absenteeism,"'
pregnancy,3"' and weapons possession.319 Finally, those who manage to
graduate from high-poverty, urban schools are less likely to attend college
than those who graduate from low-poverty schools."'
There are a number of reasons why high-poverty schools tend to
produce such dismal academic records. One of the most important is peer
influence. In 1966, James Coleman released a mammoth and controversial
report on the nation's schools, which concluded that in determining student
achievement, family background matters the most, followed by the
311. Id. at 12.
312. MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: THE CONGRESSIONALLY
MANDATED STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY-INTERIM REPORT 44
(1993).
313. KAHLENBERc, supra note 23, at 54.
314. See COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCHS., supra note 300, at xvi (reporting a four-year
dropout rate for the nation's largest forty-seven school districts in 1990 of 26.1%); NAT'L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 299, at 129 tbl.107 (reporting the national dropout rate in 1990
at 12.1%).
315. JAY P. GREENE, MANHATTAN INST., HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (2001). It must be noted that Greene's definition of "dropout" is fairly
expansive and includes some students who are typically left out of dropout calculations, such as
students who dropped out but later earned a GED.
316. LAURA LIPPMAN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc.,
URBAN SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGE OF LOCATION AND POVERTY 116 (1996).
317. Id. at 114 figs.4.41-.42.
318. Id. at 124 figs.4.56-.57.
319. Id. at 120 figs.4.50-.51.
320. KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 54 ("Few students graduating from high-poverty high
schools are likely to be going on to college: just 15 percent of inner-city graduates do." ).
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characteristics of the student body.32" ' What mattered very little, he
concluded, was school spending.322 Although scores of social scientists
continue to debate the influence of spending,323 a remarkable consensus has
formed on the point that the socioeconomic status of one's peers matters a
great deal. 24 Indeed, study after study confirms that the social composition
of the student body is more highly related to achievement, independent of
the student's own social background, than is any other school factor.325
Education commentators of every stripe acknowledge the robustness and
consistency of these findings." 6 Simply put, "Filf there is one thing that is
more related to a child's academic achievement than coming from a poor
household, it is going to school with children from other poor
households." 327
The explanation for this effect is both straightforward and intuitive.
Students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, like their parents and
teachers, tend to have higher expectations and aspirations regarding
academic achievement. In schools, as in other communities, most
participants tend to conform to the dominant culture. In schools that are
majority middle-class, that culture typically is one that values academic
achievement and generally expects students to attend college. This school
environment is contagious; it affects most students and thus tends to raise
the aspirations and motivation of poorer students. In schools that are
majority poor, by contrast, expectations and motivations tend to be fairly
depressed."' Indeed, in poor inner-city schools, researchers have found that
the dominant school culture often actively denigrates academic success,
associating success in school with "acting white."329 To be sure, this results
not from some moral failing of poor or minority students, but rather from
the starkly different realities confronting many of these students. Presented
321 COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 307, at 298-305.
322. See id. at 21-22, 296-97,312-16.
323. See sources cited supra note 309.
324. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 53
(1996) (stating that the powerful influence of the socioeconomic status of peers on student
achievement is "[olne of the most consistent findings in research on education").
325. James S. Coleman, Toward Open Schools, PUB. INT., Fall 1967, at 20 (summarizing the
findings of the Coleman Report). For a discussion of the numerous studies confirming this point,
see KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 26-28.
326. KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 37 ("'[Money is not the only issue that determines
inequality. A more important factor, I am convinced, is the makeup of the student enrollment, who
is sitting next to you in class."' (quoting Jonathan Kozol)); Chester E. Finn, Jr., Education That
Works: Make the Schools Compete, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 63, 64 (acknowledging
that "'disadvantaged children [tend] to learn more when they attendi] school with middle-class
youngsters").
327. Trine Tsouderos, Schools Out of Balance: Murfreesboro Rezoning May Fix Inequalities,
TENNESSEAN, Dec. 27, 1998, at 2A (quoting James Guthrie).
328. For a discussion of the numerous studies confirming these observations, see
KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 48-58.
329. Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping with the
"Burden of 'Acting White,"' 18 UR3. REV. 176, 177 (1986).
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with few positive role models and surrounded by poverty and despair,
poorer students have little reason to expect that hard work in school could
lead to success afterward, and some poor, minority students may come to
define themselves in opposition to white, middle-class culture.33
Evidencing the importance of peers are examples and studies that show
positive gains from socioeconomic integration and relatively little gains
from increased funding in predominantly poor schools. As for the former,
the overwhelming weight of the research suggests that one of the most
promising ways to improve student academic achievement is to put poorer,
struggling students into majority middle-class schools, with students who
want to excel academically and whose families support such goals. 3 1 By
contrast, there is very little evidence that increased expenditures in
predominantly poor schools have thus far improved academic achievement.
Milliken 11 funding, for example, has been of very limited success, even
when quite generous. 3 2  Similarly, the largest federal compensatory
program, Title I, has been notoriously ineffective in generating sustained
achievement gains.333 In cities that spend "substantially more... than their
surrounding suburbs," moreover, Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton find that
330. The existence of an "oppositional culture" in poor, African-American neighborhoods
and schools has received increased academic attention. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig,
The Burden of "Acting White ": Do Black Adolescents Disparage Academic Achievement?, in THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 375, 376-84 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds.,
1998). The theory is that when subordinated minorities, including African Americans, have been
defeated in attempts to assimilate, they develop a sense of collective identity in opposition to the
majority culture. Thus,
[i]f whites speak Standard American English, succeed in school, work hard at routine
jobs, marry, and support their children, then to be "'black" requires one to speak Black
English, do poorly in school, denigrate conventional employment, shun marriage, and
raise children outside of marriage. To do otherwise would be to " act white."
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 261, at 168. Significantly, although most recent studies focus on
African Americans, adherence to an oppositional culture seems to have more to do with class than
with race, as studies indicate that poor whites are also more likely than affluent whites to devalue
education and denigrate middle-class achievement norms. KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 52.
Nonetheless, the theory remains, as one would expect, fairly controversial. See, e.g., Richard H.
Sander, Book Review, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 143, 150 (1994) (reviewing MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 261) (challenging the "generalizations" that "fit well into the common media images
picturing the deepening failure of inner-city schools").
331. Richard J. Murnane. Evidence, Analysis, and Unanswered Questions, 51 HARV. EDUC.
REv. 483, 486 (1981); see also KAI-LENBERG, supra note 23, at 25-29 (describing numerous
studies confirming this point); Ryan, supra note 20, at 287 & n. 167, 297-301 (same). Importantly,
the evidence also suggests that the introduction of poorer students into more affluent schools does
not depress the achievement of affluent pupils, provided that the schools remain majority middle-
class. KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 38-42. Although this may seem too good to be true at first,
it makes sense when one recognizes that the majority culture of a school determines the school
environment. Id. at 39-42.
332. Ryan, supra note 20, at 289-91.
333. See Gary Natriello & Edward McDiI, Title 1: From Funding Mechanism to Educational
Program, in HARD WORK FOR GOOD SCHOOLS: FACTS NOT FADS IN TITLE I REFORM 31, 33-34
(Gary Orfield & Elizabeth H. DeBray eds., 1999) (reviewing research on Title I and concluding
that, despite billions of dollars spent and huge increases over time in funding, the program has
produced only "small, short-term, achievement effects" ).
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performance is still worse when the city schools are segregated by race and
socioeconomic status."' Other studies, finally, have found that poor
students in middle-class schools achieve higher levels of academic
achievement than do poor students in predominantly poor schools, even
when the predominantly poor schools spend more per pupil." As David
Rusk, author of one of these studies, concluded, to improve education we
should focus less on "moving money" and more on moving families and
students.336
This is not to suggest that peers are the sole determinant of academic
success or that increasing expenditures would necessarily be futile. In
addition to peers, teacher quality clearly influences academic achievement,
as does the degree of parental involvement in the school. 37 But just as
motivated peers are typically found in more affluent schools, so too are
high-quality teachers and active parents.33 This combination of variables,
more than any single one, creates a nearly insuperable set of interacting
obstacles for high-poverty schools, as Richard Kahlenberg forcefully
describes:
The portrait of the nation's high-poverty schools is not just a racist
or classist stereotype: high-poverty schools are marked by students
who have less motivation and are often subject to negative peer
influences; parents who are generally less active, exert less clout in
school affairs, and garner fewer financial resources for the school;
334. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 324, at 83.
335. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 28, 36-37 (discussing studies); Ryan, supra note
20, at 298-300 (same).
336. David Rusk, To Improve Poor Children's Test Scores, Move Poor Families, ABELL
REP., June-July 1998, at 1, 5. Rusk found that 61% of low-income students in Alamo Heights
passed the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, while only 39% of low-income students in San
Antonio passed, even though San Antonio spent more per pupil. In Alamo Heights, however, only
17% of students were low-income, while San Antonio's student poverty rate was 88%. Id.
Benefits from greater socioeconomic integration of students, it should be noted, bear on
nonacademic student behavior as well. See Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School's
Racial and Socioeconomic Mix Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS 321, 327 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (reporting that high
school students attending higher socioecornomnc schools are less likely to drop out and become
pregnant than similar students attending lower socioeconomic schools).
337. On the influence of good teachers on achievement, see MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN
LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 138-45 (1997); Ronald Ferguson, Can Schools Narrow the Black-
White Test Score Gap?, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 330, at 318, 365-66
and Adam Gamoran, Resource Allocation and the Effects of Schooling: A Sociological
Perspective, in MICROLEVEL SCHOOL FINANCE 207, 211-13 (David Monk & Julie Underwood
eds., 1988). On the influence of active parents on achievement, see CHUBB & MOE, supra note I,
at 16; TIMOTHY Z. KEITH ET AL., EFFECTS OF PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT ON EIGHTH GRADE
ACHIEVEMENT (1992); Joyce L. Epstein, Parent Involvement: What Research Says to
Administrators, 19 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 119 (1987); and Esther Ho Sui-Chu & J. Douglas
Willms, Effects of Parental Involvement on Eighth-Grade Achievement, 69 Soc. EDUC. 126
(1996).
338. For an exhaustive review of the literature on this point, see KAHLENBERG, supra note
23, at 61-76.
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and teachers who tend to be less qualified, to have lower
expectations, and to teach a watered-down curriculum.339
These factors point to a devastating paradox. Racial and socioeconomic
patterns currently interact with public school student assignment policies in
a manner that consigns those students most in need of high-quality
educational services to educational environments less equipped to deliver
them.
The key question is whether school choice will change any of this. Our
analysis in the first Part indicates that we should not expect much change.
Instead, it suggests that most school choice plans will do little to alter the
demographics of schools, and thus will do little to break apart the
concentrated poverty that exists in many urban school districts. If choice
schools remain similar in socioeconomic status to current public schools,
there is little reason to assume that choice alone will improve academic
achievement. Concentrated poverty in choice schools, in other words, will
be just as daunting an obstacle as it is in existing public schools.
To be sure, there may be some improvement. Choice schools may be
smaller than regular public schools, and they may have smaller classes,
both of which have been found to correlate with increased achievement.'34
We might also imagine some greater parental involvement, for example,
when parents choose their child's school. It is unlikely that there will be
significant increases, however, given that some parents will have no
additional time to spend and that some choice schools will be farther from a
student's home, making participation more difficult for parents. We could
also imagine that some high-quality teachers will be drawn to choice
schools, especially if those schools offer teachers more autonomy.34' But it
seems unrealistic to expect a significant migration of strong teachers to
choice schools absent higher pay. It seems equally unrealistic to expect that
sufficient resources will be devoted to choice schools to support higher pay
for teachers than is currently available in many middle-class, suburban
schools. Indeed, school choice is often proposed as an alternative to
increasing expenditures in predominantly poor schools, and it often entails
providing students less funding rather than more.34 In short, there is some
reason to expect limited academic gains from school choice, but not much
more. Research on the limited existing plans buttresses this hypothesis.
339. Id. at 47.
340. See id. at 89 (discussing research on class size).
341. See CAROLINE M. HOxBY, WOULD SCHOOL CHOICE CHANGE THE TEACHING
PROFESSION? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7866, 2000),
http://www.nber.org/papersw7866.
342. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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2. Evidence from Existing Choice Plans
Evidence on the actual or potential benefits of school choice, especially
when it involves private schools, has always been controversial. The
controversy originated with Professor Coleman, who along with several
colleagues published the first major quantitative study exploring differences
in achievement between public and private (principally Catholic) school
students. Coleman and his colleagues found that students in private schools
performed slightly better, after controlling for the students' race and
socioeconomic background.343 Their findings, not surprisingly given the
stakes, attracted sustained criticism.3" More recently, for every study
finding an advantage for private schools,345 another study concludes that
little or no such advantage exists.4 Indeed, the controversy surrounding the
research is becoming so searing that at least one observer worries that the
debate itself will blunt the potential influence of high-quality research on
the growing policy debate surrounding vouchers. 47
Despite the swirling controversy, some helpful and relatively
uncontroversial conclusions may be drawn. To begin, there is little evidence
yet that charter schools significantly improve student achievement. Some of
this has to do with the paucity of data: There are few student achievement
data sets for charter schools that are amenable to sophisticated and nuanced
analyses. What data do exist, moreover, are either inconclusive or
contradictory. For example, a 1999 study of Arizona charter schools
concludes that "it appears that charter schools are not performing very
differently from other regular [Arizona] public schools."" That same
report also notes, however, that the achievement data "provide[] some
indication of student progress in charter schools." 349 A similar evaluation of
Arizona charter schools one year later found more positive results.
Researchers from the Goldwater Institute evaluated three years of data
(1997-1999) and concluded that "students enrolled in charter schools for
343. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 180 (1982).
344. See, e.g., Arthur S. Goldberger & Glen G. Cain, The Causal Analysis of Cognitive
Outcomes in the Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore Report, 55 SOC. EDUC. 103 (1982) (criticizing the
Coleman study for flaws in sampling, research design, and sample bias).
345. See, e.g., Caroline Minter Hoxby, The Effects of Private School Vouchers on Schools
and Students, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE 177 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996).
346. See, e.g., Adam Gamoran, Student Achievement in Public Magnet, Public
Comprehensive, and Private City High Schools, 18 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 1
(1996).
347. Jeffrey R. Henig, School Choice Outcomes, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY, supra note 96, at 68, 98.
348. LoRI A. MULHOLLAND, ARIZONA CHARTER SCHOOL PROGRESS EVALUATION 39
(1999), at http://www.ade.state.az.us/charterschools/info/CharterSchoolStatusMainReport3-15-
99.pdf.
349. Id. (emphasis added).
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two and three consecutive years have an advantage over students staying in
TPSs [traditional public schools] for the same period of time." 
350
None of these reports, however, claims that charter schools have yet
succeeded in significantly boosting achievement. This may be due in part to
the fact that many charter schools are fairly new. It is nonetheless consistent
with earlier research demonstrating the importance of the socioeconomic
status of schools. Charter schools tend to reflect the status of the districts in
which they are located. It would be surprising, therefore, if these schools
consistently posted significantly stronger academic results.
There is more positive news regarding student achievement in voucher
programs, but the scholarly debate on this question often generates more
heat than light. Studies of the publicly funded Milwaukee voucher program
illustrate the scholarly controversy.3 1 On the one hand, a study by the state-
appointed program evaluator found no systematic differences between
voucher students in Milwaukee's private schools and their counterparts in
Milwaukee's public schools." 2 However, reanalyses of the same data by
other researchers uncovered systematic differences.353  In a third
independent analysis of the Milwaukee data, Professor Rouse found a
modest systemic advantage for private schools in mathematics achievement
and no such advantage in reading scores.354 In his survey of the empirical
research on the influence of educational vouchers on student academic
achievement, Professor Levin, no advocate of vouchers,355 concurred in
"Rouse's careful analysis." '56 Similar controversy has surrounded studies
of privately funded voucher programs, with one team of researchers
350. Lewis Solmon et al., Does Charter School Attendance Improve Test Scores?: The
Arizona Results 4 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
351. It should be noted that while academic disputes concerning such technical issues as
sample bias, control groups, and regression equations are usually confined to academic journals,
such disputes surrounding the Milwaukee voucher program have managed to spill into the
national press. See, e.g., Bob Davis, Class Warfare: Dueling Professors Have Milwaukee Dazed
over School Vouchers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1I, 1996, at Al.
352. JOHN F. WITVE ET AL., FIFrH-YEAR REPORT: MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE
PROGRAM (1995), http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/choice/choice-rep95.html; JOHN F. WRITE, THE
MARKET APPROACH To EDUCATION 125, 133-43 (2000) (arguing that voucher students in private
schools in Milwaukee have not improved in math or reading).
353. See JAY P. GREENE ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MILWAUKEE
EXPERIMENT (Program in Educ. Pol'y & Governance, Harvard Univ., Occasional Paper 97-1,
1997), http:f/www.ksg.harvard.edulpepg/other/mil.htm; Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A
Report Card, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 47, 70-71 (1998) (arguing that voucher students in private
schools in Milwaukee have improved their achievement in their third and fourth years).
354. Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 552 (1998).
355. Professor Levin acknowledges that educational vouchers can generate positive
individual gains, but he concludes that these are offset by the negative social consequences. See
Henry M. Levin, Educational Vouchers: Effectiveness, Choice, and Costs, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 373, 374 (1998).
356. Id. at 378.
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reporting positive findings and the next team criticizing the other's
methodology. 57
Despite the lingering disputes, some fairly clear findings are beginning
to emerge. As Jay Greene observes, in the last few years there have been
seven random-assignment3 8 and three non-random-assignment studies of
school choice experiments from eight different programs, conducted by
several different researchers."' Although they disagree on the magnitude,
the authors of all ten voucher studies find at least some academic benefits to
students enrolled in the voucher programs."6 It is surely possible that one or
even a few of the studies might be flawed, but the probability that all ten
studies might be wrong is very low.
Consistent findings of academic benefits associated with voucher
programs that place students in private schools comport with the research
regarding the importance of socioeconomic integration. Many private
schools-including urban Catholic schools-are more integrated
economically (and racially) than public schools.36" ' To the extent poorer
students are using their vouchers to enter higher socioeconomic status
schools, existing research would predict that their academic performance
would improve. However, if and when space runs out in existing private
schools and poor voucher students end up in newly created, predominantly
poor private schools, we should expect the academic benefits associated
with private school vouchers to wane.
That the benefits from private school voucher programs would likely
wane as capacity is reached does not mean that choice plans could never
result in overall academic gains in the absence of significant socioeconomic
integration. It just means that the gains will likely be fairly limited. The
example of Catholic schools, which is more nuanced than generally
portrayed, is again helpful. High-poverty Catholic schools generally
outperform high-poverty public schools, which suggests that changing the
school environment rather than altering the student body can produce some
357. Compare William G. Howell et al., Test-Score Effects of School Vouchers in Dayton,
Ohio, New York City, and Washington, D.C.: Evidence from Randomized Field Trials, Paper
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Sept. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (finding positive academic gains), with Kate
Zernike, Doubt Is Cast on Blacks' Gains Under School Voucher Program, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 15, 2000, at A8 (reporting methodological criticisms of the study).
358. Professor Hoxby has described random-assignment as the "gold-standard" of research
designs. See CAROLINE M. HOXBY, CAMBRIDGE SCH. CHOICE CONFERENCE, EFFECTS OF
VOUCHERS ON STUDENTS AND FAMILIES 72, 85 (Manhattan Inst., Conference Series No. 5, 2000)
(describing the desired methodological characteristics of empirical choice research); see also Jay
P. Greene, The Surprising Consensus on School Choice, PUB. INT., Summer 2001, at 19, 19.
359. Greene, supra note 358, at 26.
360. Id.
361. See ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 73
(1993); Peterson & Greene, supra note 295, at 36.
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academic gains.3 62 At the same time, however, high-poverty Catholic
schools do not perform as well as their more affluent counterparts, nor do
inner-city Catholic schools serving high concentrations of low-income
children perform as well as more socioeconomically integrated suburban
public schools. 363 This is just what the research regarding the importance of
socioeconomic integration would suggest, and it is perfectly consistent with
our hypothesis that choice plans that are limited in scope are unlikely to
produce more than limited academic gains.
C. School Choice and School Competition
There are two basic questions regarding the relationship between school
choice and school competition. The first is whether increased competition
among schools generates improvements in education, and the second is
whether school choice plans will foster much competition. The first
question has received a good deal of attention, and the emerging evidence
suggests, as we explain, that there are indeed gains from competition. The
second question has not received as much attention, but it is probably the
more important one given the political constraints we identify in this
Article. And here the evidence supports what common sense would
suggest: The more limited the plan, the more limited the competition. To
the extent competition is limited, the gains from competition will also be
limited.
School choice advocates rarely dwell on the connection between
socioeconomic status and academic achievement.64 Instead, they tend to
place a great deal of faith in the power of competition to improve schools
generally and to boost academic achievement in particular. The precise
causal link between increased competition and academic gains is rarely
specified, however, and the theoretical connection between competition and
overall educational gains is rarely explained. In theory, it is not entirely
clear why competition through school choice would inevitably produce
overall gains.365 It may be that choice results in advantaged parents and
students clustering in particular schools, which would benefit those schools
but do nothing for, or harm, less advantaged schools. (Consider here the
inequalities among colleges and universities.) Put differently, the same self-
sorting that might increase family-level utility might simultaneously
decrease net social utility by reducing the socially optimal level of
362. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 101.
363. See BRYK ET AL., supra note 361, at 264-66.
364. Kahlenberg is an important exception. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 47-76.
365. CAROLINE MINTER HOXBY, DOES COMPETITION AMONG PUBLIC SCHOOLS BENEFIT
STUDENTS AND TAXPAYERS? 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4979,
1994), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w4979.
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socioeconomic integration. Local residents, in addition, might have less
reason to care about local school quality because residence would no longer
determine school placement, and housing values and local school quality
would no longer be as tightly linked. Any competitive gains through choice
might thus be offset by losses from a reduction in monitoring by local
residents.6
Notwithstanding the theoretical uncertainty, emerging empirical
evidence suggests that existing competition has increased overall academic
gains, although the evidence supports only tentative conclusions and is
disputed.367 The best work on this topic has been done by Professor
Caroline Hoxby. In a widely cited paper assessing competitive effects
generated by public schools, Professor Hoxby found positive effects on
student achievement, further noting that these effects are more pronounced
in districts with less-educated adults and in districts located in states with
higher degrees of local control.3 68  Additional findings suggest that
competition can increase high school graduation rates,369 lead to greater
resources being directed to the classroom,37 and increase overall school
performance.37
If we assume, as seems quite plausible, that there are positive benefits
to competition, the question that remains for school choice programs is
whether they will spur much productive competition. The evidence
suggests, as one would expect, that limited choice plans produce limited
competitive effects.372 Consider, for example, the evidence from Arizona.
Because of the number of charter schools there, Arizona provides
something approaching a natural experiment for assessing their competitive
366. See Cecilia Elena Rouse & Michele McLaughlin, Can the Invisible Hand Improve
Education?: A Review of Competition and School Efficiency 8 (Feb. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) (suggesting that school choice "may decrease the monitoring
incentive of residents living near 'good' schools since property values would no longer be as
dependent on the quality of the neighborhood schools"); cf FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4-13
(showing that homeowners monitor government policies that affect their property values). To the
extent school choice breaks the link between the quality of local schools and property values, it
could also reduce incentives to support generous funding of schools by nonparent homeowners.
See McUsic, supra note 77, at 121.
367. Compare, e.g., GREENE, supra note 187 (finding positive competitive effects in Florida),
with Gregory Camilli & Katrina Bulkley, Critique of "An Evaluation of the Florida A-Plus
Accountability and School Choice Program," 9 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES (2001), at
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaalv9n7 (challenging Greene's findings on the Florida program).
368. See HOXBY, supra note 365; see also Rouse & McLaughlin, supra note 366, at 40.
369. See Thomas S. Dee, Competition and the Quality of Public Schools, 17 ECON. EDUC.
REV. 419 (1998).
370. See CAROLINE M. HOXBY, Do PRIVATE SCHOOLS PROVIDE COMPETITION FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS? 28-29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4978, 1994),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4978; Thomas S. Dee, Expcnse Preference and Student
Achievement in School Districts 21 (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
371. See GREENE, supra note 187, at ii.
372. See generally Frederick M. Hess, The Work Ahead, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 2001, at 8
(discussing the likely effects of a range of stimuli on public school performance).
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effects on other public schools. By, 1998, Arizona's charter school
legislation had spawned 222 charter schools that served approximately
20,000 students, which represented 2.3% of Arizona's total school-age
population.373 Due to the development of charter schools, some Arizona
public school districts lost more than ten percent of their student
enrollment.374
Through teacher surveys focused on changes in school policy or
practice implemented at the leadership level between 1994 and 1997,
researchers sought to assess school-district-level changes attributable to the
emergence of competition from charter schools. They observed some
competitive effects and noted that many education scholars would find
these effects to be "beneficial." 375 However, they characterized the size of
the effects as "modest" and noted the presence of a "ceiling [e]ffect." 
376
That is, public school districts do not appear to respond to competitive
pressures generated by charter schools beyond a "certain level." 3 7 7 This, of
course, makes perfect intuitive sense: The more limited the competition, the
more limited the response.
Because most school choice plans, especially those involving vouchers,
are currently quite limited, the threat to existing schools is small. Indeed,
given that enrollments and spending have generally increased over the last
ten years, losing some students through choice plans may not constitute
much of a threat at all.378 To be sure, publicity surrounding school choice,
especially publicly and privately funded voucher programs, might spur
some response from public school officials who wish to avoid the
embarrassment of students and parents lining up to apply for vouchers and
clamoring to exit the public schools. But if the amount of exit from schools
is capped at a low amount, few tangible consequences will follow for public
schools that lose a few students. This will be true not only for voucher
plans, but also for any school choice plan that offers a limited number of
students an exit option. As with integration and achievement, then, it seems
safe to conclude that limited choice plans will have limited effects on
competition and in consequence limited capacity to force public schools to
improve.
In sum, both proponents and opponents of choice policies-especially
charter schools and voucher programs--can point to empirical evidence
supporting their positions. Our sense is that the research points in a
direction favoring choice policies, though we concede that reasonable
373. Frederick Hess et al., Coping with Competition: How School Systems Respond to
School Choice 10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 28.
376. Id. at 25-26.
377. Id. at 26.
378. See Hess, supra note 372, at 8-11.
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people may differ in their interpretations of the admittedly limited and scant
data. In addition, we also believe that any optimism about existing choice
programs must yield to the constraints we identify and discuss in this
Article. Simply put, even if current choice programs succeed in terms of
enhancing integration, student achievement, and productive competition,
further success is capped by the very structure of the choice programs.
More specifically, the ability of suburbs to insulate their public schools
from the ambit of choice programs will effectively foreclose choice
programs from achieving the full benefits promised by theory. Given
suburbs' political and economic incentives, we currently see only limited
room for improvement-unless, of course, there exist ways to alter those
political and economic incentives.
III. EXPANDING SCHOOL CHOICE
If our analysis above is correct, one obvious strategy to improve the
effectiveness of school choice would be to expand school choice programs,
especially in ways that will increase opportunities for socioeconomic
integration. Given the strong relationship between student achievement and
the socioeconomic status of a student's peers, choice plans that increase
socioeconomic integration are quite likely to increase student achievement
as well. And given the strong correlation between race and poverty, choice
plans that increase socioeconomic integration are also likely to increase
racial integration.37 9 Expanding school choice programs, finally, would
increase the competition faced by public schools, which might induce many
of those schools to innovate and improve.
This is not to suggest that simply expanding school choice will lead to
improvement along all three axes we consider. Depending on how it is
structured, an expanded school choice program could lead to increased
racial and socioeconomic stratification. If all students in a state, for
example, received a voucher for use at private schools, and private schools
could in turn charge tuition that was higher than the voucher amount, it is
quite easy to imagine that the program would increase economic
stratification among schools.38 Similarly, simply expanding any and all
types of school choice will not necessarily lead to productive competition
and improvements in public schools. As suggested above, some
competition might boost overall achievement and improve schools, but
379. For a review of the social science evidence on this point, see supra notes 272-275 and
accompanying text. See also Ryan, supra note 20, at 284-307.
380. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 2, at 284 (raising this objection to vouchers); McUsic,
supra note 77, at 125-28 (same).
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other forms of competition might simply exacerbate existing inequalities
among schools."'
Despite the complexities and uncertainty, it seems reasonably clear that,
at least from the perspective of those trapped in failing schools, expanding
opportunities for school choice is worth the risk. Students in such schools,
almost by definition, do not have much to lose." 2 Moreover, the main
alternative to expanding choice-increasing funding in order to reduce
class size, hiring better teachers, and addressing the special needs of poorer
students-does not seem obviously more promising. In addition to the
political hurdles facing proposals to increase funding for failing schools,
especially urban ones,383 the efficacy of increased funding remains
debatable, as we described above. Even where increased funding does
eventually lead to improvements in academic achievement, funding alone
does not address racial or socioeconomic isolation,"M nor does it do much
on its own to increase the efficiency of public schools. Under these
circumstances, it seems worthwhile at least to experiment with expanded
choice programs that can increase socioeconomic and racial integration,
especially given the apparently strong support among the parents of
students currently stuck in failing schools. Attention to the details of
programs will be crucial, to be sure, but the fact that choice programs can
be structured in ways that either help or harm the neediest students hardly
seems like a good reason to shy away from experimenting with choice. 8
The risk calculus for those already attending good schools, as we have
explained, is much different. Students in adequate or excellent schools
might indeed gain under a choice program, as they and their parents
become able to find schools more suited to their needs, interests, or values.
On the other hand, students in good public and private schools might lose at
least some of their competitive advantage over students in poor schools if
choice programs are expanded. It is also possible that expanded choice
programs could lead to a decline in the quality of education or overall
student achievement at some existing schools, if choice results in decreased
funding or a substantial increase in students with special needs. Just as
381. See supra Section Il.C.
382. For statistics describing the state of urban schools, see, for example, Ryan, supra note
20, at 272-75. For a startling anecdotal account of several urban school systems, see JONATHAN
KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991).
383. See Ryan, supra note 229, at 480 (summarizing the findings of a study suggesting that
urban minority districts fare poorly in school finance litigation and reform).
384. For more discussion of this point, see Ryan, supra note 20, at 286-95.
385. There is an interesting parallel here to school desegregation. Decried as a failure by
opponents (just as school choice is), social science evidence suggests more accurately that
sometimes desegregation is successful in raising achievement and improving race relations,
sometimes it is not, and sometimes it makes things worse. Much depends, as intuition would
suggest, on how the desegregation plan is structured. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP, DeKalb
County, Georgia, at 6a-7a, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (No. 89-1290). The same is true
for school choice plans.
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importantly, it seems likely that, regardless of the actual consequences of
expanded school choice, many suburban parents will perceive it as
threatening. Many parents of students in good suburban schools already
exercised a form of school choice when they chose their places of
residence, and many are quite content with the status quo. Even if
expanding school choice would in fact benefit (or at least not harm) their
children, suburban parents are likely to be risk averse and wary of any
proposals that affect either the student population or the funding of
suburban schools.
The central question remaining thus comes into fairly sharp relief: Are
there politically acceptable ways to expand school choice in order to
increase and improve the opportunities for students in failing public
schools? Put more bluntly: Are there plausible ways to increase the
opportunities for poor students to attend middle-class public or private
schools? Our answer is "yes, but .... ." In the short run, advocates can
pursue a number of promising strategies, some with proven track records, to
expand school choice in politically acceptable ways. These strategies
include replicating and strengthening some existing choice programs, such
as the controlled choice program in Cambridge, Boston's METCO
program, and Milwaukee's Chapter 220 program,386 as well as devising
politically feasible incentives for suburban districts to accept urban students
and suburban parents to choose urban schools. The precise strategy or
strategies to employ will depend on local circumstances; there is no single
strategy suitable for all locales.
But: It is important to recognize that although opportunities to expand
choice exist, they are at present fairly limited. Unless political coalitions or
preferences change, suburban parents will likely tolerate only a limited
number of urban students in suburban schools, while only a limited number
of suburban parents will choose urban schools." 7 For this reason, we
believe that advocates interested in expanding opportunities for school
choice should also consider ways to alter the current political landscape.
One promising long-term approach, which we discuss at the end of this
Part, is to bolster access to preschools and to use the experience that parents
have in selecting preschools to loosen their reflexive attachment to
neighborhood elementary and secondary schools.
386. For descriptions of these plans, see supra Subsections I.B.1-2.
387. Cf Edward A. Zelinksy, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 665, 667-68 (1998) (book review) (suggesting that policies to increase residential
segregation will succeed only when "the preferences of the American people" support more
integration).
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A. Working Within Existing Political Constraints
There is a tendency in academic writings to offer a new, universal
solution to an identified problem. We think this tendency must be resisted
here. It surely would be elegant if we could offer a single solution to the
problem of how to expand school choice in productive and equitable ways.
However, the diversity of school districts and residential patterns renders a
universal solution all but impossible. In addition, although proposing new
solutions may seem more creative, it would be a mistake, we think, to
jettison all existing programs in favor of a novel plan. Instead, those
interested in expanding choice should look first to the possibility of
replicating and strengthening some existing choice programs. An additional
strategy entails devising politically feasible incentives for expanding
choice. We discuss each approach in turn, emphasizing, again, that local
circumstances will dictate which approach or combination of approaches is
most appropriate.
1. Replicating and Strengthening Existing Programs
Each of the four types of school choice plans-intradistrict,
interdistrict, charter school, and voucher-can generate opportunities for
poorer students to escape predominantly poor schools, depending on the
demographics of particular districts or metropolitan areas. Each can also
offer greater opportunities for racial integration. For school districts that are
economically and racially diverse, but in which there is a good deal of
residential segregation, expanding opportunities for intradistrict choice is
obviously a promising strategy. This could be accomplished by increasing
the number of magnet schools, allowing for transfers among different
schools within the district, or adopting the sort of "controlled choice" plan
created in Cambridge and implemented in a handful of other cities,
including Montclair, New Jersey, and Buffalo, New York.388
Controlled choice would obviously create the most opportunities for
choice, as it would eliminate neighborhood assignments and convert all
schools into choice schools; it would also avoid some of the inequities
created by magnet schools, which serve a limited number of students and
often drain off an inordinate amount of resources from a district's budget.389
It is unclear, however, how many districts would be amenable to controlled
choice; that some districts have adopted such plans indicates that controlled
choice is not out of the question, but the paucity of the plans also suggests
388. For further discussion of controlled choice plans, see supra Subsection I.B.2.
389. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 128-30 (comparing the benefits of controlled
choice to the benefits of magnet schools).
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that they are politically difficult to implement. For those interested in
creating controlled choice plans or in encouraging their proliferation, the
first step would be to study the political dynamics in places like Cambridge,
Montclair, and Buffalo in an effort to learn how to create-if possible-a
political climate conducive to such plans.390
In metropolitan areas where districts, rather than neighborhoods, are
segregated by income and race, interdistrict choice will accomplish more
than intradistrict choice. Enhancing opportunities for interdistrict choice
will not be easy, and it is not likely that suburban schools in the near future
will accept a very large number of urban transfer students. But there are
examples of successful, if limited, programs that allow urban students to
attend suburban schools. Boston's METCO program, Hartford's Project
Concern, and Milwaukee's Chapter 220 program all allow a limited number
of urban students to attend suburban schools.39" ' The keys to their success,
which could be replicated in other metropolitan areas, seem to be allowing
suburban schools to limit the number of transfer students admitted and
providing generous funding to schools that accept transfers. Both steps
reduce the actual and perceived sacrifice demanded of suburban districts by
limiting the burden on those districts, which in turn obviously limits the
scope of the programs. Nonetheless, advocates interested in expanding
interdistrict choice should pursue efforts to create programs modeled on the
METCO program and others similar to it.
Choice advocates should also consider combining such programs with
the creation of additional interdistrict magnet schools in urban areas, so that
the flow of students goes in both directions. Magnet schools do create some
problems of equity, which might be exacerbated if the schools not only
draw resources away from other schools within the district, but also do so to
educate kids from wealthier suburban districts.39 However, to the extent
magnet schools succeed in improving the academic achievement of some
district students and in attracting parents and students from the suburbs,
they may serve as examples of how schools could be structured and
financed in ways that improve achievement and racial and socioeconomic
integration. Again, given the state of many urban school districts, some
additional investments in magnet schools seem worth the risk.
390. For a study of the Cambridge plan, see NORMA TAN, THE CAMBRIDGE CONTROLLED
CHOICE PROGRAM (1990). For Montclair, see BEATRIZ C. CLEWELL & MYRA F. JOY, CHOICE IN
MONTCLAIR, NEW JERSEY (1990). For Buffalo, see Christine H. Rossell, The Buffalo Controlled
Choice Plan, 22 URB. EDUC. 328 (1987). For a general study of controlled choice, see CHARLES
V. WILLIE & MICHAEL J. ALVES, CONTROLLED CHOICE: A NEW APPROACH TO SCHOOL
DESEGREGATED EDUCATION AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT (1996).
391. See supra Subsection I.B.2 for a discussion of these plans.
392. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 128-30 (describing the "new forms of unfairness"
created by magnet schools).
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On a broader scale, efforts should be made to strengthen existing open
enrollment plans and to create open enrollment plans in the roughly thirty
states where none exists.393 To increase the effectiveness of such plans,
several steps should be taken. We list them in increasing order of difficulty.
First, information about the programs should be made more available to
parents, so that they are aware of their choices and can receive assistance in
making the best choices for their children. Second, greater transportation
assistance should be provided. Depending on the distances involved, as well
as the availability of public transportation, offering free transportation could
be fairly expensive. It is thus overly facile to suggest simply that states
provide free transportation for any and all interdistrict transfers. As it
stands, however, few state plans even address transportation issues; at the
very least, states should devote attention and some resources to enhancing
opportunities for choice by providing some transportation assistance."l
Finally, efforts should be made to include more districts in the plan, both as
sending and receiving districts. This is the most important and the most
difficult improvement that could be made, and there is no single strategy
guaranteed to succeed. Requiring all districts to participate is one
possibility, but it will not be politically plausible in some states, and it will
not always be effective if districts can exclude students simply by saying
that they lack space. A more promising approach, which we discuss in more
detail below, would be to create incentives for districts to open their schools
to incoming transfers.
Similar steps could be taken to replicate, expand, and strengthen
existing charter school programs, and advocates should look to existing
examples of "strong" charter laws for guidance as well as political
leverage.395 The precise steps necessary to increase opportunities for racial
and socioeconomic integration will depend on the demographics of the
district or region in which charter schools are contemplated. In districts that
are diverse racially and economically but marked by residential segregation,
simply expanding the number of charter schools would be a useful first
step. One way to do this would be to press states to allow not just districts
to approve charters but to provide the same authority to state agencies and
state-delegated entities such as universities. States that do not limit granting
authority to local districts have a larger number of charter schools, which is
not surprising given the incentives of local districts to quash charter
applications.396 Advocates should also seek more equitable funding of
charter schools to ensure that they have a fair chance of competing with
393. For descriptions of existing open enrollment plans, see REES, supra note 107.
394. For similar suggestions regarding information and transportation, see JOHN E. COONS &
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, MAKING SCHOOL CHOICE WORK FOR ALL FAMILIES 66-69,87 (1999).
395. For descriptions of existing charter programs, see supra Subsection I.B.3.
396. See id.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2120 [Vol. 111: 2043
School Choice
existing public schools and providing a good education. Again, advocates
can look to existing examples of states that fund charter schools at levels
comparable to traditional public schools. They can also encourage states to
take advantage of the funding made available by the federal government for
the creation and maintenance of charter schools.397
In states or regions where districts are segregated by race and income,
advocates should seek to increase the opportunities for students to cross
district boundaries to attend charter schools. To begin, advocates could
attempt to ensure that there are a decent number of charter schools that are
open to nonresident students. One way to do this, which several states have
already implemented,"' is to require that charter schools authorized by state
agencies be open to all students within the state on an equal basis.3'
Another method, also implemented by several states,4' would be to allow
several districts to cosponsor charter schools. Given existing politics, this
may not result in a large number of regional charter schools that span
urban-suburban boundaries, but it at least creates the option. Once options
for interdistrict charter schools exist, advocates should focus on the same
sorts of details that need attention in any interdistrict choice program. They
should ensure that parents are sufficiently informed of their options, and
they should work to ensure that some provision is made for transporting
students.
As for vouchers, finally, two types of programs currently exist: The
programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee provide vouchers to poor students in
urban districts, and the program in Florida provides vouchers to students in
persistently failing public schools."0 ' These existing programs offer
vouchers to relatively few students and provide those students little more
than the opportunity to attend a private school within the students'
residential district. Even these limited programs offer the few students
lucky enough to receive vouchers access to a better school. In urban
districts where a sufficient number of private schools have space available
and are willing to accept voucher students, even restricted voucher
programs can move some students from failing, racially and economically
397. Since 1994, the federal government has offered grants (totaling $600 million) to states to
support the creation of charter schools through the Public Charter Schools Program. Charter
Friends Nat'l Network, Update on Federal Charter School Legislation (Feb. 25, 2002), at
http://www.charterfriends.org/federal-legislation.html. In 2000, Congress approved an additional
$25 million for grants designed to help finance charter facilities. Id.; see also Improving
America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, sec. 101, pt. C, 108 Stat. 3518, 3824-30,
repealed by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, sec. 101 1(5)(A), 115 Stat.
1425, 1986.
398. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
399. Advocates might also try to encourage the federal government to give a preference in its
funding grants to open enrollment charter schools. See infra Subsection IIl.A.2.
400. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
401. See supra Subsection I.B.4.
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isolated schools into more academically productive and integrated
environments. Simply replicating such programs, therefore, would benefit
at least some students.0 2 And replicating these limited programs in other
states and cities certainly seems possible; it seems implausible that
vouchers are politically acceptable only in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and
Florida. °3
While programs modeled on those existing in Milwaukee, Cleveland,
and Florida would help some students, many more would be left unassisted.
The harder questions facing voucher advocates are whether the voucher
programs can increase in size and whether the opportunities available to
voucher students can be expanded. The crushing defeats of state-wide
voucher initiatives suggest that we should not expect to see a universal
voucher program any time soon, but the steady growth of vouchers in
Milwaukee simultaneously suggests that over time, voucher programs can
expand. ' Starting small may be necessary for political and financial
reasons, but as Milwaukee shows, programs need not remain small over
time. If voucher programs remain popular and show signs of success, the
402. As voucher opponents often point out, this will do little for those who remain behind in
failing public schools and indeed could make a bleak situation even worse as motivated students
and parents exit the system. See McUsic, supra note 77, at 127-28. But this is true of any
noncomprehensive choice or integration scheme, including those public school choice programs
often favored by opponents of vouchers, such as METCO, which-just like a limited voucher
program-allow a few students to escape failing urban schools. Critics of choice plans that are not
universal can always point to those left behind, and this is indeed a difficult and delicate question.
The real question, though, is a relative one, and it seems far from clear that the second-best
solution to a universal choice plan is a universal system of involuntary assignment based on
residence, especially when those with the means will always have the option of choosing their
place of residence (and thus their children's public school) or choosing a private school. Cf.
CHARLES L. GLENN ET AL., PARENT INFORMATION FOR SCHOOL CHOICE: THE CASE OF
MASSACHUSETTS 18 (1993) ("An inevitable cost of freedom is to experience any remaining
constraint as galling. So long as children are simply assigned to schools involuntarily on the basis
of where they live, of course, the issue of disappointment does not arise .... "). Another
alternative, which has been proposed by some commentators, is mandatory socioeconomic
integration within and across district lines. See McUsic, supra note 77, at 131-34. If successful,
this might be the most productive policy, but this alternative seems politically implausible, for the
reasons we discuss in detail in Part I.
403. Just as those interested in replicating controlled choice programs would do well to study
the political dynamics that led to the creation of such programs, those interested in voucher
programs would do well to study the dynamics in Cleveland (and the Ohio legislature),
Milwaukee (and the Wisconsin legislature), and the Florida legislature. For an overview of the
political dynamics of vouchers, as well as discussion of the political alliance that led to the
Milwaukee voucher program, see Bulman & Kirp, supra note 189, at 47-52. See also HUBERT
MORKEN & Jo RENIE FORMICOLA, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE (1999) (containing a
somewhat disjointed discussion of the players involved and strategies employed in school choice
initiatives, including those in Cleveland and Milwaukee). In addition, the dynamics that gave rise
to the growing popularity of privately funded voucher programs cast additional-if indirect-light
upon the relevant political dynamics. For a general discussion, see PRIVATE VOUCHERS, supra
note 259.
404. For a discussion of the state initiatives, see supra Subsection I.B.4. For a description of
Milwaukee's voucher plan, see MOE, supra note 4, at 37-38.
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number of vouchers available obviously should increase, although it is
impossible to predict just how much growth we can expect.
As for expanding the catalogue of schools at which vouchers can be
used, one obvious strategy would be to remove geographical restrictions
and allow vouchers to be used at any public or private school. Expanding
voucher programs to include all private schools seems a realistic prospect,
given that private schools are uniformly afforded the option as to whether
they wish to participate at all in accepting voucher students.4"5 Expanding
choice to include out-of-district public schools is trickier and raises the
same political questions facing those who wish to expand interdistrict
public school choice programs. The same options for expansion, as well as
the accompanying obstacles, exist here. All schools might be required to
accept voucher students, a plausible possibility in light of existing
interdistrict choice programs that require all districts to accept transfer
students. But such a requirement would be politically impossible in some
states and might prove ineffective if schools can thwart potential transfers
by claiming to have no space available. An alternative would be to
encourage suburban schools to agree to accept a limited number of voucher
students, along the lines of programs like METCO in Boston and Project
Concern in Hartford. A third option would be to create incentives for
suburban schools to accept voucher students, a topic to which we turn
momentarily.
For now, it is worth pausing to acknowledge that none of the strategies
identified will, on its own, significantly expand school choice. Each step
suggested is a relatively small one. Although small steps taken together
might actually open up choice to a fairly large number of students, the
political constraints we have identified will still work to limit choice
programs. As a consequence, questions of fairness regarding those "left
behind" will continue to hang over efforts to expand choice. For example,
it is questionable whether expanding choice in the ways we suggest would
generate sufficient competition among schools that we could be confident
that those who cannot or do not choose a school nonetheless benefit from
the existence of choice. In addition, it is worth considering the possibility
that attention and resources devoted to school choice will divert attention
and resources that otherwise would have been directed at the entire
population of students in failing school systems. At this point we can only
identify these issues; we cannot offer a way to resolve them, in part because
405. At the same time, it must be noted that both the Cleveland and Milwaukee programs
limit the use of vouchers to private schools located within their respective school districts. It is
unclear what explains this limitation. If it is political opposition, which we simply have not been
able to document, then even allowing all private schools to participate may be more controversial
than we envision. If the limitations stem instead from practical considerations, such as the
difficulty of providing transportation, including private schools may be politically feasible but
ensuring access to distant schools may not be.
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it is simply too difficult to predict all of the medium- and long-term
consequences of choice for existing public schools. Given the sorry state of
many urban school systems and the dim prospects (not to mention glacial
pace) of system-wide reform, we think that offering immediate help to even
a portion of students in failing schools warrants taking some risks. It is
obvious that others may reasonably view the potential costs and benefits
differently, but we remain convinced that it is worth thinking of ways to
provide meaningful choice to as many students in failing school systems as
is politically possible.
2. Creating Incentives for Expanding Choice
In addition to replicating existing programs, advocates for expanding
choice might consider employing various incentives to make choice more
attractive to more potential participants. Incentives could be targeted in at
least one of three ways: (1) to make good schools or school systems more
willing to accept transfer students; (2) to encourage middle-class children to
attend urban schools; and (3) to encourage the creation of charter or private
schools that accept students without regard to place of residence. Imagining
possible incentives is not difficult. In fact, as we discuss below,
commentators have already proposed a number of potential incentives, and
some choice plans already rely on incentives to encourage the exercise or
acceptance of choice. The hard part is thinking of effective incentives that
are politically feasible.
Begin with incentives to encourage good schools or school systems to
accept voucher students. A number of liberal proponents of school choice
have suggested giving poor students a voucher, for use at public or private
schools, valuable enough to make the recipients financially attractive to
schools.4"6 It is certainly plausible that if a voucher is worth a lot of money,
good public and private schools would be willing-perhaps even eager if
the voucher is really valuable-to accept voucher students. But there is an
obvious dilemma here that is often ignored by commentators who advocate
406. Proposals of this sort have been around for quite some time, having been offered in the
late 1960s and early 1970s by the likes of Christopher Jencks, Theodore Sizer, and Henry Levin-
all left-leaning proponents of school choice, at least at the time. See Judith Areen & Christopher
Jencks, Education Vouchers: A Proposal for Diversity and Choice, in EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS
49, 53-54 (George R. La Nouc ed., 1972); Christopher Jencks, Is the Public School Obsolete?,
PUB. INT., Winter 1966, at 18; Henry M. Levin, The Failure of the Public Schools and the Free
Market Remedy, 2 URB. REv. 32, 35-36 (1968); Theodore R. Sizer, The Case for a Free Market,
SATURDAY REV., Jan. 11, 1969, at 34. Contemporary commentators have proposed similar
incentives. See, e.g., COOKSON, supra note 3, at 131-37 (describing an ambitious proposal that
would entail giving all children shares in an educational trust fund in reverse proportion to their
families' income-i.e., the poorer the family, the greater the value of the share).
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this approach:. 7 It will be very difficult politically to make vouchers worth
enough to make voucher students politically and financially acceptable to
good schools.
Consider a suburban public school whose per-pupil expenditure is at or
above the statewide average. Now imagine that the voucher is to be used by
a poor student from an urban district. For the strictly self-interested
suburban district, the voucher amount not only will have to ensure that the
district does not lose money, but also will have to ensure that the district is
compensated for the extra costs associated with educating poorer
students."8 This would mean that the state would have to fund a voucher
that is worth more than the amount spent per pupil within the district.
Exactly how much more is anyone's guess, but even if the compensation
amount is relatively small, a voucher worth about the average expenditure
per pupil in suburban districts would still require a fairly large increase in
state funding that was devoted initially to poor students and ultimately to
suburban districts or private schools. It is hard to imagine the political
forces that could combine to achieve this result. Suburban districts are not
typically desperate for money and are generally wary of accepting transfer
students, so it is hard to imagine them taking the lead on this issue. Urban
districts, in turn, would likely lose money under this scheme and therefore
should not be expected to champion it.
This is not to say that providing additional compensation to schools that
accept poorer students, either through a voucher program or through a
public interdistrict program, is impossible or futile. Some form of bonus
payment could be used to help motivate schools to accept students. That
money could come from state governments and perhaps also from the
federal government, which already provides funding ostensibly for poor
students in the form of Title I grants.4°9 Our point is simply that it is
407. For a proposal that, despite its normative appeal, is especially fanciful, see COOKSON,
supra note 3, at 131-37. Cookson proposes not only that poorer students receive more money for
education than wealthier students, but that this system be funded by equalizing school finance
schemes and requiring the federal government to contribute fifteen percent of the necessary funds
(which would represent nearly a doubling of current federal expenditures on education). Id.
408. Many of those poorer students will also be racial minorities. To the extent that racism
affects the calculus of suburban school officials and suburban parents, the compensation payment
either will have to be even higher or may simply be unable to overcome resistance. We are not
suggesting, of course, that race will play a role in every case in every suburb, but it would blink
reality to suggest that race will never be an issue.
409. More than half of the states have some type of "compensatory" program that is
designed to channel additional funds to poor students or poor districts, but wealthier students on
average still receive more funding (through state and local sources) than do poorer students. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE AND FEDERAL EFFORTS To TARGET
POOR STUDENTS 6-7 (1998). Title I is supposed to devote resources to poor students and schools
with concentrated poverty, although the funding is much more widely dispersed than this initial
purpose would suggest. See 20 U.S.C, §§ 6301-6514 (1994); see also KAI-LENBERG, supra note
23, at 160 (noting that "Title I appears to survive largely because its preferential philosophy has
in practice been undercut, so that 90 percent of districts actually benefit" ). One way to use this
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unrealistic to think that a bonus payment scheme alone would be
dispositive. Additional money might help, but it would be difficult to raise
for large numbers of students, and it likely will not be enough to erase the
reluctance of good school systems to open their doors to poorer students.
Proof of this point exists in Milwaukee and St. Louis: Generous payments
have failed to induce suburban districts in Milwaukee to open their schools
to more than a relative handful of city students, while similarly generous
funding failed to prevent the dismantling of the interdistrict program in St.
Louis.41°
Another way to encourage movement between suburban and urban
districts is to encourage middle-class suburban students to attend urban
schools. The traditional incentive used to prod such movement is the
creation of magnet schools in urban districts that are open to suburban and
urban students alike. Magnet schools have been able to attract some
suburban students into urban school systems, and they offer urban students
the opportunity for a more socioeconomically integrated environment, as
well as a more academically challenging one. But the number of suburban
students who choose urban magnet schools is usually relatively small, and
the number of urban students who can attend them is also quite small.4 1'
Although fairly popular, interdistrict magnet schools often provoke some
controversy because they entail the redistribution of resources away from
urban students to suburban ones. As a result, while we would encourage the
creation of additional magnet schools, one has to acknowledge that magnet
schools likely will never be more than one small way to expand school
choice.412
In addition to interdistrict magnet schools, some commentators suggest
that intradistrict choice plans might encourage middle-class parents to
remain in or move to cities, which would increase socioeconomic
integration in urban schools by increasing the supply of middle-class
students.413 It is certainly conceivable that robust intradistrict choice plans
in urban districts could act as an incentive to encourage potential
funding as a form of compensatory payment would be to allow Title I money to follow poor
students to whatever school they attend, which is not currently permitted under the law. See
Chester E. Finn, Jr., Fixing Schools Without a Voucher Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A13.
The political difficulty, of course, is that this change would probably require reducing the number
of schools that receive Title I funds to ensure that the money is devoted only to poor students.
410. For a discussion of the Milwaukee interdistrict program, see STATE OF WIS.
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 247, at 21-23. For a discussion of the St. Louis plan,
see WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 130.
411. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 23, at 129-30 (citing statistics).
412. Cf JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
AND SCtlOOL DESEGREGATION 72 (1984) (suggesting that "[miagnets are betler characterized as
a drop in a bucket than a cure for what ails us").
413. See, e.g., Thomas Nechbya & Michael Heise, School Finance Reform: Introducing the
Choice Factor, in CITY SCHOOLS: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK 367, 376-81 (Diane Ravitch &
Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2000).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2126 [Vol. I 11: 2043
School Choice
suburbanites to reside in cities. Those parents, however, would have to be
reasonably assured that their children could choose a good school. For this
to happen, private schools would likely have to be included in the mix, as
most urban districts are not going to have a sufficient supply of good public
schools to guarantee to the parents inclined to move to the suburbs that their
children will be able to choose a high-quality school if they remain in a
city. For the same reason, vouchers would have to be available to every
student in the district and not limited to poor students or those attending
persistently failing schools. At the moment, the prospects of providing
every student in an urban district a voucher seem quite dim, as the
experience in both Milwaukee and Cleveland indicates.414 Thus, while a
robust intradistrict choice plan could be an effective incentive for attracting
middle-class parents into poorer, urban districts, a robust plan at the
moment seems unrealistic for most districts. Although more limited choice
plans-for example, plans that involve only public and charter schools-
might lead some middle-class parents to remain in urban school systems, it
seems unrealistic to expect them to have a significant impact.
A final target for incentives is charter or private schools that would
accept students without regard to residence. One way to encourage the
creation of charter schools that do not have geographical limitations on
admissions is to provide more money to such schools, and specifically to
provide additional money for transportation. The federal government,
which already provides money to states for the creation and maintenance of
charter schools,415 could play an important role here. That is, it might be
politically feasible to channel additional federal resources to charter schools
that draw students from more than one neighborhood or district, which
might encourage the creation of such schools in the first place and might
help new and existing schools cover transportation costs.
As for private schools, commentators have offered a number of ideas as
to how private schools might be encouraged to admit an economically,
geographically, or racially diverse group of students. Most proposals either
would give poorer students additional funding, which we have already
discussed, or would require private schools that accept voucher students to
hold open a number of seats for poorer students. Private schools, for
example, might be allowed to charge whatever they like for tuition, but if
they accept voucher students, they would have to accept a certain
percentage of students who could not pay any tuition beyond the voucher
amount.416 The latter proposals are intriguing and would probably work if
414. See supru Subsection I.B.4.
415. See supra note 397.
416. For an especially thoughtful proposal along these lines, see COONS & SUGARMAN,
supra note 394, at 78-79. Coons and Sugarman, once the leading academic proponents of school
finance equalization, see JOHN E. COONS FT AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
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vouchers were universally available. If vouchers are not universally
available, however, and are given only to poor kids, there can be no tit-for-
tat, where private schools get to accept some voucher students and charge
them additional tuition in exchange for accepting some poor kids. Where a
limited number of vouchers are given only to poor students and the voucher
amount is fairly modest, the question facing private schools will simply be
whether they wish to accept some poor students who have a modest
voucher to spend. Some religious and secular schools that do not charge
much tuition will do so, as they already have, but many private schools will
likely decline to participate.
In sum, existing choice programs can be replicated and strengthened,
and incentives can be used to encourage the expansion of school choice.
Taken together, all of these efforts might add up to fairly substantial
increases in the availability and scope of school choice. But until suburban
parents come to see school choice as a potential benefit rather than a threat,
increasing school choice in meaningful ways will remain difficult. There
will be less overall support for choice, as many suburbanites will continue
to believe that it is unnecessary and potentially threatening to their schools
and residential property values, and there will be resistance to opening up
the suburbs for those seeking to exercise choice. The final issue to discuss,
then, is whether there is any hope that the politics we have described might
change such that suburbanites become more supportive of choice.
B. Working To Alter the Politics of Choice
There are at least two related ways that the politics of school choice
might be altered. One method would be to encourage the formation of
larger, more organized, and more unified coalitions in support of school
choice. The school choice "movement" at present is quite fragmented and
unorganized.4"7 The groups and advocates involved tend to push for certain
types of school choice and to resist or refuse to support other types. The
most important divide is between public and private school choice
programs.' Some groups, like the NAACP and teachers' unions, support
(1970), have since become champions of targeted voucher programs designed to help
disadvantaged students. See, e.g., COONS & SUGARMAN, supra note 23.
417. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 207 ("To the extent the movement for choice can
be called a movement at all, it is an extremely fragmented and conceptually shallow one. It lacks
mission."); MORKEN & FORMICOLA, supra note 403, at 286 (" [T]here is no unity among the
existing educational reform groups as to what the best kind of school choice is. The result is that
there is a fragmentation among the organizations as to what is the most practical type of school
choice to support financially or politically.").
418. See, e.g., HENIG, supra note 22, at 215 (" Some advocates of public school choice invest
the line separating public and private schools with almost mystical significance. Crossing that line
is taboo, because once it is crossed, it will be impossible to stem the flow of vital life forces from
the public sector."); see also CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 219-26 (proposing a school choice
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public school choice but adamantly oppose private school choice.419 Other
groups, such as the Institute for Justice, appear most interested in private
school choice, while providing some support for charter schools.420
In theory, if the various groups that support school choice could form a
unified coalition in favor of choice, the chance of expanding school choice
programs would improve. One could imagine, again in theory, the NAACP
and the Institute for Justice agreeing to support both public and private
school choice, provided that both types of choice offer substantial
opportunities for poorer students to attend predominantly middle-class
schools. If an ideologically broad but unified coalition were to form, this
might not only increase interest-group pressure for choice; it might also
help galvanize public support for choice. Together, this could motivate state
legislatures to act. If school choice interest groups remain fragmented, by
contrast, it seems unlikely that legislatures will be motivated to adopt any
school choice plan that is likely to upset suburban voters.
It is unclear, of course, if even a unified coalition in favor of school
choice would be successful in moving legislatures to adopt choice programs
that interfere with the current prerogatives of suburban schools. Perhaps an
even larger obstacle, however, inheres in the groups themselves. Put
bluntly, it does not seem likely that these groups would be willing to work
together and to compromise their positions in order to present a unified
front. Although both the NAACP and the Institute for Justice, for example,
represent minority parents and students, it seems close to fanciful to suggest
that they might work together to support a mutually acceptable choice plan.
Given the different philosophies of these groups, the possibility of their
putting aside their differences in order to work together for school choice
seems remote. What is true for the NAACP and the Institute for Justice
seems true for other groups as well. It is hard to imagine, for example,
teachers' unions agreeing to work together with groups that support private
school choice.
If altering the politics of choice through the creation of new coalitions
seems unlikely, perhaps the preferences of suburbanites themselves could
be altered. That is, perhaps it is possible to convince some suburban parents
that school choice, both public and private, is something from which they
could benefit, which in turn would increase support for more expansive
school choice plans. This is obviously not a small task, nor is it one that can
be accomplished overnight. But there currently exists an intriguing
plan that would give parents a voucher for tuition and would convert all public schools into tuition
schools).
419. See supra Section I.C.
420. See Inst. for Justice, Legal Cases, at http://www.institutefo justice.org/caseslndex.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (describing cases in which the Institute for Justice is involved).
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opportunity to make progress along this front. That opportunity can be
found in state and federally funded preschool programs.
The provision and organization of preschool education differs
dramatically from the provision and organization of elementary and
secondary education. The majority of preschools4"' are privately run, and
many parents pay tuition on their own for preschools. 2' A substantial and
growing minority of children, however, participate in state or federally
funded programs. The oldest and most well known of these is the federal
Head Start program, which provides funds to local agencies to support
preschools for children living in poverty. As of 1998, there were 822,000
children in Head Start schools.423 In addition, the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act supports preschool programs for children with
disabilities, and in 1998 served 572,000 children.' 24 Title 1, finally, also
provides federal funds for high-poverty school districts, which can be used
to support preschool programs. As of 1996-1997, there were over 260,000
students in Title I prekindergarten programs.2 5
At the state level, government-funded programs now exist in forty-one
states and the District of Columbia.426 Most of this growth has occurred in
the last twenty years, and the growth continues to accelerate. In 1991-1992,
for example, 290,000 children participated in state prekindergarten
programs. 27 As of 1998-1999, that figure had more than doubled, to
725,000.428 Despite this explosive growth, there is still plenty of room for
more, as the majority of children are not currently enrolled in government-
funded preschools. Most states, for example, either limit their programs
explicitly or give a preference to a targeted population-usually children
living in poverty or at risk because of family circumstances. In 1995,
Georgia became the first state to offer universal access to preschool for all
42 1. Although some commentators assiduously use either the term "preschool" or the term
"prekindergarten program," implying that there is a significant difference between the two, we
use the terms interchangeably to refer to any program that provides some instruction and thus
differs from traditional day-care programs.
422. See EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 21 (OECD Country Note, July 2000).
423. KAREN SCHULMAN ET AL., CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, SEEDS OF SUCCESS: STATE
PREKINDERGARTEN INITIATIVES, 1998-1999, at 8 (1999).
424. See id.
425. Id.
426. The states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin, plus the District of Columbia. Id. at 13.
427. Id. at 4.
428. Id.
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four-year-olds in the state, and in 1997, New York adopted a similar plan
that is scheduled to go into effect in 2002.430 Universal access, however,
remains the rare exception. Moreover, even targeted programs are not
reaching all poor children: As of 1996, only thirty-six percent of children
between the age of three and five whose families earned less than $15,000
annually were in preschool programs. 3'
The structure and details of federal and state programs vary quite a bit
from state to state and from community to community, making it difficult to
describe a "typical" prekindergarten program. What most programs have in
common, however, is that funding is provided to both public and private
preschools. The federal Head Start program, for example, provides money
to both public schools and private agencies,432 and indeed, most Head Start
programs are operated by private agencies, including church-based
preschool programs.433 Most state programs also provide money to both
public and private schools. Of the forty-two states that sponsor programs,
only seven limit funding to public schools, and six of the seven programs
are relatively older ones, begun before 1 9 8 5 .4 The other thirty-five states
fund both public and private programs. Hawaii actually has a preschool
voucher program, which provides certificates to poor families that can be
used to enroll their children in any licensed public or private preschool
program. 35
That funding is provided to public and private agencies does not
necessarily mean that parents have a choice among programs. Some
programs, like Head Start, do not offer much choice to parents: Those
living in the community where the program operates are eligible to attend
only the local program.436 Other programs offer a limited range of choices.
In Georgia, for example, families can choose between public and private
programs, but children residing in the attendance zone or district where the
preschool program is located may be given first preference. 7 Finally, some
429. RACHEL SCHUMACHER ET AL., STATE INITIATIVES To PROMOTE EARLY LEARNING 55
(2001).
430. Linda Jacobson, Plans for "'Universal" Preschool Gain Ground in New York State,
EDUC. WK., Oct. 25, 2000, at 1.
431. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 423, at 5.
432. 42 U.S.C. § 9836 (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 1302.2 (2001).
433. See SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 423, at 7.
434. The programs are in the District of Columbia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, New York,
Wisconsin, and West Virginia. Anne Mitchell, Prekindergarten Programs in the States: Trends and
Issues 2 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
435. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 423, at 44.
436. This is suggested in the federal statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 9840 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
(listing eligibility criteria), and it was confirmed by an expert, Anne Mitchell. E-mail from Anne
Mitchell to James E. Ryan, Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law (Sept. 27,
2001) (on file with authors).
437. Office of School Readiness guidelines indicate that a provider may, but is not required
to, give enrollment priority to students living in local school attendance zones or school districts.
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programs, such as Hawaii's, do not seem to place any geographic
restrictions on choice.438 Even where choice is not restricted, however,
transportation is not typically provided, and the lack of public or
government-funded transportation can effectively restrict choice to local
programs for some parents.
Our message to those seeking to expand school choice is simple:
Support and try to shape efforts to expand access to government-funded
preschools. Expanding access to government-funded preschools is an
increasingly popular cause, supported by Democrats and Republicans
alike.439 Part of the support stems from research that demonstrates both
short- and long-term benefits from preschool, 4"0 and part stems from the
recognition that welfare reform, which pushes parents back into the
workforce, requires some attention to child care." Whatever the precise
motivation for support, however, it is clear that government funding and
popular support for preschool education are growing. Between 1991 and
2000, for example, state spending on preschool programs increased by over
$1 billion-from $700 million442 to nearly $2 billion."' 3
In addition to supporting efforts to expand access to preschools,
advocates of school choice should seek to ensure that choice remains a
component of government-funded programs. The fact that most programs
fund public and private preschools makes this a completely plausible goal.
Indeed, perhaps the key point to recognize here is that government-funded
preschools operate on a different basis than do most public elementary and
secondary schools. The default rule for preschools is generally not the
neighborhood public school. The status quo, therefore, is not as much of an
obstacle in this context as it is in the context of school choice at the
elementary and secondary level. Even teachers' unions, which strongly
See Ga. Office of Sch. Readiness, 2001-2002 Pre-K Program Guidelines § 3.3,
http:/Iwww.osr.state.ga.usFY1Guide2OO2.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
438. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 423, at 44.
439. A 1989 bipartisan education summit initiated by the first President Bush, for example,
recommended universal access to prekindergarten by the year 2000. Id. at 1.
440. Some studies have indicated that children who participate in early childhood education
programs are less likely to be held back or placed in special education programs later in their
academic careers. EDWARD ZIGLER & SUSAN MUENCHOW, HEAD START: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMERICA'S MOST SUCCESSFUL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT 204 (1992). Other studies indicate
that participation in early childhood education is associated with increased employment and
postsecondary education. LAWRENCE J. SCHWEINHART ET AL., SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS: THE
HIGH/SCOPE PERRY PRESCHOOL STUDY THROUGH AGE 27 (1992); see also LYNN A. KAROLY Elr
AL., INVESTING IN OUR CHILDREN: WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS (1998).
441. EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15 (OECD Country Note, July 2000) ("Most welfare recipients are single mothers who
cannot work without child care."); see also Jacqueline L. Salmon, For Many Children, Nowhere
To Go, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at Al (describing a nationwide "childcare crunch").
442. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 423, at 4.
443. Mitchell, supra note 434, at 5.
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support the drive for increased access to preschool, are not insisting that
funding go only to public programs.' If state and federal governments
continue to fund both public and private programs, as seems likely, one
prominent reason to oppose choice-to keep money out of the hands of
private schools-disappears.
The theory behind our suggested strategy is that experience may change
perceptions. To the extent that parents experience school choice for their
preschool-aged children, and to the extent that they appreciate having that
choice, it seems reasonable to expect that some would continue to support
choice programs that involve elementary and secondary schools. Working
families in particular may find that being able to choose schools that are
closer to their places of employment is preferable to the current system,
which assigns most students to schools that are close to their homes.
Suburban parents in general may discover that the ability to choose from a
more diverse array of educational settings is valuable and worthy of
support.
For this to work, access to government-funded preschools must expand
to include parents who are currently not receiving assistance, including
suburban, middle-class parents. This could happen by making preschool
universally available at the government's expense, as it is in Georgia, or by
instituting a sliding-scale benefits program, where the amount provided for
tuition would depend on the parents' income level." It could also happen
by simply allowing government-funded students to attend preschools with
children whose parents pay full tuition, which does not typically happen
under current programs. Whatever the method, the keys are to increase
parental involvement in government-funded school choice programs at the
preschool level, maintain participation by public and private preschool
providers, and make efforts to inform those parents that school choice exists
at this level.
One especially promising strategy would be to encourage the creation
of more worksite preschools. Numerous news reports suggest that there is
great demand among parents for on-site day-care centers and preschools,
and that some employers are beginning to respond to that demand." 6 A
persistent problem, of course, is cost, which some employers and
444. Sandra Feldman, Remarks to the AFT QuEST Conference (luly 12, 2001), at
http:f/www.aft.org/press/2001/questOl-speech.html. In her remarks, the president of the American
Federation of Teachers endorsed universal early childhood education initiatives and pointed to the
Head Start model as a prototype. Id.
445. The latter program was suggested by Feldman in her report. See id.
446. See, e.g., Gretchen Marquardt, Kids and Company: Abbott Offers Employees On-Site
Child Care Facility, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 7, 2001, Neighbors, at 1; M.B. Taboada,
Businesses See Benefits of On-Site Child-Care Centers, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Sept. 24, 2001,
at BI; Kindercare @ Work To Provide Onsite Childcare for Employees at Saturn, PR NEWSWIRE,
June 20,2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File.
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employees are unwilling or unable to bear.447 Government funding might
help solve this problem and foster the creation of more worksite preschools.
Such schools, it bears noting, would likely be fairly integrated by race and
income, given that workplaces are generally more racially, ethnically, and
socioeconomically diverse than are neighborhoods." 8 If parents have a
good experience with on-site preschools, moreover, it seems at least
plausible that they might favor on-site elementary schools, which could be
created as charter schools.4 9
There are, to be sure, a number of obstacles to increasing access to and
choice among preschools. These include cost in general, transportation
costs in particular, and ensuring that full-day programs are available for
families with two parents who work full-time. None of these obstacles,
however, seems insuperable, and programs across the country have
addressed them. Indeed, the fact that Georgia has implemented a program
that provides universal access to preschool suggests that doing so is
politically feasible. That Hawaii has instituted what amounts to a preschool
voucher program is further evidence of the possibilities that exist in this
context. In short, although there will be hurdles to overcome, and although
costs and other logistics may place constraints on programs, there is a great
deal of room for creative thinking and innovative programs in this context,
which could simultaneously assist young children and boost the cause for
expanding school choice at the elementary and secondary school level.
Finally, in addition to the obstacles facing efforts to expand access to
preschool, it is obviously possible that the experience of choice among
preschools may not be enough to alter every or even most parents'
perceptions of the costs and benefits of choice at the elementary and
secondary level.4"' At the same time, however, it seems plausible that some
would change their perception, and it also appears from most studies that
447. See Tiffini Theisen, Day Care on the Job; It's a Perk That Remains Elusive for Most
Parents Who Work, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 18, 2001, at G1.
448. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law,
89 GEO. L. 1, 17-19 (2000) ("For most working adults, the workplace is where they are most
likely to have genuine interaction across racial lines; in particular, it is the most frequent source of
contact between black and white citizens."); see also Andrea Schoellkopf, On-Site Child Care
Comforts School Employees, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 11, 2001, at 4 (describing a preschool
program at an elementary school that serves both poor students eligible for federal assistance and
the children of teachers, which was created to satisfy teacher demand and to establish "a
heterogeneous group" of preschoolers).
449. See Michael Utley, A Day-Caring Environment: Some Larger Companies, Concerned
with Retaining Good Employees, Offer On-Site Day Care for Employees' Children, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE, Oct. 1, 2000, at Hi (describing one on-site center that serves kids up to six years
old).
450. The existence of government-funded choice at the college and university level, for
instance, which occurs through federal Pell grants and state grants, apparently has done little to
increase support for such choice at the elementary and secondary level. Our intuition is that
parents would see more of a connection between preschool choice and choice among elementary
(and later) secondary schools, but there is obviously no guarantee of this.
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increasing access to preschool is a worthy goal in itself, separate and apart
from its impact on subsequent school choice policies.45 1 The potential
benefits, both direct and indirect, of increasing access to preschools thus
seem worth the costs. Indeed, given the current intransigence that
characterizes school choice politics, efforts to alter preferences and
perceptions, even if they take a while to come to fruition, seem uniquely
worthwhile.452
CONCLUSION
We end on a note of very cautious optimism. The political economy of
school choice, which we have tried to explicate, suggests that the biggest
obstacle to expanding choice in meaningful ways stems from suburban
opposition to any changes to the status quo that might upset the suburbs'
advantaged position. This opposition has been a constant in the area of
school reform, and it has worked to shape reforms in ways that leave the
financial and physical independence of suburban schools intact. Existing
school choice programs conform to this historical pattern, as most leave
suburban schools untouched: Those schools typically need not accept
transfer students involuntarily, nor must their students participate in choice
programs. If this pattern remains unaltered, we should not expect school
choice to reach its theoretical potential in terms of racial or socioeconomic
integration, academic achievement, or beneficial competition among public
schools.
We hope that this Article constitutes, at the very least, a first step
toward altering that pattern. Before obstacles can be overcome, they must
be identified. Although it seems obvious to us that suburbanites constitute
the largest obstacle to increasing opportunities for choice, their role in
school choice has remained until now largely unexplored. This might seem
mysterious at first, and readers may be wondering, as we did, why this point
has remained somewhat obscure in choice debates. It becomes clear once
the politics of choice are better understood. Neither side in the choice
debate has much of an incentive to emphasize suburban opposition to
school choice. Those in favor of school choice, especially private school
choice, surely gain nothing by highlighting suburban opposition. It is much
better for their cause if they can portray choice as universally popular and
451. See sources cited supra note 440.
452. It is also possible that even if a substantial number of parents alter their stance toward
choice, they will be outweighed by local residents without children, who might perceive any
choice plan as a potential threat to their home values. At the very least, we would expect new
coalitions to form among groups of suburbanites, with some parents, especially working parents,
on one side of the choice debate, and property owners without children together with families with
a stay-at-home parent (for whom a neighborhood school is the most convenient) on the other.
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single out culprits like teachers' unions as the reason why such a popular
cause is often stymied. Conversely, those who oppose school choice often
argue that limited programs, such as the ones that exist in Cleveland and
Milwaukee, are the proverbial camel's nose under the tent. Allow limited
choice programs, the argument goes, and the next thing you know, vouchers
will be given mostly to white middle-class parents looking to flee public
schools. It does not help this argument, of course, to point out that the odds
of expanding choice are at the moment quite slim, given suburban support
for local public schools and opposition to broad school choice plans.
Identifying suburban opposition may indeed be the first step toward
overcoming it, but past experience and the emerging pattern among school
choice programs should give pause to anyone attempting to do so. To be
sure, there are ways to take small steps toward expanding school choice, as
we have described. Existing programs may be strengthened and replicated
elsewhere, and incentives can be used to ease the path toward expansion.
Taken together, these steps could add up to significant expansions in some
states and communities. Over the long term, however, change seems to
await an alteration of suburban perceptions and preferences. And this,
finally, is where preschools may help. To the extent that government-
funded preschool programs can become an attractive alternative model for
how education is provided, and to the extent that parents support this
alternative, the cause of expanding school choice will be advanced. There is
no guarantee, of course, that perceptions and preferences will change, but
providing parents with the experience of school choice at the very
beginning of their children's education seems more promising than any
alternative we have seen or considered.
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